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ASSESSING FREEWAY DECONSTRUCTION: A SURVEY OF 21 CITIES WITH 
CASE STUDIES OF SAN FRANCISCO AND MILWAUKEE 
 
Doddy Aditya Iskandar 




This study evaluates the effect of urban freeway deconstruction on t he local economy. 
Scholars for years debated the role of urban freeway on the local economy. Those who 
found a positive effect of urban freeway use national data to support their finding. 
However, other scholars found the effect of urban freeway on the local economy mixed. 
Four major questions are raised in this study: What are the key factors of the city that 
affect the decision to remove urban freeways? What are the similarities and differences 
between cities that choose to remove their urban freeways?  Does freeway deconstruction 
bring about the intended results, as measured through property values? If not, what are 
the causes? What type of institutional arrangement and political support ensures the 
initiative for freeway deconstruction can be implemented? 
Twenty-three cases of urban freeway deconstruction in twenty-one U.S. cities are used as 
the unit of analysis. I develop seven causal conditions from two distinct characteristics of 
the city: a p ost-industrial city and a declining, transitional industrial city. Qualitative 




of causal conditions that lead to the decision to remove urban freeways. I use case studies 
of urban freeway deconstruction in San Francisco and Milwaukee to illuminate the 
economic effect of the project on t he local economy and identify actors, motives, and 
rationales behind the decision to remove urban freeway. A hedonic price model is used to 
test the economic impact of urban freeway deconstruction on t he local economy. A 
descriptive comparative analysis is employed to reveal actors, their role in the decision-
making process, and coalition building that affect the decision to remove urban freeways.   
I found out that urban freeway deconstruction did not always bring a positive economic 
impact on t he local economy, measured by the increased property value. Only a post-
industrial city experienced this positive economic impact while a declining, transitional 
industrial city did not. Further, the local growth coalition in a post-industrial city is 
characterized by broad support from various actors, while in a declining, transitional 
industrial city, it w as the local political elites who drives the process. This in turn 
significantly affects the economic outcome of the process.  
In conclusion, I present recommendation for future research, and implications for place-
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This chapter serves as an introduction to this study. It outlines the overall picture of the 
research study, including the research topics, questions and objectives, followed by 




Freeways are important to local and regional economies as they stimulate inter- and intra-
regional commerce by connecting one region to another. Numerous studies have 
evaluated the impact of freeways on local economies; however, the results are mixed 
(Karnes, 2009; Boarnet & Chalermnpong, 2000; Boarnet, 1995). Not only are the 
findings concerning the effects of freeways on the local economy inconclusive, but 
scholars also point to the unintended impacts that the urban social fabric was disrupted 
and racial composition changed drastically.  
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Baum-Snow (2007:800) in his study found that had freeways not been built, central city 
population would have grown 8 pe rcent between 1950 and 1990. Boarnet (1998) even 
argues that although he agrees that, at a national level freeways contribute to economic 
growth, at a local level they encourage firms to move from one location to another 
location closer to newly constructed freeways.  
 
Building freeways reinforces asymmetrical relations between a city and its surrounding 
regions. Scholars have argued that freeway construction has decentralized jobs (Glaeser 
& Kahn, 2001) and this brings a significant impact to the city. City population declines 
over time partially because of freeway construction and this erodes the local tax base. 
While demographic decentralization is something that the city cannot avoid, this creates 
fiscal problems for the city. Because of excessive freeway construction cities face 
considerable problems. Economic growth is always associated with the need for more 
land for development. Yet, land available for development becomes increasingly scarce. 
Thus local government faces a big question: How do they obtain enough space for future 
development? 
 
Freeway removal provides an opportunity for cities to redeem not only ample spaces for 
future development but also to create positive impressions on local communities. Tearing 
down freeways is something akin to reversing the urban renewal rationale, implemented a 
half century ago. Just like any other development policy, freeway deconstruction brings 
resistance, but it a lso might garner some support from various groups. Against this 
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background, building and tearing down freeways can be interpreted as an example of 
developmental policy that sparked a heated debate among interest groups and requires a 
thorough assessment concerning the impacts on local economies and urban social 
structure.  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, freeway construction sparked debate and oppositions from 
many American communities, especially among the urban poor and minority groups. 
Two decades later, debates still linger, although this time it is  about freeway removal. 
Objections and support for tearing down freeways came from various groups and 
institutions. Freeway opponents cited the fact that after the 1970s freeways did not create 
value added to the city. Moreover, empirical evidence pointed to the fact that traffic jams 
still occurred even though cities kept adding new freeways to their road networks. Urban 
scholars also criticized freeways as they create racial tension, not only between the 
central city and surrounding suburbs but also within the central city itself. Those in favor 
of building freeways argued that removing freeways will create traffic jams, local 
businesses will lose customers and city may lose the ability to attract firms and 
businesses.  
 
Despite these contradictory arguments, the number of U.S. cities removing freeways from 
their road networks is increasing. In European and Asian countries, some cities also 
replaced freeways with natural and man-made amenities. This approach perhaps was 
spurred by the notion that cities can act as an entertainment machine (Clark 1994, 2000). 
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Clark’s thesis posits that the local economy is driven not only through the production side 
but also via the consumption side, something that many scholars neglected for years. He 
suggests that in order to bolster the local economy cities can provide urban amenities to 
increase local consumption. Florida (2002, 2005) advances Clark’s thesis that a 
combination of urban amenities and the so-called ‘creative class’ are the key ingredients 
for successful local economic development.  
 
The notion that freeways act as a crucial driver for the local economy because they 
provide access to greater market has also been challenged. This challenge stemmed not 
only from bitter experience of urban redevelopment, but it also stemmed from the fact 
that they split communities and encourage the relocation of employment centers from one 





Because a common assumption holds that freeways are important for the local economy, 
any initiative to tear down freeways will be seen as a r adical experiment (Kang & 
Cervero, 2009). If a city demolishes its freeway, one might inquire about the fate of the 
local economy. Would the demolition of the freeway affect goods’ and passengers’ 
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mobility, especially within an urban region? One might attempt to argue that decreasing 
mobility in the city will affect the local economy, as local economies often depend on the 
flow of goods and services. Despite these arguments, a m ovement where cities create 
specific development strategies as a means to achieve a world class status is surging and 
aggressively influencing urban development policy. Inherent in this approach are the 
ideas that cities should attract knowledge workers and high-skilled labors and this can be 
accomplished by providing urban amenities and an inviting physical environment. One 
indicator of whether cities achieve the ‘world class’ status or not is the presence of 
advanced service sector, and very often these industries are located in the urban area 
where there is a high concentration of knowledge workers and high-skilled labors.  
 
At the same time, the allure of the so-called “creative class” thesis partially affects the 
course of urban development (Florida, 2002). Florida argues that in the future, local 
economies will depend on the presence of this creative class. Rather than focusing on the 
freeway development, cities should invest in an infrastructure capable of attracting this 
creative class. The following issues become the framework for me to explore. 
Specifically I am interested in the attributes of cities and their decision to demolish 
freeways as well as the characteristics that allow for a successful deconstruction.1 
                                                          
1 San Fransisco, CA falls under beta+ world city category and was ranked 12 in 2010, while Milwaukee, 
WI is categorized as highly sufficient city in 2010 (see details in Beaverstock, Smith & Taylor (1999) 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb5.html#t1, and last accessed in September 24, 2013 for the 2010 rank 
and Foreign Policy report on The Global Cities Index 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/node/373401, 
for the 2010 report). Alpha, beta, gamma and sufficient are categories used by the Globalization and World 
City (GaWC) research group to assess cities in terms of their advanced producer services using the 




This leads to the question of whether a global city or a world city still needs freeways to 
expand its local and regional economy or not. In other words, what constitutes basic 
infrastructure for a world class city or a city in pursuit of world city status? This comes 
from the fact that not every city is destined to be a world city or global city, as the 
definition of global city or world city is ambiguous and suffers from a loose meaning 
(Savitch 2010: 42). As cities embrace global competition, and not all cities are destined to 
be a world city or as a global city, one might inquire about whether there is a 
development strategy capable of bolstering the economies of these cities. Florida 
provides a suggestion that in order to revive local economies, cities should emphasize 
"creative classes” as the main driver for the economic development policy (2002). His 
argument is provocative and alluring for policy makers, especially as they face problems 
in crafting a development strategy suitable for the global economy. The admiration for a 
world-class status where the economy predominantly consists of advanced service sector 
makes policy makers try to reproduce many policies of a post-industrial city (such as 
amenities driven development or ‘creative class’ driven development). However, these 
policy makers often fail to recognize various historical and economic contexts that 
precede the strategy. As for the case of cities pursuing freeway demolition, almost all of 
them are integrating the concept of creative class, either partially or wholly, as part of the 
development strategy.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
have sufficient services so as not to be overtly dependent on world cities 
(http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/gawcworlds.html).    
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This brings us to the central topics of my investigation. If cities are starting to reorient 
their development strategy by demolishing their freeways, does the strategy guarantee a 
successful result? While changes in urban development strategies have been discussed at 
length, there are different perspectives in looking at how transportation infrastructure 
affects the economy of an urban region. Although scholars agree that freeways contribute 
significantly to the national economy; there is disagreement, however, over whether 
localities will also reap similar benefits from freeway development (Boarnet, 1998). Yet, 
empirical evidence shows that cities are rushing to add freeways to their road networks, 
on the basis that not only will it reduce congestion but it will also increase flows of goods 
and passengers, something deemed vital to local and regional economies.  
 
Given the fact that cities are still rushing to build freeways, it can be assumed that many 
still accept the notion that freeways are able to stimulate the local economy. Yet, the San 
Francisco case proves otherwise. After the 1989 earthquake, several freeways2 were 
damaged, and many were afraid that these disrupt the flows of traffic. In reality it was far 
from that, which in turn strengthened the City of San Francisco’s decision to tear down 
the Embarcadero Freeway and replace it with a boulevard and public amenities. Another 
freeway removal took place several years later in San Francisco and by the end of the 
1990s San Francisco has steered towards an “amenities driven” development strategy. 
                                                          
2 There were at least seven freeways affected by 1989 earthquake in San Francisco: (1) San Francisco – 
Oakland Bay Bridge, Interstate 80, (2) Cypress Street Viaduct/Nimitz Freeway, Interstate 880, (3) 
Embarcadero Freeway, California State Route 480, (4) Southern Freeway, Interstate 280, (5) Central 
Freeway, U.S. Route 101, (6) State Route 17 and (7) State Route 1. Of these, the Embarcadero Freeway 
was the only freeway that was proposed to be demolished before the earthquake. Local residents opposed 
the proposal because they feared congestion and business loss. 
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New York City and Portland also pursued similar policies and it is no coincidence that 
these three cities reveal similar economic traits. These cities are post-industrial cities with 
the advanced service industries as the predominant sector, a ch aracteristic frequently 
found in a global city or a world-class city. Hence, my proposition is that freeway 
deconstruction can only be truly successful in a post-industrial city. 
 
This brings us to my second topic of investigation. Given the fact that there are 21 cities 
in the U.S. involved in freeway deconstruction (and several more in European and Asian 
countries), one might inquire whether the pursuit of such projects benefits downtown 
businesses only or the city/metropolitan region as a whole. One possible explanation is 
that by demolishing freeways (in many cases elevated freeways) downtown businesses 
and those who have a stake in the downtown land uses might reap the benefits as the flow 
of traffic and the physical environment change. Molotch (1976) and Logan & Molotch 
(1987) pointed to the fact that in every city there is a growth coalition with an interest in 
seeing an increase in land and property values, either by preserving the existing uses from 
changing into other uses or by pushing for changes if such changes can provide 
development opportunities for those whose properties will gain significant value.  
 
Incorporating local “growth machine” thesis into my research helps address the notion of 
why some cities are successful in pursuing freeway deconstruction. Molotch (1976) 
argues that because cities are often associated with specific interests, it i s important to 
investigate various interests of those whose properties gain value when growth takes 
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place. In observing the decision-making process behind urban freeway deconstruction, I 
posit that local growth coalitions are also at work in shaping the decision to demolish the 
freeways. That is, “growth coalitions” may sometimes turn against short term growth 
(like freeway construction) in order to promote long term development (like freeway 
deconstruction and amenity driven strategy). 
 
The last topic I investigate is whether such experimentation brings significant changes in 
land value and improved urban spatial structure. In their study, Kang & Cervero (2009: 
2789) found that freeway demolition that took place in Seoul, South Korea increased 
property values. This was achieved by removing the elevated freeway and replacing it 
with an “urban stream” and linear park3. They argue that replacing an elevated freeway 
with an urban stream and park positively affects commercial and residential property 
values (ibid, p. 2790). This approach is seen as the antithesis of freeway construction 
heralded decades ago as the driver for economic growth. Freeway construction brought 
not only economic impacts, but also unintended consequences such as increased social 
segregation. Currently, debates still linger about freeway demolition and its subsequent 
cost and benefits. Hence, it is pertinent to explore whether freeway deconstruction leads 
to positive economic effects, as measured by residential and commercial property value.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Urban stream is defined as waterway that flows through a heavily populated area. It can be man-made or 





This study focuses on the rationale behind freeway deconstruction in two very different 
cities, San Francisco and Milwaukee. In conducting this study I posit three objectives.  
 
The first objective is to understand key characteristics of a city that deconstructs a 
freeway. Many cities and regions compete to attract businesses to relocate to their areas, 
and one of the incentives is by building freeways. Local governments have incentives to 
promote freeways because they are supposed to create more jobs and lure investments to 
their regions. Yet in reality, freeway construction only creates seasonal jobs during the 
construction period (Boarnet, 1998). And the notion that freeways will create jobs in an 
urban region is debatable, as industries and businesses move from one region to another.  
 
Even though freeway construction is often touted as a prerequisite for the local economy 
to grow, scholars are less sanguine about this claim (Cervero & Kang, 2008; Cervero, 
2006; Boarnet, 1998). Globalization has triggered significant changes in the demographic 
and economic structure of the city, which in turn affect whether cities really need 
freeways. Outsourcing in manufacturing industries coupled with high investment in 
research and development has changed the economic base of the city (Bivens, 2005). As 
advanced service sector has replaced manufacturing industries, a number of cities were 
starting to restructure their local economies. Rather than relying on t he manufacturing 
11 
 
industries, these cities chose to adapt to this change by turning to post-industrial 
employment, the commodification of culture, hotels, restaurants, tourism and other ways 
of stimulating consumer demand. Consumption becomes a new paradigm in 
understanding how cities work (Clark, 1994). From this point of view, it can be argued 
that those living in post-industrial cities tend to value urban amenities more than the 
presence of freeway. The declining, transitional industrial city on the other hand tends to 
value freeways more than urban amenities since this city relies heavily on freeways to 
transport manufactured goods.  
 
The second objective is to analyze whether freeway deconstruction can bring the intended 
economic impacts to the city. I am interested here in whether freeway deconstruction 
actually brings added value to affected, nearby neighborhoods as well as to the city at 
large. Kang & Cervero (2008) argue that changes in the uses of land, from elevated 
freeways into urban green space can bring a positive impact to property values. 
Controlling for other factors, such as demographic and political aspects, it is possible that 
similar situations can also be found in U.S. cities. Further, if property values reflect a 
city’s prosperity, then freeways may not be useful for enhancing economic growth. Even 
if there is variation among cities that remove their freeways, it is  still important to 
investigate why such variation exists and what kind of determinants might affect such 




The third objective is to investigate local political conditions (institutions, coalitions) in 
the decision making process of freeway deconstruction. A local growth machine has a 
stake in boosting property values (Molotch, 1976; Molotch & Logan, 1987). 
Notwithstanding the evident role of a growth machine, changes in the cities’ 
demographic and economic characteristics also contribute to shaping a rationale for 
building or deconstructing a freeway. However, a local growth machine can push a 
specific development agenda in order to create economic growth. As land is the key to 
ensuring whether an economy can thrive or not, a local growth machine will drive the 
development initiative towards the best uses of land (either through freeway construction 
or through urban amenities development). Further, changes in the demographic 
composition might alter the power structure of a city which then shapes the rationale for 
any growth oriented policy. In this case, a large number of innovative persons will 
influence the economic development strategy of the city4. Thus, cities can use their 
creative classes to formulate a p ost-Fordist strategy that places an emphasis on 
consumers, the rise of service and white-collar workers (Florida 2005: 13). I therefore 
suggest that any development strategy chosen will be linked to both the presence and the 
nature of a city’s “creative class”, a rising affluent middle class and its growth coalitions 




                                                          
4 Innovative person here refers to those who work in the advanced-service sector, in particular research 
centers, think-tank organizations and universities.  
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Organization of the Study 
 
This chapter provided the foundation of the study and subsequent chapters that follow. 
Chapter 2 discusses the trajectory of freeway construction and the literature of city-region 
development, outlining the historical significance of highways in shaping the economic 
development of the metropolis. It also discusses the effects of urban freeways on local 
and regional economies, and how they stimulate the decentralization of jobs leading to 
asymmetrical relations between central cities and suburbs. Chapter 3 outlines the 
framework in implementing the study. It details the rationale and theories as well as the 
descriptions of the research methods used in this research. Data collection, coding and 
analysis are also detailed in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 provides an assessment of whether certain characteristics of cities may have 
affected the decision and the outcome of freeway deconstruction. By analyzing 21 cities 
using qualitative comparative analysis, this chapter provides an argument that certain 
characters of a post-industrial city can affect the decision to demolish freeways, whereas 
certain characters of a d eclining, transitional industrial city can affect the outcome of 
freeway deconstruction. 
 
Chapter 5 establishes the argument that after the 1970s, with the advent of new post-
industrial economies, freeways ceased to create added value to the local economy. 
14 
 
Building from this argument, this chapter demonstrates that constructing or removing 
freeways will not affect the local economy, and that any changes in land values are 
caused by other factors. A hedonic price model is used to establish the relationship 
between various independent variables and land values as the dependent variable in San 
Francisco and Milwaukee.   
 
Chapter 6 provides a description of San Francisco and Milwaukee, focusing on the 
political system, institutional arrangement and decision-making processes. An attempt is 
made to connect the theoretical topics covered in the literature review and the changing 
conditions of both cities. Each case of freeway deconstruction in each city will be 
discussed and analyzed. The discussions and analysis contain historical accounts leading 
to the decision to demolish freeway in each city and the effects generated by the decision. 
This study will delve into the question of who launched the initiative and what are the 
stakes and effects on land uses, urban form and economic performance.  
 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by presenting the findings obtained in previous chapters in 
a general form. This also includes a normative argument about whether any city should 
redirect their development strategy in order to rejuvenate their economic viability and to 








This chapter outlines the theoretical background pertaining to freeway deconstruction and 
local growth coalitions. In doing so, it delineates the historical trajectory of urban 
renewal and freeway construction and their impacts on central city and metropolitan 
areas. Central to the discussion is the role of local governments and actors in addressing 
whether freeways would stimulate local economies without disrupting the existing urban 
social fabric. In line with the historical discussion of freeway construction, one section 
focuses on the dynamics of the controversies that evolved around freeway construction 
and removal between 1960 and 2000. A general examination will focus on freeway 
deconstruction trends in a number of cities in the U.S. and abroad. This section 
culminates in a closer examination of theories of urban politics that gave impetus to the 








Freeway deconstruction is a project to remove a part or section of elevated freeways in 
central cities. The first city to remove its elevated freeways was New York City followed 
by Portland, Oregon. Although the reasons behind the decision to remove elevated 
freeways varied in both cities, nevertheless it sparked a new movement as a response to 
the impact that urban renewal and freeway construction have engendered. Local 
communities, politicians, planners, and social activists have produced plans to remove 
elevated freeways and replace them with various uses in more than twenty cities in the 
U.S. In European cities like Paris and Madrid, they also embarked on this path 
(Kimmelman, 2011; Samuel, 2010). The same pattern also emerged in the Asian city of 
Seoul, South Korea. This approach to remove elevated freeways challenges the common 
assumption that freeways stimulate the local economy. Histories revealed that elevated 
freeways ease mobility but they also decreased land value nearby and promote migration 
to suburbs, leaving the central city with economic challenges (Baum-Snow, 2007). 
Further, elevated freeways erode social capital as they split neighborhoods and created 
distinct spatial and economic segregation.  
 
Social movements that challenged freeway construction, which erupted in the mid 1950s 
until early 1970s, were the byproduct of an exclusionary decision-making process that 
restricted local community involvement. At that time political leaders acted under the 
assumption that any decision built upon t echnical considerations would be accepted 
without resistance. Anti-freeway movements also reflected changes in the relationship 
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between federal and state governments on the one hand and local governments on the 
other, as the latter were often influenced by local pressures and various interest groups. 
Hence, it is pertinent to situate urban renewal in accordance with freeway construction in 
the historical perspective as it reflected not only the transformation of urban form, but 
also the way local growth coalitions took a critical role in shaping the fate of the city.  
 
Urban Renewal, Social Movements, and Freeway Deconstruction 
The debate on the merit and disadvantages of freeway construction can be traced back 
more than a half century ago when local governments with support from federal 
government aggressively implemented urban renewal in U.S. cities. Implemented 
between the 1950s and early 1970s, urban renewal was intended to rejuvenate the 
economic performance of central cities and to beautify the urban environment. The 
program was born out of concerns over the dwindling economic attractiveness of central 
cities as urban population exploded after the boom of industrialization in the U.S.    
 
Prior to 1940, a number of local governments recognized the problem of overcrowding 
and degradation of environmental quality. Milwaukee, for example, conducted a 
comprehensive and revealing study about the nature of suburbanization in 1946. The 
results revealed suburban residents' dissatisfaction concerning city life at that time which 
led to leapfrog development patterns beyond city limits. Respondents cited the following 
as their reasons for leaving the central city: the suburban environment was better for 
children because the air was cleaner and there was less congestion, and the available 
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parcels in suburbs were larger than the ones in the central city (McCarthy 2009: 123). 
Coupled with the fact that cities lacked affordable housing at that time, these factors 
combined affected the attractiveness of the city. As a r esult, those who could afford to 
opted to move to the urban fringe. The continuing deterioration of central business 
districts in most cities exacerbated this situation and this forced manufacturing industries 
to relocate elsewhere (Gotham 2001: 286; Mollenkopf, 1983). Central cities started to 
lose population as manufacturing industries moved to the suburbs and their workers 
followed because of its close proximity to work locations and suburban attractiveness. 
Local businesses gradually followed this trend. Against this background, local businesses 
in particular downtown associations voiced their concerns to local governments about the 
degradation of the central city and possible economic losses in the future, and urged local 
governments to lobby for federal assistance to reverse this trend. The federal government 
responded to these problems by rebuilding central business districts and by providing 
affordable housing in central cities. Starting in 1937, several Housing Acts were enacted 
to address the aforementioned concerns (Edson 2011: 3-4).  
 
The 1949 Housing Act and its subsequent act (1954 Housing Act) received wider 
acceptance not only from local governments but also from business communities. This 
was caused by the notion that Title I of the 1949 Housing Act encouraged the private 
sector to lead the efforts to rebuild cities. The 1949 Housing Act was designed with the 
rationale that there were millions of families still living in slums and more than three 
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million still living with other families4. Many saw this as a big opportunity for business 
communities to provide affordable housing and to revitalize downtown areas in many 
U.S. cities. Downtown associations and real estate boards welcomed federal assistance in 
stimulating the local economy, as the federal government designed this policy under the 
belief that it w as "the American way" for private enterprises to build cities. In other 
words, the federal government provided enormous support to enable the market to 
function freely (McCarthy 2009: 120-21). Bolstered by this act, local governments 
created coalitions with local businesses to get federal assistance for urban redevelopment 
in their areas. However, this public-private coalition turned out to be not what many had 
expected before, largely due to the political and social factors that were embedded in the 
decision-making process at that time.  
 
Although the 1949 Act stipulated a need for affordable housing provision as part of urban 
redevelopment, the words ‘urban renewal’ did not appear until the federal government 
enacted the 1954 Housing Act. This act provided a legal basis for a concerted effort to 
eradicate and to prevent slums and urban blight through commercial redevelopment 
instead of public housing (Flanagan 2007: 265). Slum clearance intensified as municipal 
governments perceived predominantly black and urban poor neighborhoods in central 
cities as hurdles for creating an attractive city and thus designated these areas for slum 
clearance. Many of these neighborhoods were located in close proximity to downtown 
and were considered prime locations for commercial development. Public officials at that 
                                                          
4 As quoted in Harry S. Truman: Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. January 5, 




time often made the decision to relocate the urban poor and demolished the 
neighborhoods without proper public hearings. This left a d evastating effect on central 
cities. By the end of 1963, more than 609,000 people were forced to relocate (Goodwin, 
2009). At this point, it became apparent that the idea of urban redevelopment was 
oriented towards sanitizing downtowns and demolishing slums rather than rejuvenating 
the existing neighborhoods.  
 
The 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts created a vehicle for reshaping urban environments by 
replacing poor neighborhoods with commercial and upper class residential use. Both Acts 
also incorporated a need for increased mobility from the central city to surrounding 
suburbs and vice versa, due to the increased consumption of automobiles. Automobile 
industries increased their production capacities as the economic growth increased, and 
combined with changes in consumers' preferences, households and individuals 
dependency on a utomobiles became a new norm in the urban lifestyle. In 1955 a lone, 
Americans bought 7.4 million new cars (Wards Auto, 2011); a new record for the 
automobile industry, beyond the existing 61 million vehicles already clogged the nation's 
roadways (Mohl, 2002). Municipal governments, fearing that businesses would flee from 
central cities, pushed for freeway construction, that not only connected cities to one 
another but also cities to surrounding suburbs.  
 
Freeway construction was implemented with little or no attention to social problems that 
might arise. During a meeting with the President's Advisory Committee on a National 
Highway System one proponent of freeway construction, Robert Moses from New York, 
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argued that freeways should go right through cities, and not around them, in order to 
achieve the intended goal, "the stabilization of trade and values in the principal or central 
business district" (Mohl 2002: 29). Urban planners and transportation engineers at that 
time rarely incorporated social and economic factors into their models. As a result, many 
urban neighborhoods were demolished to make way for new freeways. It is estimated that 
during the height of freeway construction each year more than 63,000 housing units were 
demolished. Although urban renewal projects assured that these losses would be replaced 
with other uses with higher added value, empirical evidence shows that three decades 
after massive urban redevelopment projects in U.S. cities, municipal governments lost 
their tax bases and never regained them (Boustan, 2010; Gotham, 2001).  
 
The rate of freeway construction increased considerably between 1950 and 1970. 
Whereas in 1950 t he total length of urban freeways (including those that penetrated 
cities) was only 480 miles (Schwartz, 1976), in 1970 t he number increased to 22,478 
miles (Highway Statistics 1971). This increased the freight volume transported via 
interstate highways, and at the same time also encouraged housing development in 
adjacent suburbs. Although scholars lauded the effect of freeway construction in 
enhancing the national economy, there were criticisms raised with regard to the way local 
governments and the private sector obtained the land for development (Gioielli, 2011; 
Mohl 2004).  
 
After the 1970s, the rate of freeway construction gradually dropped as the federal 
government enacted new laws concerning the effects of federal projects on the 
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environment. In addition, due to increased opposition from minorities especially black 
communities, new pressures mounted questioning whether it was ethical or not to use 
federal money for urban redevelopment which in turn created social problems. Oil crises 
in the mid 1970s and urban fiscal crises in the 1970s further complicated the situation as 
it became more difficult for local governments to use federal money to finance local 
development projects.    
 
After more than two decades, freeway construction demolished vibrant urban 
neighborhoods and forced poor residents to relocate to other areas to make way for more 
space (Highsmith, 2009; Mohl, 2002). At the same time, it also encouraged the white 
middle-class to move from central cities to suburbs because of lower land prices. As 
central city tax bases eroded and cities continued to struggle to provide decent services, 
freeway construction now seems like an empty promise. As the economic attractiveness 
of central cities continued to decline, many city residents started voicing their concerns 
the local economy and urged local governments to take drastic action. Recent empirical 
evidence challenged the notion that freeway construction contributes to local economies, 
and planners are seeking new approaches (Cervero et al., 2009; Baum-Snow, 2007; 
Glaeser & Saiz, 2001; Boarnet, 1998) 
 
Rationale for Freeway Deconstruction 
Freeway construction was criticized because it encouraged affluent individuals and 
households as well as local businesses to move to suburbs rather than stimulating the 
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local economy. As a co nsequence, tax bases of central cities eroded and many cities 
struggled to find additional sources of revenue. Even though a plethora of studies 
supported the claim that freeways contribute to economic growth (Nadiri & Mamuneas, 
1996; Sen et al. 1998; Rephann & Isserman, 1994), these studies usually measured the 
effects of freeways on the national economy and not the effects on the local level. Those 
who criticized freeway construction argued that if freeway construction did not create 
stimuli for local economies, then cities should pursue different strategies instead. Given 
the opposition from local neighborhoods and community activists, as well as the 
difficulties in tapping federal funding after the 1970s, many cities have partially 
abandoned their plans to build more freeways. Past experiences made central cities 
contemplate ways to enhance local economies without disrupting the existing social 
fabric.   
 
The first rationale for freeway deconstruction is the notion that freeways did not stimulate 
the local economy. Although freeways induce higher mobility and stimulate national and 
regional economies, studies found mixed results about the effect on the local economy. 
Boarnet, using California data at the county level from 1969 to 1988 (1998), points out 
that freeway construction in one location tends to draw production away from other 
locations (1995, 1998). Using retail and manufacturing employment data, he shows that 
as the length of the highways in one county is increased, the number of people employed 
and retail sales increase. However, this growth has an adverse effect on nearby counties 
as retail sales in these areas decrease and people move to the county with the newly 
constructed freeway (1998: 381). In other words, if there are no n ew additional jobs 
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created at the national level, at the local level freeways only creates a negative spillover 
effect as it encourages business and industrial establishments to move from one area to 
another area closer to freeways. What appears to be a job created in one city is a lost job 
in another city (Boarnet 1998: 382; Bartik 1991).  
 
The second rationale is the idea that cities should pay more attention to creating attractive 
amenities rather than focus on bui lding freeways. Clark (1994, 2000) presents a 
persuasive argument concerning how city should pursue economic development policy. 
He points out that for years scholars have neglected the consumption side of the city and 
instead focused more on the production side as the driver for the local economy. Florida 
(2002, 2005) pushed Clark’s thesis further by arguing that in the globalized era, cities 
should no longer build freeways but rather they should invest in building other types of 
infrastructure that have the capacity to attract the “creative class.” Florida argues that 
there is a high association between the availability of universities, research centers, and 
urban amenities such as parks, museums, and sport stadia in a city and the presence of the 
creative class. He notes that in an area with a high concentration of the creative class the 
rate of economic growth is higher compared with the areas with a lower concentration5.    
 
The third reason is the fact that after cities removed freeways and replaced them with 
urban amenities, property and land values increased. Kang (2009) examined the effect of 
                                                          
5 There were criticisms directed to "creative class" thesis (see for example Malanga, 2004; Peck, 2005 or 
MacGillis, 2009 for their criticism and Florida 2012 for his counter argument) and while many of these 




replacing a freeway with an urban stream6 in Seoul and found out that property and land 
value increased. Because property value increases, the demographic structure in the city 
gradually changes as a result. Among others, highly educated workers often inquire about 
the availability of urban cultural amenities. For this group, it is inherent in their lifestyle 
to consume urban cultural amenities frequently, along with other urban services. This 
leads to additional demand for urban services, including urban amenities. This argument 
is in line with Clark's thesis (1994) and Florida's argument about the importance of urban 
amenities provision to stimulate the local economy (2005).   
 
Although these reasons provide a compelling argument for not building urban freeways 
in central cities, there pale in comparison with the narrative about how central cities kept 
losing population due to freeway construction. Baum-Snow (2007) provides a convincing 
argument by pointing out that central cities lost eight percent of their population between 
1950 and 1990 because of freeways. Even without federal government funding, state and 
local governments kept building urban highways and thus exacerbated the situation 
(2007: 781). Further, as freeways induce mobility, firms also decide to relocate their 
establishments to suburbs as they provide not only lower land expenses, and therefore 
lower tax rates, but also because of close proximity to the interstate highways, which is 
vital for freight transportation (Raphael & Stoll, 2010). Between 1970 and 2000, while 
central city population declined by more than 18%, suburban population grew by more 
than 100%. The fact that the population of central cities shrunk and local economies 
faltered even after urban renewal and freeways were constructed excessively is a sign that 
                                                          




a different approach needs to be used to reverse this trajectory. A number of cities 
gradually accepted freeway removal as a solution to create an attractive urban 
environment (Cervero, 2011). 
 
Freeway Deconstruction in the U.S. and around the World 
Freeway construction has been criticized for a number of reasons, ranging from its 
immediate negative effect on the local economy and its long term impacts on the 
demographic structure of a city. Coupled with urban renewal, it brought bitter 
experiences to cities and residents, and, as a co nsequence, many opposed the idea of 
building more freeways and instead urged cities to consider other development 
alternatives, including removing existing freeways and replacing them with other uses, 
including urban amenities. There are at least 21 cities in the U.S. and several cities in 
other part of the world that have removed or are considering removing their freeways 
from existing road networks.    
 
Table 2.1 shows the list of cities in the U.S. that have removed or are considering 
removing their freeways from their road networks. By looking at this table, we can see 
that a number of cities removed their urban freeways and experienced decreased 
percentages of commuters driving alone between 2000 a nd 2010, a lthough this is not 
always the case. Portland, San Francisco, and New York fall within this pattern although 





Table 2.1 List of cities in the U.S. with urban freeway removal initiative 
state 
 








city suburbs 2000 2010 
MD Baltimore 651,154 1,866,002 54.7 60 Jones Falls 
Expressway 
- 
NY New York 
(Bronx) 
8,008,278 1,252,880 25.4 23.4 I-895/Sheridan 
Expressway 
- 
NY Buffalo 292,648 821,870 65.4 68.5 Route 5 - 
IL Chicago 2,896,016 4,883,879 52.6 51.8 Lakeshore Drive - 
OH Cleveland 478,403 1,647,863 67.8 69.3 Shoreway - 
CT Hartford 121,578 1,018,365 56.3 N/A Aetna Viaduct - 
KY Louisville 256,231 731,764 80.8 82.4 I-64 - 
WI Milwaukee 596,974 838,942 68.8 70.4 Park East Freeway Remove
d (2002) 
TN Nashville 545,524 616,971 78.5 78.5 Downtown Loop - 
CT New Haven 123,626 360,279 55.7 N/A Route 34 Connector - 
LA New Orleans 484,674 827,357 60.3 69.2 Claiborne 
Expressway 
- 
NY New York 8,008,278 1,252,880 25.4 23.4 West Side Highway Remove
d (1973) 




OR Portland 529,121 1,245,328 66.3 58.8 Harbor Drive Remove
d (1974) 
OR Portland 529,121 1,245,328 66.3 58.8 I-5 - 




CA San Francisco 776,733 954,450 49.5 46.7 Central Freeway Remove
d (1999) 
WA Seattle 776,733 954,450 61.7 59.2 Alaska Way Viaduct - 
NY Syracuse 563,374 1,650,185 65.9 64.6 I-81 - 
NJ Trenton 147,306 556,237 N/A N/A Route 29 - 
 Washington, 
D.C. 
85,403 265,358 46.8 43.5 Whitehurst Freeway - 
OK Oklahoma 
City 
506,132 452,828 80.4 83.1 I-40 - 
RI Providence 173,618 678,999 60.5 60.5 I-195 - 
Source:  
1. http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysTear.html, last accessed on December 2, 2010;  
2. Spivak, Jeffrey. 2011. Top 10 Metro Highway Removal Projects. Urban Land September 13. 
http://urbanland.uli.org/Articles/2011/September/SpivakTopTenHighway;  
3. Jaffe, Eric. 2011. The Death Row of Urban Highways, part 1. the Atlantic Cities November 2. 
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/2011/11/death-row-urban-highways/411/#slide9;  
4. Jafe, Eric. 2012. The Death Row of Urban Highways, part 2. the Atlantic Cities February 8. 
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/2012/02/death-row-urban-highways-part-2/1170/;  






Globalization and Characteristics of the City 
 
Globalization swept cities and regions all over the world; as a result, global competition 
emerges as a new paradigm. Cities not only compete with other cities in the same 
country, they also compete with other cities from other countries. This makes the 
economic competition more intense. However, because globalization is indicated by the 
high mobility of labor and capital supported with advanced technology, it provides 
windows of opportunity for cities that can reposition themselves. Cities with abundant 
resources and ample political supports are able to position themselves in the international 
marketplace (Savitch & Kantor, 2002), whereas cities with lesser economic and political 
resources may not be able to compete.  
 
The above paragraph becomes the basis of my argument in which I differentiate cities 
based on t heir socio-economic characteristics. This categorization is useful in 
understanding why cities pursuing similar development policy arrived at a different result 
and outcome. Two distinct but somewhat related categories are 'post-industrial city' and 
'declining transitional industrial city.' Post-industrial city is a concept, which seeks to 
explain a city where the advanced service sector produces more wealth than 
manufacturing or other sectors combined. This is a concept loosely derived from Bell's 
seminal work (1974) and Habermas (1970). Both see that rapid development of 
technology changes the mode of production and in turn this also changes the 
demographic, economic and eventually, political structure of the city. Whereas a post-
industrial city is indicated by the presence of advanced service industries as the 
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predominant sector, a declining transitional city is indicated by the decline in the 
manufacturing industry, high unemployment rate, and the inability of the local 
government to replace the manufacturing industry with other potential industries as the 
economic base. In the following section, I will outline characteristics of each city and 
their influence on the decision-making process. 
   
Post-industrial City 
By the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, information technology reached its apex and 
this continues in subsequent decades. Economic competition that emerged between 
different political ideologies and countries have stimulated considerable progress in 
technology. Businesses incorporated the advancement in technology in the production 
process to streamline the process and this lead to capital becomes mobile and 
transferrable to any place in the world regardless of political boundaries.  
 
Hence, globalization is understood as a process in which political and economic borders 
are opened, and society is gradually exposed to various norms and values that may differ 
from what they believed and understood. This does not mean globalization that engulfed 
almost the whole world forces cities and regions in the South to accept norms and values 
from the North. Rather, globalization creates a situation in which cities develop their own 
characteristics utilizing local resources to advance their standings in the global 
competition. Local resources here can be defined as the political, economic, and even 
social capital that a city possesses.  
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Short (2004) differentiates the impact of globalization on cities and regions into several 
aspects. One of these aspects is the way globalization shapes the role of cities in the 
global economy. He argues because of globalization, a number of cities have the 
privilege to act as command centers, indicated by the presence of stock exchanges, 
headquarters of multinational corporations and head offices of major banks (Short 2004: 
12). In other words, a concentration of financial and advanced service sector in a ci ty 
reflects the size of the city’s economic and political influence in the global economy. 
There is a correlation between the concentration of advanced service industries in a 
particular city with its role in the political and economic realm. The higher the 
concentration, the higher the role a city plays. 
 
Globalization has pushed these cities forward, leaving other cities behind in their trails. 
As financial and advanced service industries gradually replaced the manufacturing 
industry as the main driver of the local economy, significant changes emerge in urban 
spatial structure. Many industrial cities with manufacturing industry as the economic base 
with a large portion of the middle class working in this sector underwent economic and 
physical transformation. This transformation is reflected in the fact that the majority of 
land use in these cities is for the financial and advanced service sector with strong 
presence of financial and multinational corporation headquarters in the downtown area. 
Moreover, white-collar jobs are predominant in the local economy. These are common 




Sassen (1991) and Hall (1997), among others point out that such transformation from an 
industrial city to a post-industrial city is the result of cities responding to a new 
international division of labor, where the majority of workers work in advanced service 
industries (including creative and cultural industries) between 1970 and 1990. However, 
the 1990s shows these cities underwent another form of economic transformation. 
Advanced service industries are being restructured and downsized by lean minded 
management seeking economies, with the result that they were suffering massive job 
losses (Hall 1997: 317). As a response, firms and companies decided either to relocate to 
lower cost locations or to smaller cities within the same national space or to lower wage 
cities in less developed countries. This brought an adverse effect on ol der industrial 
cities. Firms and businesses left these cities because they could not adjust production cost 
to stay competitive due to factors such as high labor costs and the quality of the 
infrastructure. Furthermore, as firms and businesses left these cities, minority groups and 
low-skilled laborers are often left behind due to their inability to access economic 
resources to move to other cities or regions. In the following section, I will outline the 
impacts of globalization on the declining industrial city that lost their competitive 
advantage.         
 
Declining Transitional Industrial City 
Bell (1973) identified several indicators for a post-industrial society: (1) service sector as 
the economic base, (2) the dominance of white-collar employment, (3) knowledge as the 
governing principle in social life, and (4) an increasing role for government in social 
regulation. Whereas the period of the 1970s until 1990s showed massive transformations 
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from industrial society to a post-industrial society, this transformation only happened at 
the state level and happened unequally at the local level. Between 1970 and 1990 only a 
handful of cities experienced dramatic transformation from an industrial city to a post-
industrial city (Gospodini, 2009; Mooney, 2004). After going through a significant 
transformation these cities now belong to the new hierarchy called global cities (Knox 
1995; Beaverstock et al. 2000). The rest of industrial cities continue to lose 
manufacturing jobs due to various factors, and still struggle to stay competitive in the 
market, as they cannot substitute low-skilled labor with white-collar employment 
(Walker & Greenberg 1982: 17).  
 
Against this background, globalization has two impacts on c entral cities. First, it 
transforms cities and creates windows of opportunity for cities to compete in the global 
economy. Second, it engulfs and pushes down cities that are unable to transform 
themselves into a postindustrial city as they lack necessary factors to attract investment 
from advanced service industries. Detroit, for example, once a prominent city where the 
automobile industry dominated the local economy, now is barely able to provide basic 
services for its residents. Worst yet, some of these industrial cities are trapped in a 
vicious circle, as investment, employment, and population keep flowing out of their 
political jurisdictions due to intercity competition (Florida, 2012; Peters & Fisher, 2004; 
McCann, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002).  
 
Although there are no clear definition of what a declining, transitional industrial city is, 
indicators such as the number of white-collar employment created against the number of 
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jobs lost in the manufacturing industry can provide an illustration of how these industrial 
cities struggle to stay competitive in a fierce global competition. Between 1980 and 2005, 
Rochester, NY had an employment growth of 22.6%; however, a closer look reveals that 
the manufacturing industry had a negative employment growth (-44%). Hartford, CT had 
an employment growth of 11% but its manufacturing industry lost almost half of its labor 
force (Atkins et al. 2011). To make it worse, these cities still have to compete with other 
cities to attract businesses and individuals/households to relocate to their areas. 
Furthermore, individuals and households are often reluctant to relocate to these cities, 
citing various reasons such as the quality of school district, the high rate of the property 
tax, and lack of amenities. Businesses often play cities against each other to get a 
favorable economic stimulus (in the form of tax abatement or tax holiday), and often they 
only stay in a particular city for a number of years before deciding to move on to another 
city. 
 
Although these illustrations seem depressing and eclipse our optimisms concerning the 
future of cities, a number of cities have started to rejuvenate their local economies, by 
introducing development strategies to attract a particular demographic group. Labeled as 
the 'creative class', this demographic group is believed to improve the local economy 
through innovation, invention and consumption (Florida, 2002, 2005). The proponent of 
this approach suggests that only through this creative class do these cities survive in 





Changes in the Demographic and Economic Structure 
Globalization has brought massive changes to urban landscape, giving two distinct 
options to the city, either they survive in the transformation and become part of the global 
economy (and subsequently struggle to be a part of global city elites) or they gradually 
decline and are incapable of competing with other cities. Both post-industrial and 
declining transitional industrial cities experienced drastic changes in their demographic 
and economic structure, and these changes brought significant impacts. Changes in the 
demographic structure affected the economic structure of the city. As the local economy 
changes, it affects individual and household preferences in deciding where to work and to 
live.  
 
After the World War II and before the 1970s, manufacturing industries were predominant 
in U.S. cities. Historical data suggests that in 1950 30% of the labor force worked in the 
manufacturing industry; however, this figure continued to decline to a mere 11% by the 
end of 2006. O n the other hand, services (government services and other service-
producing industries combined) accounted for 40% of total labor force in 1950, and this 
number continues to increase. By the end of 2006, other service-producing industries 
accounted for more than 40% of total labor force, while government services remained 
stagnant and hovered around 10% between 1950 and 2006 (Lee & Mather, 2008).  
 
Several explanations accounted for these changes in the economic structure of the city. 
One popular explanation is the idea that globalization forced firms to restructure and 
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downsize its businesses, and as a result, many firms relocated to smaller cities within the 
same state or to other states with lower labor cost (Hall, 1997). Further, economic 
restructuring often required management to close factories or relocate economic activities 
overseas. Many argued that it was cheaper to import goods produced overseas where 
labor costs were cheaper or there were no stringent environmental protection policies in 
place rather than producing those goods at home. However, these decisions were often 
criticized because it would create trade deficits between the U.S. and other nations and 
create unemployment in the U.S.   
 
However, this argument was challenged through empirical data. The U.S. trade deficit 
was not caused by importing goods previously produced in U.S. and now produced 
overseas, but rather because the U.S. consumed a large amount of oil and gas. Between 
1989 and 2007, oil and gas accounted for more than 33% of total imports.7 Changes in 
the local economic structure therefore couldn’t be directed to an accusation of unfair 
labor practices but rather because technology advancement enabled changes from labor-
intensive industries to capital-intensive industries, where automation gradually replaced 
human labors. Productivity and employment data shows manufacturing value added 
output increased by 123% while employment has dropped by 21% between 1987 and 
2007 (Morss, E.R).  
 
                                                          
7 Data is obtained from Morss, E.R. The Loss of American Manufacturing Jobs: What are the facts? 




Changes in the economic structure transformed the demographic structure in the city and 
metropolitan region. Between 1950 until the 1980s, urban poor and minorities were 
predominant in central cities, while affluent population settled in suburban communities. 
However, after the 1970s, this trend was gradually reversed in several cities. The 
emergence of advanced service sector such as information and telecommunication and 
financial industries that started to dominate the urban landscapes in the 1980s helped 
cities to attract affluent population to live in central cities. San Francisco, CA and Seattle, 
WA for example, are widely known as cities with a high concentration of advanced-
service centers in the West Coast. Their racial compositions are predominantly white and 
Asian. Portland, OR also revealed a pattern similar to San Francisco.  
 
On the other hand, Detroit, MI was barely able to reverse the trend of losing its white 
population. White population now only accounts for 7.8%, a sharp decline from 68.6% in 
1950 (Davis 2012: 4). Poverty is concentrated in the central city and it kept increasing 
from 19% in 1960 to more than 33% in 2010. Cleveland also faces similar situation. The 
poverty rate kept climbing from 43.9% in 1970 to 65.1% in 2000. White population only 
accounted for 5.3% of the total population, while black population accounted for more 
than 90% in 2000.8 In other words, a declining industrial city is indicated by its inability 
to compete in the global market, the high proportion of minorities and a high poverty rate 
in the city. These factors push these cities further down the ranks and as a result, they lost 
their economic attractiveness.  
                                                          
8 See Cleveland, Ohio: the Central neighborhood. Available online at 
http://www.frbsf.org/cpreport/docs/cleveland_oh.pdf last accessed on June, 20, 2012. 
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Changes in the Spatial Configuration and Individual Preferences 
It is pertinent to note that globalization not only affects demographic and economic 
structure, but it also affects spatial configuration and individual preferences. Spatial 
configuration reflects the spatial arrangement of urban land use as dictated by market and 
the demographic structure of the city. Prior to 1960, cities were developed in concentric 
patterns, and economic and political activities gravitated around central business districts. 
After 1960, the suburbanization of jobs redefined the way land use was organized. 
Central business districts were no longer the center of economic activities in cities as 
businesses and firms left central cities to suburban areas. The implementation of urban 
renewal and highway construction between 1960 and the mid 1970s severely deprived 
central cities of their social capital as evident in the demolition of neighborhoods where 
minority groups lived and brought an unexpected impact (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). 
Downtown areas became barren land devoid of social interactions, especially during the 
weekend. The emergence of advanced service firms that replaced the manufacturing 
industry as the local economic driver in the late 1970s and early 1980s gradually changed 
the urban landscape. Multinational corporation headquarters, banking offices, consulting 
firms and other advanced service industries accounted were predominant in central 
business districts; whereas manufacturing industries were shifted to suburban areas. 
 
As urban landscape and land use changed considerably, so did individual preferences. As 
the economy becomes global, it affects individual preferences. While previously 
individuals only consumed goods available locally, now they also consume nonlocal 
goods advertised via global mass media and other news outlets. Here, cities can choose 
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either to take the advantage of this shift in individual preferences or simply to ignore it. 
Post-industrial cities were aware of this situation and they fully exploited this opportunity 
to their advantages. A number of cities started building urban cultural amenities such as 
museums, concert halls (e.g. Los Angeles, Chicago) or natural amenities such as urban 
parks (Seoul) to attract people to relocate there. Municipal governments in these cities 
believe that certain types of people are attracted to this kind of services and these people 
often inquire whether cities have certain amenities before they decide to relocate. In 
addition to this, the lifestyle and social status of local high-income individuals and 
households also increase the demand for cultural amenities and attractive environments. 
 
Clark (1994) used this as empirical evidence to emphasize the importance of amenities in 
attracting people to move to a particular city. He noted that local consumption for some 
time had driven the local economy, yet urban scholars often ignored or neglected this fact 
and instead opted to examine external drivers such as external investments or 
federal/state regulations that may foster local economy9. Despite years of belief in the 
role urban amenities played in driving the economic growth, only recently urban scholars 
began incorporating amenities as part of larger urban theories (Strom, 2002; Clark, 2000; 
Judd & Fainstein, 1999). Glaeser, Kolko & Saiz (2001) found out in their study that 
urban success comes from being an attractive ‘consumer city’ for high skilled people, and 
this strengthened Clark’s thesis. As cities became more dependent on high skilled people 
to drive the local economy, they gradually embraced the consumption side approach as a 
                                                          
9 Romer (1989) argued that there is a strong association between knowledge, human capital and economic 
growth, however, his thesis did not mention explicitly the role of amenities in attracting human capital with 
high skills.  
39 
 
means to bolster the local economy. These policy shifts are an acknowledgment to the 




Jobs or Amenities: Assessing development strategies in the global economy 
In the global economy, cities compete with one another to attract investment and human 
resources capable of propelling the economy ahead of their competitors. It is common for 
a city to provide an economic stimulus (often in the form of multi-year tax break) to the 
company as an incentive for relocation. Due to the intense intercity competition, local 
governments tend to increase the amount of stimulus offered to the private sector to lure 
them to invest in their cities. This in turn creates a fiscal problem for the city. Rather than 
engage in a constructive negotiation with the private sector, city officials often rely on 
cutting the budget previously allocated to public services. Thus, inter-local competition 
often drives cities to offer higher stimulus but to do so require them to sacrifice provision 
of necessary services.  
 
To avoid this situation, a number of cities began implementing a new approach by 
building amenities. The rationale is that certain demographic groups are attracted to 
relocate to a particular city because of the availability and quality of its amenities. Studies 
by independent groups and consulting firms affirmed this approach, as the result revealed 
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the top ten most sought after cities are those with abundant urban amenities (Knight 
Frank et al., 2011; UN-Habitat, 2011; Foreign Policy, 2010).  
 
Florida posits another approach in bolstering the economic growth of the city (2002, 
2005). He suggests that in the global economy, labor mobility is even higher than before. 
As innovation and invention become the driver to propel the regional economy, one 
particular demographic group holds the key to the future. Labeled as the creative class, 
this group is not restrained by political jurisdiction or geographical limit. Florida (2002) 
argues that as this group drives the economy through creativity and consumption, cities 
should look for a development strategy that can satisfy their needs. Rather than building 
freeways, he suggests that cities should invest on the infrastructure that stimulates 
innovation and creativity.  
 
While his thesis rarely touches on the role of cultural amenities, Florida (2005) also 
believes that urban amenities attract the creative class, because individuals in this group 
often incorporate the consumption of urban amenities into their lifestyle. Other studies 
affirm his assumption. Carlino & Saiz (2008: 33) found that higher local government 
investment in new public amenities would increase a city's attractiveness. This in turn 
disproportionately attracts highly-educated individuals and as these individuals move to 





The Role of Power in the Decision-making Process 
 
The decision to build freeways in the 1960s until the mid-1970s during the pinnacle of 
urban renewal and the emergence of social movements to oppose and remove freeways 
couldn’t be separated from the power holders that influenced the decision-making 
process. There are four concepts of community power structure in the city, from the 
notion that power is concentrated in the hands of elites to the urban regime. Although the 
debates on who governs the city have shifted considerably since the 1960s, these four 
strands are worth mentioning because it gives us a greater understanding of how power is 
exercised in the decision-making process. 
 
The first strand argues that power is concentrated in the hands of elites. By investigating 
Atlanta as a representation of a regional city, Hunter (1953) tried to address the question 
of who governs the city. He used the reputational analysis to reveal who had a decisive 
role in the decision-making process. He concluded that power in the decision-making 
process in reality was concentrated in the hands of elites. These were executive seniors as 
representatives from key businesses in the city and the mayor as the sole representative of 
the public sector. In short, Hunter found that the capitalists were in charge, and local 
government was their servant (Altshuler & Luberoff 2003: 51). 
 
The second strand was developed by political scientists who disagreed with sociologists 
take on the role of power. They opined that the reputational analysis (based on 'status') 
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was not sufficient to address the question of who governs the city. Rather than relying on 
the reputational analysis, scholars from this strand opted to use the decisional analysis 
based on the notion that power is behavioral, and not an individual status. Dahl (1961) in 
his seminal work on 'who (if anyone) governs New Haven?' looked at the way power was 
actually employed in particular decision-making situations. He found out that instead of 
being concentrated in the hands of elites, power was actually dispersed, although not 
equally, among power holders, including local community members. As a result of this, 
the number of studies addressing the issue of plurality in governing the city increased 
significantly.   
 
The third strand perhaps influences decision-making process in an indirect way, 
compared with the first two strands. One of the seminal pieces from this strand is 
represented by Tiebout’s model (1956). This model hypothesizes a situation in which a 
municipal government in a region offers varying public services at varying rates 
(measured through tax rates) and individuals can select to live in a particular municipality 
based on their preferences for these services, and whether they are willing to pay for the 
services. Because municipal governments' budgets depend on individuals and businesses' 
willingness to pay for the provided services through various taxes, they compete with one 
another in offering these services through tax rates that might be acceptable to individuals 
and businesses.   
 
If the third strand focuses its attention on how individual decision is shaped through 
rational choice, the fourth strand directs its attention at the concept of public-private 
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partnership. This stemmed from the notion that elites (such as senior executives from 
local key businesses) form an alliance with public sector, as the middle-class gradually 
lost its grips on the decision-making process. This comes from the fact that city officials 
possess political resources yet they do not have adequate economic assets to ensure that 
any policy created can be implemented. A public private coalition often emerges as a 
strategic response to a significant project or policy that has a broad repercussion. This 
situation is easily found in almost every city not only in the U.S. but in other parts of the 
world as well. Molotch aptly described this as a growth coalition (Molotch 1976; Logan 
& Molotch, 1987) as it is usually formed not only by city hall and chambers of commerce 
but by other stakeholders as well, such as mass media and local universities, to name a 
few. These local coalitions usually seek local economic growth. Stone (1989) added that 
in order to stand, a growth regime needs the participation of the private sector to 
implement the policy. 
 
These four types of community power structure provide an avenue for a growth coalition 
to shape the development strategy to bolster the local economy and to reshape the 
physical structure of the city. The following section will address the association between 







Growth Coalitions and Development Strategies 
 
As the previous section outlines a foundation for understanding various roles of power in 
the decision-making process, this section will address how different groups and actors act 
to influence the design and implementation of development policy. With regard to the 
decision making process, various studies have evaluated the role of local growth 
coalitions in influencing such processes (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Ferman, 1996; DeLeon, 1992). 
Growth coalitions use an array of development strategies from offering incentives such as 
tax abatement or tax holiday to building sport stadia and museums to seek economic 
growth. A development approach that focuses on building amenities and attractive urban 
environments is part of the emerging trend that put an emphasis on the consumption side 
by creating an economic development policy that focuses on the entertainment or 
entrepreneurial aspects of the city (Clark, 1994; Hall & Hubbard, 1998). The idea to 
create an entrepreneurial city is often tailored to attract knowledge and high-skilled 
workers as the economy shifts from manufacturing-based to services-related activities.  
 
Against this background, an entrepreneurial city tends to pursue a consumption-based 
development policy rather than a production-side policy. Placing an emphasis on urban 
cultural amenities can help cities claim the patronage of a particular economic niche. 
Attracting particular patrons to visit and live in the city can stimulate the local economy. 
As these patrons are able to purchase the services provided, this in turn stimulates job 
creation in the city. Although modern approaches to the development strategy often focus 
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on the reductionist explanation of economy, this new approach places culture as a 
centerpiece in harnessing economic development strategy (Allmendinger, 2001).  
 
Behind every development strategy there is a coalition with the aim of bolstering 
development, as measured through the property value and intensification of land use. 
This coalition consists of various actors regardless of their political association and 
ideology. By forging a coalition, this group seeks to maximize property value through 
various development strategies. One example of a growth coalition at the national level 
with an urban element on i t was the urban renewal program. This federal-led initiative 
gained support from municipal governments and local key businesses since it was 
designed to reinforce the attractiveness of central cities’ downtowns and to reverse 
population flight from central cities to suburbs through various means. Municipal 
governments used this federal aid program as a vehicle to demolish poor urban 
neighborhoods to make ample spaces for downtown and highways development. The 
coalition for freeway construction was led from Detroit and supported not only by the 
federal government but also by other municipal governments, truckers, automobile 
dealers, highway contractors, and highway-related businesses in every congressional 
district (Altshuler & Luberoff 2003: 250).  
 
What made this coalition attractive from local governments' perspective was the 
assumption that federal aid was virtually "free" (ibid). State governments took the 
responsibility for the nonfederal share of the expenditure (in the case of highway 
construction), and local governments simply provided in-kind contributions or 
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infrastructure expenditures that the city would have incurred even in the absence of urban 
renewal. Because of this compelling reason, local officials can distribute or share in 
distributing the benefits (of the program/projects) to new actors without aggravating 
taxpayers. 
 
Against this historical trajectory, Peterson makes an interesting argument in his seminal 
work (1981, 1995). He created two distinct categories: developmental policy and 
redistributive policy10. While developmental policy is designed to attract people and 
business investment, redistributive policy tends to repel them. Peterson argued that 
developmental policies were local governments’ responsibility because they were the 
ones who understood local problems and challenges, whereas redistributive policy 
became the domain of the federal government. Because developmental policy was 
associated with the notion of advancing the local economy, local actors and institutions 
formed a coalition to ensure that any policy crafted will boost economic growth. Steps 
were taken to create political and economic environments suitable for implementing such 
policies. Freeway construction in this light could be seen as an example of economic 
stimulus to attract businesses and people to relocate to a particular city.  
 
Growth coalition is a pattern prevalent in any city around the world (Rohe, 2009; Savitch 
& Kantor, 2002; Calavita & Ferrer 2000; Marshall, 1996). This form of coalition allured 
                                                          
10 Although in City Limits (1981), Peterson created three distinct categories; in his subsequent work (1995) 
he merged allocational policy to become a part of developmental policy. Part of his argument was that 
high-quality services are important assets and thus fall within the category of developmental issue (see 
Peterson, P.E. 1995. The Price of Federalism. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press)  
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many cities faced insurmountable tasks in providing services and attracting economic 
investment. Faced with unequal distribution of resources, complex relationships, and 
limited government authority, urban actors were heavily constrained and limited by 
economic and systemic forces (Orr & Johnson 2008: 17). While historically the private 
sector played an important role in shaping local economies in U.S. cities, as cities and 
regions were tightening their belts due to the fiscal crises since the 1970s, a partnership 
with the private sector had created windows of opportunity for local government to 
provide new services needed without sacrificing other existing services already in place. 
A local growth coalition focused on improving the economic condition of the city by 
creating a political environment suitable for implementing developmental policy. Proxies 
such as changes in population, the number of jobs created, and intensification of land use 
reflect the local economic growth. By achieving this, a growth coalition can tighten its 
grip on local politics and direct the development goals to align with theirs.  
 
 
Power and Planning in Urban Freeway Deconstruction: A theoretical framework 
 
The fact that there are cities succeeding in deconstructing their freeways will be framed 
as a foundation for the proposed design. It reflects the antithesis of the importance of the 





I begin my inquiry by addressing the role of power and planning in urban development 
strategy. Planning process is not devoid of the influence of power (Forester, 1988). As a 
result, power ultimately affects the outcome of the planning process. This brings to the 
concept that power is shaped by the following factors: demography, the economic 
structure of the city and inter-governments' relations. These factors work together in 
shaping how the power is exercised in a political arena. A compromise between planners 
and decision-makers on the one hand and major power holders (such as local businesses, 
neighborhood associations, and homeowners) on the other is a prerequisite in today's 
urban development strategy. This compromise becomes the starting point of a local 
growth coalition. 
 
Cities that experience strong economic growth may favor a populist development strategy 
such as urban freeway deconstruction. Local growth coalitions in these cities are 
supported by white-collar workers, minority groups, professional associations, and 
homeowners. On the other hand, declining cities may have difficulties in pursuing a 
populist development strategy and prefer to pursue a long-standing strategy instead. 
Local political elites often dominate the local coalition in a declining city, with additional 
support comes from blue-collar workers and local businesses; however, this power 
structure is not as strong as the power structure in a city with a strong economic growth. I 
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The conceptual model of the policy process for freeway deconstruction consists of two 
stages of inquiry. The first inquiry examines the effect of characteristics of the city on the 
city's decision to remove urban freeway. I break down characteristics of the city to seven 
causal conditions. I then measure the effect of these conditions on the decision to remove 















Figure 2.2 A Conceptual Model to Analyze the Effect of Characteristics of the City on the 
Decision to Remove Freeways 
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The second step is to analyze the role of local growth coalition in shaping the decision to 
remove freeways. To do so, I identify actors and institutions that form the coalition. Once 
I identify those actors and institution, I proceed to explore whether such a coalition may 
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To test whether power and planning have a significant impact on the decision to remove 
urban freeway in American cities, I develop table 2.2 f rom figure 2.1. This table 
illustrates the relation between variables, indicators, sources of data and method of 
analysis that I use to test my propositions. 
 
Table 2.2 Variable, indicators, sources of data and methods of analysis 
Variable Indicator Source Method of Analysis 
Population growth 
& migration 
1. The number of 
population 
between 1970 and 
2000 
2. The number of 
people migrated 
between 1970 and 
2000 
the Housing and Urban 
Development's State of 
the Cities Data 
Systems (SOCDS)  
Comparative 
historical analysis 
Racial composition The proportion of 
African American in a 
city between 1970 and 
2000 
the Housing and Urban 
Development's State of 





Income & poverty Median household 
income in a city 
between 1970 and 
2000 
the Housing and Urban 
Development's State of 







the number of college 
graduates and 
individuals with an 
advanced degree in a 
city between 1970 and 
2000 
the Housing and Urban 
Development's State of 









1. Metro GMP 












The number of housing 
units between 1970 and 
2000 
the Housing and Urban 
Development's State of 












Table 2.2 Variable, indicators, sources of data and methods of analysis (cont'd) 





1. The number of 
jobs created 
between 1970 and 
2000 
2. The number of 
manufacturing jobs 
created between 
1970 and 2000 
3. The number of 
jobs in finance, 
insurance and real 
estate industries 
created between 
1970 and 2000 
the Housing and Urban 
Development's State of 







Access 1. Distance between 
the location of 
housing unit and 
the removed urban 
freeway; distance 
between the 
location of housing 
unit and central 
business district 
2. Economic access 
to employment 
center 




agencies in San 
Francisco and 
Milwaukee 
2. Online spatial data 







Federal laws (Acts) 
and grant, state and 
local budgets 
Relevant acts and the 
amount of budget 
disbursed in each urban 
freeway removal 









Note: the State of the Cities data systems (SOCDS) provides data for individual metropolitan 
areas, central cities, and suburbs. Data are compiled from US Census Bureau (particularly Census 
and American Community Survey (ACS) data).  
 








Research Questions and Propositions 
 
The following questions represent the central inquiry of this project: 
1. What are the key factors of the city that affect the decision to remove urban 
freeways? 
2. What are the similarities and differences between cities that choose to remove 
their urban freeways? 
3. Does freeway deconstruction bring about the intended results, as measured 
through property values? If not, what are the causes? 
4. What type of institutional arrangement and political support ensures the initiative 
for freeway deconstruction can be implemented? 
5. Finally, how can we understand the effect of highway deconstruction in our 
findings? 
 
My first argument is that cities have to align their development strategy with global and 
regional pressures and economic changes. Because of these changes, local government 
needs to create a development strategy that satisfies those who hold economic power. 
Cities also treat changes in their demographic structure and labor force as determinants 
that influence development strategies. In this light, Florida's creative class (2010, 2005) 
can be considered a major driving force in shaping the local economy. He argues that 
what makes one city significantly stronger than another depends upon the presence of a 
creative class. Florida (2005) points out cities with a large number of innovative persons 
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are the ones that can transform themselves from an industrial-based economy into an 
advanced-service sector (a post-industrial city). Post industrial cities with a creative class 
will prefer an array of public goods and improved schools rather than freeways that are 
more suitable to industrial cities. Therefore, this study develops the following 
proposition: cities with post industrial traits are more likely to successfully implement 
freeway deconstruction than declining, transitional industrial cities. In other words, cities 
with a large number of advanced service sectors are more likely to reshape the physical 
environment by demolishing freeways and creating more urban amenities as compared 
with declining, transitional cities.  
 
This brings us to the need to evaluate the economic impact of urban freeway 
deconstruction on pr operty values in the city. The assumption is that freeway 
deconstruction is the antithesis of freeway construction that exports city's real estate 
value to the suburbs. Tearing down a freeway is expected to increase the property value 
of the city and attract certain demographic groups (e.g. white-collar employees) back to 
the city. Further, local government develops this strategy under pressure from vested 
interests that have a s take in seeing increased property values in the city (Logan & 
Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976). I develop my second proposition from this assumption. 
It focuses on the impact of freeway deconstruction on pr operty values, in particular 
commercial and residential values, and can be stated as follows: Where cities are ready 
for this change, freeway deconstruction brings positive changes in property values 




My second proposition leads to the notion of whether a particular type of political support 
and institutional arrangement leads to urban freeway deconstruction. This brings us to the 
possibility that local growth machines spur the initiative to reshape the physical structure 
of the city. This study posits that there is an interaction between economic development 
and political processes. Class-based or traditionally left-right issues no longer dictate 
development strategies (Sharp 2005: 133; Clark & Inglehart 1998: 9-10; Rosdil, 1991). 
Rather, strategies are geared towards a new political culture. Miranda & Rosdil (1995) 
even argued that the magnitude of unconventional political culture was an important 
predictor of progressive economic development policy. I summarize those arguments as 
my third proposition as follows: Cities with post materialist, populist coalitions and 
progressive growth machines will support freeway deconstruction, whereas declining, 
transitional industrial cities may not have enough political support for removing their 
urban freeways. 
 
This study addresses the argument that a post-industrial city might be more successful in 
implementing freeway deconstruction. The argument is that a post-industrial city is 
capable of negotiating with the private sector in terms of what kind of infrastructure they 
might need to build, while a transitional declining city is unable to do this. This leads to 
the assumption that a post-industrial city has a different reason when implementing 
freeway deconstruction compared with a declining transitional industrial city. Because 
the reason is different, I assume that the efforts yield different result and impacts. This 
leads me to my last proposition: There are significant differences between a post-
industrial city and a declining, transitional industrial city in the process and effect of 
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urban freeway deconstruction. My assumption is that although freeway deconstruction 
provides space for urban amenities for both post industrial city and declining industrial 
city, the former pursues this approach to satisfy the needs of the “creative class” while the 
latter engages this strategy to lure the “creative class” to come to the city. And as a 
consequence, I predict that the positive impact of freeway deconstruction will be more 





This literature review outlines the theory underpinning this dissertation’s research 
questions and the propositions under examination. The remaining chapters summarize the 








This chapter deals with the way data is collected and analyzed. It outlines the nature of 
the study, the research design and model, the method employed for investigation, the 





I use comparative analysis to investigate the reasons why some cities successfully 
removed their urban freeways while others did not. Savitch & Kantor (2005) argued that 
comparative analysis help the researcher to get a d epth analysis that fits within the 
context, but at the same time also provides common ground that is testable on a larger 
urban pattern (p. 137). Comparative analysis can also be used to explain similarities or 
differences (Pickvance 2001: 7, 16 ). Comparative analysis requires the things being 
compared to be commensurable but not necessarily identical.   
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There are two approaches in comparative study, one is the variable-oriented strategy and 
the other is the case-oriented strategy (Pickvance 2001, 12) . DiGaetano & Klemanski 
(1999), Savitch & Kantor (2002), and Sellers (2002) employed comparative analysis in 
exploring urban governance in a number of cities. Using a number of cities as the basis of 
their analysis, they identified the underlying structure of urban decision-making patterns. 
They also employed the variable-oriented strategy in the analysis to explore similarities 
and differences. The opposite approach is the case-oriented strategy, such as the study of 
Abu Lughod (2007) or the seminal works of Sassen (1991). Since this study seeks to 
appreciate complexity and differences found in the units of observation, it employs the 
case-oriented strategy. 
 
One of the issues involved in creating a comparative study design is the number of 
observation sites for comparison. A large number of observations not only consume time 
in collecting and analyzing data, but also add burden for the researcher who has to 
scrutinize a lot of information in order to find causal patterns. Savitch & Kantor (2005, 
137), borrowing from Durkheim's argument, pointed out that comparisons should contain 
substantial variation allowing the researcher an ‘adequate range’ of subjects for 
comparison. The most important thing is that the research goal should determine the 
balancing act. This study evaluates 23 cases from 21 c ities before delves deeper in the 
case study of urban freeway deconstruction in San Francisco and Milwaukee. By 
carefully selecting cases of American cities as the unit of analysis, this approach could 
overcome the noise from the differences in country-level history, ecology and culture that 
are inherent in cross-national comparison (Savitch & Kantor 2005: 141). Pickvance 
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argued that while writers were commonly resorting to two contrasting sides (either 
universalizing or differentiating), there are two other types of comparative analysis: 
differentiating comparative analysis with plural causation and universalizing comparative 
analysis with plural causation (2001: 23). Pierre (2005: 459), drawing from Savitch & 
Kantor’s (2002) and Sellers’ (2002) works, suggested a framework that combines 
sensitivity in the analysis of individual cases with a comparative analysis to uncover 
drivers of change and causal relationships between key variables in the analysis. This 
combination, if applied to a sufficient number of cases, can be rewarding. 
 
 
The Application of Comparative Analysis 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Causal Conditions and Coding 
In order to analyze the proposition that a certain type of city has greater influence in 
shaping the decision to demolish urban freeways than others, I use qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA). I have identified proposals to remove urban freeways in 21 
cities; however only five cities were able to implement such a proposal. This raises a 
question: what makes a city differ one from another in terms of its ability to remove 
urban freeways? To answer this question, I develop causal conditions based on t he 
typology of cities. I use two distinct definitions to differentiate cities based on their socio-
economic characteristics: one is a prosperous post-industrial city; the other is the 
declining, transitional industrial city. Differentiating cities into two distinct categories 
helps me focus on the notion that there is a correlation between characteristics of the city 
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and the decision to remove urban freeways and that a certain type of cities has a greater 
possibility of removing urban freeways than others.  
 
I use two different definitions of cities in this study. These definitions stem from the 
effect of globalization, economic maturity, and de-industrialization on cities. Using Bell's 
seminal definition of post-industrial society (1973), I define 'post-industrial city' as a city 
with the following indicators: (1) service sector as the economic base, (2) the dominance 
of white-collar employment, and (3) knowledge as the governing principle in social life11. 
I define 'the declining transitional industrial city' as a city with the following indicators: 
(1) manufacturing industry as the economic base, but it fails to stimulate local economic 
growth, (2) the percentage of college graduate or individual with an advanced degree is 
less than 20 pe rcent, and (3) the percentage of African-Americans is higher than 25 
percent of total population.   
 
Thus, from these two definitions, I develop seven causal conditions to investigate the 
effect of characteristics of the city on the decision to demolish urban freeways. The first 
causal condition is net employment growth. This is the number of employment created in 
central cities by all industries. The second condition focuses on the performance of the 
manufacturing industry, by looking at the number of jobs in the manufacturing industry 
created in central cities. The third causal condition looks for the ability of the advanced 
                                                          
11 There is the fourth dimension in Bell's definition (an increasing role for government in social regulation), 
however, because changes in the government's role is not part of this study, I exclude this from the working 
definition of a post-industrial city.  
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service sector to generate employment in central cities. The fourth causal condition 
evaluates growth in median household income as the effect of economic growth. As the 
city adds more jobs and median household income increases, I posit that these two factors 
combined leads to an increased housing occupancy rate. Thus, housing occupancy rate 
becomes the fifth causal condition.  
 
Because the post-industrial city is associated with a healthy economy, I expect that there 
is a positive effect of factors such as employment growth, job creation in the advanced-
service sector, housing demand and median household income on the outcome. However, 
this is not the case in the declining, transitional industrial city. The effect of net 
employment growth on the decision to remove urban freeways in this city cannot be 
determined. Net employment growth may propel a local economy; however, it is 
uncertain whether this growth will have a significant effect on t he outcome. This 
explanation also applies to employment growth in the advanced-service sector. It is 
doubtful that the high level of job creation in this sector will affect the decision to remove 
urban freeways in the declining, transitional industrial city. Moreover, I suspect that 
changes in median income may have a negative effect on the outcome.  
 
The last two causal conditions concern the socio-economic aspects of the city. 
Educational attainment becomes the sixth causal condition. It is indicated by the percent 
of college graduates and individuals with an advanced degree. The last causal condition is 
racial diversity. It measures the proportion of minorities of total population. In my study, 
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I use the proportion of African Americans to represent minority groups. In a post-
industrial city, educational attainment plays a considerable role in influencing the 
development strategy. However, it is doubtful racial diversity will also play a similar role. 
In the declining, transitional industrial city, it is uncertain whether both causal conditions 
have considerable effects on the outcome. 
 
The first step is obtaining the demographic and economic data of the 21 cities. I utilize 
the Housing and Urban Development State of Cities Data Systems (SOCDS) as this 
database provides data for individual metropolitan areas, central cities, and suburbs. I use 
the data between 1970 and 2000 because the proposals to remove urban freeways in the 
21 cities took place between 1970 and 2000. I classify the data based on the seven causal 
conditions that I have identified before. Because the unit of analysis is the case instead of 






































































        
Baltimore -65,516 -59,740 -108 -2.50 -1.99 63.0 27 
Buffalo -49,944 -37,122 -813 -17.71 -12.51 35.6 31.5 
Chicago -45,027 -231,426 24,956 6.59 -4.86 35.4 31.4 
Cleveland -78,261 -63,851 1,881 -19.88 -18.57 49.5 25.8 
Hartford -12,472 -9,201 -3,751 -15.56 -13.32 35.0 16.1 
Louisville -20,061 -26,329 1,091 -3.93 -6.77 31.8 31.5 
Milwaukee -23,662 -49,263 2,986 -12.79 1.13 35.9 28.2 
Nashville 104,665 -6,867 10,240 15.23 63.98 25.7 34.2 
New Haven 1,214 -5,928 -5 9.73 7.92 35.1 24.7 
New Orleans 823 -11,263 -1,445 7.27 2.23 65.7 31.9 
New York 379,781 -323,418 36,655 9.85 2.23 23.5 29.2 
Niagara 
Falls -7,870 -7,605 77 -27.47 -3.82 17.5 25.7 
Oklahoma 
City 91,378 6,288 8,898 6.36 63.94 14.2 28.3 
Portland (1) 128,769 11,466 6,882 31.90 55.62 5.5 36.4 
Portland (2) 128,769 11,466 6,882 31.90 55.62 5.5 36.4 
Providence 3,629 -8,584 758 6.37 -0.84 11.7 26.4 
Rochester -19,921 -26,127 -871 -18.71 -5.62 37.4 28.2 
San 
Francisco 
(1) 134,745 2,752 6,963 79.82 10.41 6.6 34.9 
San 
Francisco 
(2) 134,745 2,752 6,963 79.82 10.41 6.6 34.9 
Seattle 105,083 -8,054 3,090 35.55 21.09 7.3 42.4 
Syracuse -12,070 -10,333 -1,562 -8.57 -5.21 23.6 24.9 
Trenton -411 -7,022 563 5.05 -3.97 49.9 19.3 
Washington, 
D.C. -19,399 -4,700 4,111 30.28 -2.08 58.4 28.3 






After the data is compiled, I code the data to obtain seven causal conditions with a 
Boolean value of 0 and 1. Table 3.2 outlines the differences between post-industrial cities 
and declining, transitional industrial cities in seven causal conditions. The signs on the 
table display whether a particular causal condition has an influence on t he decision to 
remove urban freeways or not.  
Table 3.2 The expected effect of causal Conditions on urban freeway deconstruction 
Demographic and Economic Data Outcome 




deconstruction in the 
post-industrial city 
urban freeway 




net employment growth between 
1970-2000 
empl-growth + - 
employment growth in the 




employment growth in FIRE 
industries between 1970-2000 
FIRE-growth + + 
change in the median household 
income between 1970-2000 
income + - 
percentage of housing units added 
between 1970-2000 
housing + - 
change in the proportion of the 




change in the proportion of 




Source: Author's interpretation from Ragin (1987, 2000) 
Note: 
 + : denotes there is considerable influence on the outcome 
 - : denotes there is no significant influence on the outcome  
 
To evaluate whether these causal conditions may have effects on the decision to remove 
urban freeways, I use the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method. I choose this 
method because it helps me identify combinations of causal conditions that may lead to 
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the decision. Further, since there are only 23 cases represent 21 cities it is not feasible to 
use a variable-oriented approach to identify which causal conditions significantly affect 
the decision.  
 
To identify which combinations have a close association with empirical cases, I change 
each condition into a nominal-scale. This helps me relate the calculation with theories I 
use in chapter two. For example, Bell's argument on pos t-industrial society (1973) 
addresses the role of the advanced service sector in creating considerable jobs and thus in 
my analysis I assign a positive sign (+) for a city which exhibits positive white-collar 
employment growth. This approach also applies to other causal conditions as well.   
 
For the first causal condition that describes the net employment growth between 1970 
and 2000, I set a p arameter: cities with a n egative net employment growth rate are 
assigned '0' (absent), while those with a positive net employment growth rate are assigned 
'1' (present). I argue that a city with the value of '1' represents a city with a h ealthy 
economy and thus has a probability of influencing the decision to remove urban 
freeways. Net employment growth here is defined as the total number of jobs created 
from all industries. This means that net employment growth may influence the decision to 
remove urban freeways. It follows the following argument. Net employment growth has a 
positive effect on housing demand and median income. Net employment growth with a 
positive sign will increase median income and housing demand. On the other hand, 
growth rate with a negative sign may weaken housing demand since there is a probability 
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that as median income decreases, the ability of individuals and households to purchase 
houses also decreases. Thus, as housing demand increases, municipal government starts 
to consider the option of removing urban freeways to free land for development. In other 
words, net employment growth indirectly affects the decision to remove freeways. Using 
the parameter outlined above yields the following: there are 12 cities with the value of '0' 
and nine cities with the value of '1'.    
 
The second causal condition concerns the effect of de-industrialization on the city, 
measured by the number of jobs created in the manufacturing industry. The focus is on 
the ability of the manufacturing industry to generate employment in a large enough 
number to stimulate the economy. Although job losses in the manufacturing industry are 
common phenomena in U.S. cities (especially between 1970 and 1990), I argue that cities 
with a healthy economy should be able to create jobs in all industries, including in the 
manufacturing industry. Job creation in the manufacturing industry signals a healthy 
economy, although not all cities with a healthy economy indicate job creation in the 
manufacturing industry. Hence, for the second causal condition, I set a parameter: those 
cities with negative growth rate in manufacturing industry are assigned '0' (in other 
words, employment growth in manufacturing industry is absent in this city), whereas 
cities with positive net employment growth sign are assigned '1' (in other words, 
manufacturing industry adds considerable number of jobs in this city). From this second 




This leads us to the third causal condition: job creation in the advanced-service sector. A 
post-industrial city is capable of generating a considerable number of jobs in the service 
sector, particularly in the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industries. Even 
though almost all cities are able to create jobs in the FIRE industries, not all cities were 
able to maintain a steady employment growth in these industries between 1970 and 2000. 
Hence, the third parameter states: cities with a positive employment growth rate in the 
FIRE industry are assigned '1', whereas those with a negative growth rate are assigned '0'. 
This yields the following: seven cities are assigned '0' and 14 cities are assigned '1'.    
  
The fourth causal condition deals with the effect of a healthy economy. If the local 
economy grows, we can expect demand for various goods and services will increase. This 
in turn stimulates job creation. Conversely, job creation also stimulates demand for 
various goods and services. As jobs and demand for goods and services increase over 
time, I argue the median household income will increase as well. I assume as the median 
household income increases, so does the support for urban freeway deconstruction as a 
populist strategy. Thus, I set the parameter as follows: cities with a positive increase in 
median household income are assigned '1', while those with a negative increase in median 
household income are assigned '0'. This yields the following: 15 cities are assigned '0' and 
six cities are assigned '1'. 
 
The fifth causal condition portrays the effect of a healthy economy on the use of land. As 
the cities experience economic growth, there is empirical evidence that housing 
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occupancy rates increase as well. Higher occupancy rates reflect higher housing demand. 
If the housing supply is limited, market will compensate this through an increased 
housing and land price. This will lead to additional demand on hous ing development. 
Cities will respond to this demand by looking for additional land for development. I 
argue that cities with higher housing occupancy rates seek to remove their urban 
freeways while cities with lower housing occupancy rates may not be interested in 
removing their urban freeways. Therefore, I set the parameter as follow: cities with a 
positive increase in housing occupancy rate are assigned '1', while those with a negative 
increase are assigned '0'. This yields the following: 11 c ities are assigned '0' and nine 
cities are assigned '1'. 
   
The sixth causal condition is racial composition. Various studies have explored the effect 
of racial diversity and/ or racial composition on e conomic growth (Alesina & Ferrara, 
2005; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Florida & Gates, 2001). These studies confirm 
that there is a correlation between racial diversity and productivity and economic growth, 
especially in the rich democratic societies. One striking finding from these studies reveals 
that racial diversity may have a negative effect on the economic growth (Easterly & 
Levine, 1997; Mauro, 1995). Alesina & La Ferrara (2005), however, emphasize the need 
of tailoring racial diversity with political institutions to explain why cities with diverse 
ethnicities with no dominant group may achieve higher economic growth than those with 
a dominant group. The reason may lies in the fact that if a group is politically dominant, 
it may impose a type of government that restricts the freedom of the minority. On the 
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other hand, a more fractionalized society in which no group is dominant may end up with 
a constitution especially careful to defend the rights of minorities (ibid: 770).  
 
I posit that a city with a diverse racial composition with no dominant group may achieve 
higher economic growth than a city with a single predominant racial group. To evaluate 
whether racial diversity may have an effect on the outcome, I collect information on the 
proportion of African Americans from 21 cities between 1970 and 2000. Cities with the 
percentage of African American population less than 25 percent represent a diverse racial 
composition. On the other hand, a percentage of African American population more than 
25 percent in the city signifies that a single predominant group is present. Hence, I set a 
parameter as follows: cities with a percentage of African American population less than 
25 percent are assigned ‘1’, whereas cities with a percentage of African American 
population greater or equal to 25 percent are assigned ‘0’. This produces the following: 
11 cities are assigned ‘1’, and 10 cities are assigned ‘0’.  
 
The last causal condition is the educational attainment. Using Bell's argument that 
knowledge in the post-industrial city is the governing principle in social life I develop an 
argument that an individual with higher educational background has a higher effect on 
the local economy than an individual with lower educational background. Romer in his 
study (1989) found that literacy level helped predict the rate of investment. Because the 
rate of investment significantly affects the growth rate, he argued that the literacy level 
indirectly predicts the rate of growth, although he noted that this may be the cause of 
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collinearity. Florida in his seminal study on creative class also suggested the importance 
of having individuals with higher education in stimulating the local economy (2002, 
2005).  
 
In this study, I assume there is a correlation between the number of college graduate and 
individuals with an advanced degree with the economic growth of the city. Thus, I use 
the number of college graduates and individuals with an advanced degree between 1970 
and 2000 as a proxy to estimate the effect of higher education on the local economy. The 
argument is that higher educational attainment stimulates higher value added of goods 
and services in a city. The higher the number of college graduate and individuals with an 
advanced degree, the faster is the rate of economic growth. I develop a parameter as 
follows: cities with the percentage of college graduate and individuals with an advanced 
degree higher than 25 percent are assigned '1', whereas cities with the percentage of 
college graduate and individuals with an advanced degree less or equal to 25 percent are 
assigned '0'. This yields the following: there are 18 cities with symbol '1', and three cities 
with symbol '0'. 
 
Table 3.3 illustrates the result of the coding process. Demographic and economic data of 
the 21 cities observed are translated into Boolean value of 0 and 1. The result facilitates 
further analysis using the crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (cs/QCA) to 











income housing race educatio
n 
Baltimore 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Buffalo 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Chicago 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Cleveland 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Hartford 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Louisville 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Milwaukee 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Nashville 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
New Haven 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
New Orleans 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
New York 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Niagara Falls 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Oklahoma City 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portland (1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portland (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Providence 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rochester 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
San Fransisco (1) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
San Fransisco (2) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Seattle 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Syracuse 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Trenton 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Washington, D.C. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Source: author's analysis, based on the coding process from table 3.1 
My first proposition focuses on the notion that a post-industrial city may have a better 
chance in removing urban freeways than a declining, transitional industrial city. To 
investigate this proposition, I run all seven causal conditions altogether to identify what 
combination of causal conditions may have an effect on t he outcome. I employ the 
cs/QCA method to calculate possible combinations of causal conditions that affect the 
outcome. This calculation will result in a conjuncture of causal conditions that lead to the 
outcome. There are two principles of causal complexity in the cs/QCA. The first category 
refers to necessity. This indicates whether a causal condition is necessary for the outcome 
to happen. A necessary condition is a superset of the outcome. The second category refers 
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to sufficiency. A sufficient condition (or a combination of conditions) is a subset of the 
outcome. The following examples show the differences between necessary and 
sufficiency in cs/QCA:  
1. education → decision to remove urban freeway (education is necessary and 
sufficient) 
2. education * employment growth in FIRE industry → decision to remove urban 
freeway (education is necessary but not sufficient) 
3. education + employment growth in FIRE industry → decision to remove urban 
freeway (education is sufficient but not necessary) 
4. education * employment growth in FIRE industry + housing * race → decision to 
remove urban freeway (education is neither necessary nor sufficient) 
   
 
San Francisco and Milwaukee: A comparative analysis 
 
The finding from the cs/QCA section serves as a background for my comparative 
analysis on t wo cities that successfully remove their urban freeways. I choose San 
Francisco and Milwaukee because both cities were able to remove their urban freeways 
despite their distinct characteristics. San Francisco is a post-industrial city with a 





San Francisco and Milwaukee had an urban population of more than 100,000 people and 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population of more than one million people. In terms 
of population density, both cities had a relatively high population density (17,243 people 
per square mile in San Francisco and 6,214 people per square mile in Milwaukee) in 
2010. San Francisco is a post-industrial city while Milwaukee is a typical transitional 
declining industrial city in the Midwest. Table 3.2 depicts differences between San 




















Table 3.4 San Francisco and Milwaukee in a snapshot 
 San Francisco, 
CA 
Milwaukee, WI 
Type of government Consolidated 
city-county 
City 
City size [sq. miles] 46.87  96.9 
Population (city proper)  805,235 594,833 
Population (MSA level)  4,335,391 1,555,908 
Population density (city proper) [person/sq. miles] 17,179  6,296 
2010 Percapita income (in current dollars) 45,478 26,624 
2010 Median household income (in current dollars) 71,304 51,598 
2010 Educational attainment (population 25 years or 
older with bachelor’s degree) [in %] 
31.5 13.8 
2010 Unemployment rate (city) [in %] 7.1 11.6 
2010 Unemployment rate (MSA) [in %] 9.5 8.2 
Percentage of black population in 2010 (central city) 6.7 40.9 
Percentage of the Black population in 2010 (MSA) 9.1 17.4 
Percentage of employment in FIRE (finance, insurance, 
real estate) in 2010 
9.8 6.4 
2008 Gross Metropolitan Products (GMPs) [in millions 
of current dollars] 
336,101 82,909 
2008 Central City’s contribution to GMPs [in %] 54.8  
2010 Gross Metropolitan Products (GMPs) [in millions 
of current dollars) 
325,927 84,574 
Relative Global Network Connectivity (GNC) 0.508 - 
2010 Global City Classification according to GaWC Alpha Gamma- 
Source:  
1) Population data (at city level), population density, and land area in square miles for San 
Francisco are taken from U.S. Census Bureau website: 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0667000.html, last accessed January 23, 2012. 
2) Population data (at city level), population density and land area in square miles for 
Milwaukee, WI are taken from U.S. Census Bureau website: 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/5553000.html., last accessed January 23, 2012.   
3) Educational attainment data (population 25 years or older with a bachelor’s degree) for 
the city of San Francisco, CA can be accessed at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, 
last accessed January 23, 2012.  
4) Educational attainment data (population 25 years or older with a bachelor’s degree) for 
the city of Milwaukee, WI can be accessed at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, 
last accessed January 23, 2012. 
5) Unemployment data for San Francisco is taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics website 
http://www.bls.gov/web/metro/laummtrk.htm, last accessed on June 4, 2011. 
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6) Unemployment data for the City of Milwaukee, WI is taken from U.S. Census website 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, 
last accessed January 26, 2012. 
7) Unemployment data for Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Ellis MSA is taken from Wisconsin 
Department of Workforce Development website 
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/newsreleases/ui_local_default.pdf, accessed at June 4, 
2011. However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimates that the unemployment 
rate is slightly lower than the figure published by Wisconsin DWD (7.6% as per April 
2011). 
8) Information about dissimilarity in the central city and MSA for both cities are obtained 
from U.S. 2010: Discover America in A New Century 
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/segregation2010/Default.aspx?msa=41620 (last 
accessed September 29, 2011) 
9) Information about Gross Metropolitan Products (GMPs) for San Francisco-Oakland-
Freemont, CA MSA and Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Ellis, WI MSA is obtained from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis website 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmetro/action.cfm, last accessed January 23, 2012.  
10) Information about City of San Francisco’s contribution towards San Francisco-Oakland-
Freemont, CA MSA's GMP can be found at the US Mayors website 
http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/MetroEcon0608.pdf, last accessed June 
4, 2011. 
11) Global network connectivity data on San Francisco and Milwaukee is obtained from the 
following: 
i. Taylor, P.J. & R.E. Lang. 2005. U .S. Cities in the 'World City Network.' The 
Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program Survey Series, available 
online at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20050222_worldcities.pdf (last 
accessed on January 23, 2 012). This paper listed 40 U.S. cities and measured 
their global network connectivities (GNC). San Francisco is one of the 40 cities 
with global network connectivity score at 32,178 and relative GNC score of 
0.508. Milwaukee is not listed as one of those 40 cities because its relative GNC 
score is less than 0.059. 
ii. Derudder, B., F. Witlox & P.J. Taylor. 2007. United States Cities in the World 
City Network: Comparing their positions using global origins and destinations of 
airline passengers. Urban Geography 28 (1): 74-91. The authors measure the 
global network connectivity profiles of American cities using airline passengers' 
data and find that 23 out of 40 cities have high global network connectivities. San 
Francisco ranks fourth in this list, while Milwaukee is not on the list. This does 
not mean that Milwaukee does not have the global exposure like San Francisco. 
The finding implies that although Milwaukee has global network connectivity, it 
is relatively small compared with other global American cities such as San 





I use the comparative analysis to evaluate my second and third propositions. My second 
proposition is built from the claim that a positive effect from removing urban freeway is 
strongly felt in a post-industrial city rather than in a declining, transitional industrial city. 
A hedonic price model is used to measure the economic impact of urban freeway removal 
on property values in San Francisco and Milwaukee. My third proposition is derived from 
my claim that a local coalition in a progressive city is supportive of freeway removal than 
a local coalition in a declining, transitional industrial city. To do so, I use a comparative 
historical analysis to trace the process of urban freeway removal in San Francisco and 
Milwaukee and to identify stakeholders and power holders that had political influence in 
the decision-making process.    
 
 
Hedonic Price Model to Estimate the Effect of Freeway Removal on House Prices 
 
My second proposition posits that freeway deconstruction brings positive changes in the 
property values (commercial and residential values). Implicit in this statement is the 
claim that a positive effect from removing urban freeway is strongly felt in a post-
industrial city rather than in a declining, transitional industrial city. By a positive effect 
here, I mean land value and/ or housing price will increase because of urban freeway 
removal. My argument rest on t he following assumption: the broader is the support to 
remove the freeways, the higher is the effect of freeway removal on housing prices. In a 
post-industrial city, homeowners and neighborhood associations become the main drivers 
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in the local growth coalition. However, in a declining, transitional industrial city, local 
elites drive the agenda.  
 
As the majority of population in the post-industrial city consists of people with a higher 
educational background and broader access to economic resources, demand for urban 
amenities is higher in this city than in a declining, transitional industrial city. This is 
because their lifestyle demands higher consumption of urban amenities. Hence, we can 
expect the majority of the population in the post-industrial city will support any 
development strategy that will create additional space for urban amenities. On the other 
hand, a declining, transitional industrial city may not have higher demand for urban 
amenities because the majority of the population still work in the manufacturing industry 
and may have different lifestyle compared with those in the post-industrial city.        
  
To test this proposition, I use property value at a specified time (before and after freeway 
removal) as an indicator to measure whether considerable changes took place in each 
city. This approach rests on t he following assumption. Housing sector is very much 
associated with the economic growth. High demand on t he housing sector indicates a 
positive economic growth and at the same time, it will trigger growth in other economic 
sectors. Further, high economic growth will also stimulate housing demand not only in 
the central city but in suburban areas as well. Various factors influence demand for 
houses, such as close proximity to urban amenities and views of attractive landscape. 
This implies that if particular house is located near urban amenities and/ or has an 
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attractive vista, then the price is higher compared with a similar house that is located far 
from urban amenities or without an attractive vista. Hence, urban freeway removal is 
seen as a land development strategy. 
 
Since property value is a differentiated bundled of structural and neighborhood 
characteristics, we can estimate the effect of each characteristic on the price using the 
hedonic price model12. This method is widely used in estimating the effect of 
neighborhood characteristics and amenities on housing price, such as public school 
attributes (Clark & Herrin, 2000), open space amenities (Shultz & King, 2001) or even 
environmental quality, such as air quality (Beron et al., 2001) and noise from highway 
construction (Chernobai et al., 2011). Because we perceive houses as goods with a 
package of attributes, then the price of one house differs with another as the attributes 
change or if there is an additional unit of the attributes to the house.  
 
In order to estimate whether changes in the property value is the effect of urban freeway 
removal or from other factors, I use housing and neighborhood characteristics in the 
calculation. To do s o, I use property value as the dependent variable, and for the 
independent variables, I use structural characteristics (age of the house, number of 
bedrooms, type of structure, building size, lot size) and neighborhood characteristics 
                                                          
12 I use Rosen's definition of a hedonic price model. He defined a hedonic equation as "a joint envelope of 
a family of value functions and another family of offer functions" (1974). The price of a marketed good 
reflects its characteristics. For example, the price of a car reflects not only the capacity of its machine and 
fuel consumption, but also reflects style, luxury and lifestyle. Therefore, a researcher can assess the 
individual characteristics of certain good by looking at how the price people are willing to pay for it 
changes when the characteristics change.  
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(including the availability of urban amenities and close proximity to urban freeways). I 
gather information on property value from various sources. For information pertaining to 
property data in the city of Milwaukee, I retrieve information from the Assessor’s Office. 
They collected and stored property data digitally since 2002.  
 
For calculation, I use property data from district 3 and district 4 in the case of Milwaukee 
and financial district and Chinatown property data in the case of San Francisco. To 
evaluate whether urban freeway removal brings the intended economic impact, I calculate 
property value before and after freeway removal in both cities. Table 3.4 describes the 
breakdown of each variable with the predicted sign that I use in estimating the effect of 
urban freeway removal on housing price. Due to the housing crisis, which started in 













Table 3.5 Variable name and definition, data source, descriptive statistics and predicted 
sign 
Dependent variable and variables in the housing category 
Variable name Definition source Predicted sign 
Real price Real sale price of the 
property (2012 dollars)  
Milwaukee: Assessor’s 
Office (nominal price 
divided by CPI for 
housing) 
ln (real price) is the 
dependent variable 
Year built Year the house is built  Assessor’s Office ? 
bedrooms No. of bedrooms in the 
house  
Assessor’s Office + 
story No. of story in the 
house  
Assessor’s Office + 
Exterior  Assessor’s Office + 
Square feet Structure size in square 
feet  
Assessor’s Office + 
Lot size Lot size in square feet  Assessor’s Office + 
Variables in the neighborhood category 
Variable name Definition source Predicted sign 
District/access 1 = urban 
freeway/interstate 
highway within 0.25 
miles of property, 0 = 
otherwise 
Computed via GIS 
application 
- 
Stream 1 = stream within 0.25 
miles of the property, 0 
= otherwise 
Computed via GIS 
application 
? 
    
Source: author's analysis 
The findings are then compared one with another, focusing on what makes housing price 
change before and after freeway removal. Aligning the results from both cities side by 
side helps me identify the effect of freeway removal on the local economy. I predict the 
effect of urban freeway removal on housing price in San Francisco is far more significant 






Identifying Local Growth Coalitions through Comparative Analysis 
 
My third proposition looks for evidence of whether a local coalition in the progressive 
city is supportive of urban freeway removal than a local coalition in the declining, 
transitional industrial city. To identify the existence and the role of a local growth 
coalition in the decision-making process in each city, I use the archival data from various 
sources. These data are obtained from the following sources: 
1. Milwaukee Society of History 
2. Department of City Development, City of Milwaukee  
3. Frank P. Zeidler Section (Government Information Center), Milwaukee Main 
Library 
4. Government Information Center, San Francisco Public Library 
5. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 
6. State of California Department of Transportation 
7. State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation  
8. Local newspapers: Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, San Francisco Examiner 
 
I develop inquiries around the following issues: 
1. Who initiated the idea to remove the freeways?  
2. Were there any particular reasons (social, economic, and/ or political factors) that 
created the pressures to remove the freeways?  
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3. What was the reaction from local governments? Were there any differences 
between initial reaction and subsequent reactions from local government as more 
pressure was built around specific local development strategies such as limiting 
budget allocation for urban freeway construction? Was there any formal 
document made (academic draft/paper, alternative plan) before a decision was 
made? 
4. Was there any pressure or supports from the local community and/ or any other 
non-governmental institutions that may contribute to the decision to remove urban 
freeways? If so, did the support or pressure succeed in achieving the objective of 
removing freeways? 
5. Was there any coalition between private sectors and local governments in pushing 
the idea of removing urban freeways? Was there any particular approach that the 
coalition took to achieve their goal?  
 
I use the questions outlined above to identify whether there were local growth coalitions 
in San Francisco and Milwaukee. Moreover, I also use these questions to evaluate the 
role of each actor or group in the coalition. I classify information obtained from various 
sources into the following category: 
1. socio-economic and political factors which lead to social unrest in the 1960s; 
2. demographic changes and economic downturn between 1960 and 1980 which lead 
to significant changes in the physical structure of the city; 
3. the role of each group/actor in building local coalition to remove urban freeways; 
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4. the effectiveness of local coalitions in shaping the decision-making process, and 
5. the role of federal, state and local governments in shaping and/ or influencing the 
decision-making process.  
 
I analyze each city in a chronological order. This helps me identify relevant factors such 
as socio-economic factors, the disagreement between local governments and state 
governments, and the conflict between municipal government and local community 
among others that motivate the emergence of a local growth coalition in each city. This 
culminates in a comparative table outlining a specific role of each actor in shaping the 
decision to remove urban freeways in each city. I use the findings from the comparative 
table to identify whether there are significant differences between local coalitions in San 
Francisco and Milwaukee. Based on t he definition of a prosperous post-industrial city 
and a declining, transitional industrial city in previous sections, I posit that homeowners, 
neighborhood associations, and professional association dominated the local coalition in 
San Francisco, whereas in Milwaukee the local political elites were the main driver, 






ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITY ON THE 
DECISION TO REMOVE FREEWAYS USING QUALITATIVE 




This chapter evaluates the effect of characteristics of the city on urban freeway removal. 
Seven causal conditions are evaluated against the decision to remove urban freeways in 
21 cities. These causal conditions are derived from two distinct types of cities: a post-
industrial city and a declining, transitional industrial city. I use the "crisp-set Qualitative 




Characteristics of the City as Causal Conditions that Affect the Decision to 
Demolish Freeways 
 
There are less than 30 cities that, in some way, advanced proposals for urban freeway 
deconstruction in the U.S. Of these cities, only five were able to demolish their urban 
freeways between 1970 and 2000. The decision to demolish urban freeways is influenced 
by various aspects of the city. Portland demolished its freeway in the 1970s because local 
communities demanded the beautification of the downtown riverfront and freeways 
blocked views from the city to the river. Several problems such as the high level of air 
pollution and the decline of downtown retail trade also influenced local communities' 
pressure on Portland's municipal government to tear down freeways. San Francisco, on 
the other hand, failed to tear down its freeways, despite continuous demand from local 
communities and social activists since the late 1960s and until an earthquake in 1989 
damaged its freeways. After public in this city discovered that freeways were not 
necessary to facilitate traffic and economic growth did public opinion change. Milwaukee 
also follows the same storyline. This city was divided almost evenly on the issue of urban 
freeways since the 1975 referendum. It finally removed Park East Freeway in 2000 after 
the State of Wisconsin, Milwaukee City, and Milwaukee County reached a compromise 
concerning the uses of ISTEA1 fund allocation. In each of these three cases, various 
aspects were involved in influencing the decision to remove the freeways. 
                                                          
1 The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 is a federal law that provides 
highway and transit funding with collaborative planning requirements. This law gives significant power to 




San Francisco and Portland are two cities with many similarities. Both cities are post-
industrial cities with advanced-service industries as the leading sector. Milwaukee, on the 
other hand, suffers from deindustrialization and still looks for a way to reinvigorate its 
local economy. Even though these cities have different characteristics, they were able to 
remove urban freeways from their road networks.2  
 
It is then pertinent to address the question of which attributes of the city affect the 
decision to remove an urban freeway. To answer this question, I develop seven causal 
conditions derived from two distinct definitions of cities: a postindustrial city and 
declining, transitional industrial city. A post-industrial city refers to a city with advanced 
service industries as the leading sector, whereas a declining, transitional-industrial city is 
indicated by a significant decline in the manufacturing industry, high unemployment 
rates, and local government’s inability to replace the manufacturing industry with other 
potential industries as the economic base.  
 
In order to assess which attributes of the city may affect the decision to demolish urban 
freeways, I break down characteristics of the city into seven causal conditions. I then 
proceed by analyzing these causal conditions that I suspect affect the decision to remove 
urban freeways. The first three causal conditions are snapshots of the central city's ability 
                                                          
2 Between 1970 and 2000, there were 23 proposals of urban freeway removal in 21 cities. However, further 
investigation revealed that only five cities were able to remove urban freeways for various reasons. These 
five cities are, in alphabetical order, Milwaukee, New York City, Niagara Falls, Portland, and Oregon.  
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to generate jobs between 1970 and 2000. The first causal condition is the net employment 
growth, followed by the employment growth in the manufacturing industry as the second 
causal condition, and the employment growth in the finance, insurance, and real estate 
(FIRE) industries as the third causal condition. The fourth causal condition measures 
whether the growth of the local economy has a real impact on voters as measured by 
median household income3. Housing occupancy rate as the fifth causal condition 
indicates whether economic growth stimulates other sector. The sixth condition argues 
that as the local economy grows the racial composition also changes, as African-
Americans are displaced from central cities. The last causal condition essentially argues 
that educational attainment plays a pivotal role in shaping voters' preference in 
influencing the trajectory of local development. As the proportion of college graduates 
and individuals with an advanced degree increases, demand for a better quality of living 
increases. Municipal government responds to this demand by creating an inviting urban 
environment and providing urban amenities. Municipal government then removed urban 
freeways to make way for the development.   
 
Table 4.1 depicts detailed information of these seven causal conditions in each case along 
with the outcome. Out of 21 cities, only three cities, Oklahoma City, Portland, and San 
Francisco, enjoyed a positive employment growth in the manufacturing industry. Even 
though the advanced service sector gradually replaced the manufacturing industry as the 
                                                          
3 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, median household income is the income of householder and all 
other individuals 15 years old and over in the household, whether they are related to the householder or not 
(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long_INC110211.htm). Median household income is a sensitive 
political indicator, because voters may direct their dissatisfaction towards their government if their living 
costs exceed their income.  
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economic base in central cities, not all cities had a positive net employment growth. New 
York, Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle were the only cities that were able to generate 
employment in almost all industries. Surprisingly enough, these cities also had a smaller 
proportion of African American population while the underperformed4 cities tended to 
have a larger proportion of African American population.   
 
Data in table 4.1 are obtained from the State of the Cities Data Systems (SOCDS), 
available from the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) website. The SOCDS 
provides data from individual metropolitan areas, central cities, and suburbs. Data 
collected specifically cover the period of 1970 and 2000. Because cities in the U.S. 
demolished urban freeways between 1970 a nd 2000, I argue that the effects of urban 








                                                          
4 I define underperformed cities here as cities with economic growth less than the national average. I use 
indicators such as median household income, employment growth in all sectors, changes of employment 
growth in manufacturing and FIRE industries and housing occupancy rate in central city.  
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growth income housing race 
educati
on 
1 Baltimore -65,516 -59,740 -108 -2.50 -1.99 63.0 27  - 




231,426 24,956 6.59 -4.86 35.4 31.4  - 
4 Cleveland -78,261 -63,851 1,881 -19.88 -18.57 49.5 25.8  - 
5 Hartford -12,472 -9,201 -3,751 -15.56 -13.32 35.0 16.1  - 
6 Louisville -20,061 -26,329 1,091 -3.93 -6.77 31.8 31.5  - 
7 Milwaukee -23,662 -49,263 2,986 -12.79 1.13 35.9 28.2 demolished 
8 Nashville 104,665 -6,867 10,240 15.23 63.98 25.7 34.2  - 
9 New Haven 1,214 -5,928 -5 9.73 7.92 35.1 24.7  - 
10 New Orleans 823 -11,263 -1,445 7.27 2.23 65.7 31.9  - 
11 New York 
379,781 
-
323,418 36,655 9.85 2.23 23.5 29.2 demolished 
12 Niagara Falls -7,870 -7,605 77 -27.47 -3.82 17.5 25.7 demolished 
13 Oklahoma 
City 91,378 6,288 8,898 6.36 63.94 14.2 28.3  - 
14 Portland 128,769 11,466 6,882 31.90 55.62 5.5 36.4 demolished 
15 Portland 128,769 11,466 6,882 31.90 55.62 5.5 36.4 demolished 
16 Providence 3,629 -8,584 758 6.37 -0.84 11.7 26.4  - 
17 Rochester -19,921 -26,127 -871 -18.71 -5.62 37.4 28.2  - 
18 San Francisco 134,745 2,752 6,963 79.82 10.41 6.6 34.9 demolished 
19 San Francisco 134,745 2,752 6,963 79.82 10.41 6.6 34.9 demolished 
20 Seattle 105,083 -8,054 3,090 35.55 21.09 7.3 42.4  - 
21 Syracuse -12,070 -10,333 -1,562 -8.57 -5.21 23.6 24.9  - 
22 Trenton -411 -7,022 563 5.05 -3.97 49.9 19.3  - 
23 Washington, 
D.C. -19,399 -4,700 4,111 30.28 -2.08 58.4 28.3  - 
Source: author analysis based on SOCDS HUD 
(http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/socds.html, retrieved between June 2011 and 
August 2013), Jeffrey Spivak, 2011 and Eric Jaffe, 2011. 
 
 
To identify relevant causal conditions that affect the outcome (the decision to remove 
freeways) I code each causal condition. To do s o, I assign a Boolean number to each 
causal condition in each case (instance) where '0' indicates that a particular causal 
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condition is absent and '1' indicates that the causal condition is present. This step allows 
me to analyze the combined effect of causal conditions on the decision to remove 
freeways in 21 cities.  
 
I first categorize cases with similar outcome to analyze whether characteristics of the city 
have a significant effect on the decision to remove urban freeway. Similar cases are then 
grouped in a same table. This produces two tables that contain combinations of coded 
causal conditions with their associated outcomes. These two tables depict how frequent 
each combination of causal conditions occurs. The first table (table 4.2) shows seven 
combinations of causal conditions that lead to a positive outcome. The second table (table 
4.3) shows 16 combinations of causal conditions that lead to a negative outcome.  
 
Table 4.2 Coded Causal Condition with A Positive Outcome 
Causal Condition 






growth income housing race education 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Median:         
1 0 1 1 1 1 1   
Source: Author's analysis 
 
 
Table 4.2 r eveals that a positive outcome (a removal of urban freeway) requires a 
combination of six out from seven causal conditions. These conditions are as follow. The 
city experiences employment growth, especially in the FIRE industries. Further, the 
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median household income and housing demand in the city continue to increase. On the 
other hand, the proportion of African Americans is less than 25% of the total population. 
Lastly, the number of college graduates and holders of an advanced degree is more than 
25% of total population. These are characteristics of a prosperous city. We can infer that 
a prosperous city have all the necessary condition to effect the decision to remove its 
urban freeway. However, it is  difficult to generalize the finding. Three cases have all 
seven causal conditions present. The other four cases have only three to six causal 
conditions; therefore, it is difficult to generalize these four cases simply by looking at the 
table.   
 
 
Table 4.3 Coded Causal Condition with A Negative Outcome 
Causal Condition 






growth income housing race education 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 
Median:         
0 0 0 0 0 0 1   
Source: Author's analysis 
 
 
Table 4.3 r eveals a different story of the effect of causal conditions on t he outcome. I 
found that a combination of the following conditions leads to an unsuccessful urban 
freeway proposal. First, the city experiences job losses almost in all industries. Second, 
93 
 
the manufacturing industry is stagnant and there is no a dditional jobs created. Third, 
FIRE industries are not able to create jobs. Fourth, the median household income does 
not increase. Fifth, there is no a dditional housing demand. Lastly, the proportion of 
African-Americans in the city is greater than 25% of the total population. In sum, these 
are indicators of a declining economy. A city with these characteristics will not be able to 
remove its freeways. 
 
However, if we look at the data, not all cities that unsuccessfully removed their highways 
are declining cities. Some of them are prosperous cities, such as Washington, DC or 
Nashville. Median household incomes in these two cities were $51,673 and $50,521 in 
2000 (SOCDS HUDUSER). As a comparison, the average median household income in 
2000 was $47,584 (ibid). Therefore, it is imperative to analyze which causal condition or 
a combination of causal conditions leads to a positive outcome. To do so, I integrate 
cases with a positive outcome and cases with a negative outcome to identify what causal 
conditions may affect the outcome by creating a truth table. 
 
A truth table is like a cell from a multi-way cross-classification of several categorical 
independent variables (Ragin 1987: 87). Each row in this table is not a single case, but a 
summary of all the cases with a certain combination of causal conditions. Constructing a 





To construct a truth table, I use the formula (2)k, with k de noting the number of 
conditions or factors, to calculate possible combinations of causal conditions. The 
analysis yields 128 possible combinations of seven causal conditions. Since there are 128 
possible combinations, it is pertinent to evaluate which combinations are necessary to the 
outcome. To do s o, I use the standard analysis from cs/QCA. This step produces 14 
possible combinations out of 128 combinations that directly associate with the 23 cases 
from 21 cities investigated. However, not all cases are distributed evenly to these 14 
combinations. Three combinations have higher instances, while the remaining 11 
combinations consist of only one case each.  
 
Table 4.4 displays 14 combinations with at least one condition present that may or may 
not produce a positive outcome (demolition of freeways). Three combinations of causal 
conditions yield a positive outcome (freeway removal), while one combination of causal 
conditions has a contradictory outcome as it relates not only to the positive outcome but 
also to the negative outcome. The first three combinations that yield the positive outcome 
have a consistency score of '1.' The fourth combination has a consistency score of 0.600. 
A high consistency level means that a set of causal condition has the ability to provide 


























































































Standard analysis in cs/QCA also produces 1) a complex solution, 2) a parsimonious 
solution and 3) an intermediate solution. A complex solution is a solution from the 
calculation that avoids using any counterfactual cases5; that is rows (combinations) 
without cases. A parsimonious solution on the other hand, permits the use of any 
counterfactual cases that will yield simpler (or fewer) combinations. An intermediate 
solution uses only the remainder cases that survive counterfactual analysis based on 
theoretical and substantive knowledge.  
 
The next step is to identify what causal condition works as a necessary condition for the 
city to remove urban freeways. To do s o, I argue that the decision to remove urban 
freeways is a function of net changes in total employment, employment growth in the 
manufacturing industry and FIRE industries, changes in the median household income, 
number of housing units added, changes in race and ethnicity, and educational 
attainment. This can be formulated into eq. 4.1. 
Y(decision to remove freeways) = f (empl-growth, manuf-growth, FIRE-growth, income, housing, 
race, education) ....................................................................................................(4.1) 
 
The following is my argument for the eq. (4.1). In order to demolish urban freeways, a 
particular city needs to have a net employment growth, in which both the manufacturing 
and FIRE industries should have a positive employment growth. Further, this city should 
                                                          
5 Counterfactual literally means contrary to the fact. Counterfactual case in qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) refers to a conditional statement indicating what would be the case if its antecedent were true 
(although it is not true).  
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have significant growth of median household income to stimulate consumption on 
housing and amenities. As the economy grows, demand for housing units is expected to 
increase. At the same time, a high proportion of college graduates and holders of an 
advanced degree can have a significant effect on the local economy. This is because they 
are more likely to be entrepreneurs and become high level consumers. To bolster local 
economy the percentage of this group should be greater than 25%. As this gentrification 
process slowly takes place, I expect the proportion of African American population will 
also change. As the advanced service sector gradually replaces the manufacturing 
industry, the proportion of African American population will gradually decrease over 
time. My assumption rests on the empirical evidence in many post-industrial cities where 
the percentage of African American population is less than 25%6.  
 
Thus, I argue that it is necessary for the city to have all of those causal conditions before 
it finally arrives at the decision to demolish urban freeways. Prior analysis resulted in a 
truth table with 14 possible combinations of causal conditions necessary for the outcome 
to happen. From these 14 possible combinations, I proceed with crisp analysis QCA to 
identify which combination has a consistency level = 1. The analysis yields three 
combinations of causal conditions with a consistency score = 1, one combination of 
causal condition with consistency score = 0.6, and the remaining combinations have a 
consistency score = 0. The contradictory row where the consistency level = 0.6 s hows 
                                                          
6 Empirical evidence point to the fact that the proportion of urban minority groups decrease over time, with 
the proportion of black population is less than 10% of total population.  
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that there are cases where all causal conditions are present yet the outcome is mixed in a 
sense that the combination produces positive and negative outcome at the same time.  
 
Cs/QCA with Complex Solution 
I direct my attention first to combinations of causal conditions with consistency score = 
1. Table 4.5 depicts these three combinations along with raw coverage, unique coverage 
and consistency score.  
Table 4.5 Truth Table analysis with Quine-McCluskey algorithm 





0.166667 0.166667 1.000000 
~empl-growth*~manuf-growth*fire-
growth*~income*~housing*race*education 
0.166667 0.166667 1.000000 
empl-growth*~manuf-growth*fire-
growth*~income*housing*race*education 
0.166667 0.166667 1.000000 
Source: author analysis using cs/QCA 
Coverage is defined as the relative importance of different paths to an outcome. Raw 
coverage indicates which share of the outcome is explained by a certain alternative path. 
Unique coverage specifies which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by certain 
alternative path. Consistency is defined as the proportion of observed cases that are 
consistent with the pattern. Scholars sometimes use the definition of significance value of 
inferential statistics to explain the consistency score in cs/QCA (Wagemann & Schneider, 
2007; Schneider & Grofman, 2006). Here, the consistency score might be conceptionally 
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similar to the significance value of inferential statistics, and some of the coverage values 
might share some characteristics with measures from regression analysis, such as r2 and 
partial correlation coefficients (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007).  
 
Drawing from table 4.5, I derive the following: 
~empl-growth*~manuf-growth*fire-growth*~income*housing*~race*education + 
~empl-growth*~manuf-growth*fire-growth*~income*~housing*race*education + empl-
growth*~manuf-growth*fire-growth*~income*housing*race*education →  urban 
freeway removal    ................................................................(4.2) 
 
Note that (+) in the eq. (4.2) means (OR) and (*) means (AND). Thus, I argue that in 
order to be able to remove urban freeways from road networks, a city should experience 
one of the following:  
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1. The manufacturing industry experiences enormous job losses, which brings a 
negative impact on other industries. Moreover, median household income in the 
city continues to decline. At the same time, the city also experiences the economic 
restructuring. This is indicated by: (1) the increasing number of college graduates 
and holders of advanced degrees, and (2) the increasing number of individuals 
working in the FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) industries. These two factors 
combined slowly change the demographic composition in the city and stimulate 
housing demand. The proportion of the African-Americans becomes smaller in 
the city. To energize the city, the local coalition looks for a strategy that caters to 
this new demographic structure. The provision of urban amenities is seen as a 
strategy to invigorate the community and at the same time attract high-skilled 
workers. Removing the underutilized freeway is seen as the feasible solution. This 
situation is represented by the following equation: ~empl-growth * ~manuf-




2. The manufacturing industry experiences enormous job losses, which brings a 
negative impact on other industries. As a result, the median household income in 
the city continues to decline. These factors combined slowly change the 
demographic composition in the city. African-Americans become the 
predominant group in the city as White middle classes leave the city. At the same 
time, the city also experiences economic restructuring. This is indicated by: (1) 
the increasing number of college graduates and holders of advanced degrees, and 
(2) the increasing number of individuals working in the FIRE (finance, insurance, 
real estate) industries. Change in the median household income negatively affects 
housing demand. To bolster the local economy, local coalitions in the city place 
an emphasis on college graduates and high-skilled workers in FIRE industries as 
the economic driver. To attract this group, a conventional approach cannot be 
used. Instead, the local coalition endorses an urban amenities driven strategy. 
With the African-Americans' strong position in the local politics and the growing 
role of the high-skilled workers in the local economy, the development strategy 
that works is the one that satisfies both groups. Hence, the only viable solution is 
tearing down the existing urban freeway. This situation is represented in the 
following equation: ~empl-growth * ~manuf-growth * firegrowth * ~income * 






3. The city generates jobs in all industries except in the manufacturing industry. 
Despite the fact that FIRE industries contribute positively to the local economy, 
the median household income remains stagnant or declines. The proportion of the 
African-American population continues to increase because they are attracted to 
new jobs created in the city. At the same time, the number of college graduates 
and holders of advanced degrees continues to increase. This situation brings a 
pressure on the provision of affordable housing. To bolster local economy and to 
provide land for development, the local coalition advances a proposal to remove 
an underutilized urban freeway. This situation is represented by the equation: 
empl-growth * ~manuf-growth * fire-growth * ~income * housing * race * 
education → urban freeway removal  
 
 
cs/QCA with Intermediate Solution 
Using the cs/QCA with complex solution I find that it is not necessary for cities to have 
all seven causal conditions in order to remove their urban freeways. In this section, I use 
cs/QCA with intermediate solution to address this problem by identifying necessary and 
sufficient conditions leading to the outcome. Analyzing 14 possible combinations yields 
three combinations of causal conditions with the consistency score of 1. However, these 
three equations (eq. 4.2) need to be simplified in order to arrive at necessary conditions 
for urban freeway removal to happen. In doing so, I convert each causal condition into a 
single letter. A lower case letter refers to the absence of a condition whereas an upper 
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case letter indicates that such a condition is present in the case. Therefore the following 
applies:   
1. empl-growth (which corresponds to net employment growth) is indicated with A 
(present) or a (absent); 
2. manuf-growth (which corresponds to employment growth in manufacturing 
industries) is indicated with letter B (present) or b (absent); 
3. FIRE-growth (which corresponds to employment growth in FIRE industries) is 
indicated with letter C (present) or c (absent); 
4. income (which corresponds to median household income) is indicated with letter 
D (present) or d (absent); 
5. housing (which corresponds to the number of housing units added between 1970 
and 2000) is indicated with letter E (present) or e (absent); 
6. race (which corresponds to the proportion of black people from total population 
in the city) is indicated with letter F (present) or f (absent), and 
7. education (which corresponds to educational attainment measured by number of 
college graduates and holders of advanced degrees) is indicated with letter G 
(present) or g (absent) 
 
Each condition in the three combinations in the eq. 4.2 is substituted with its 
corresponding letter, and this yields the following equation as follows. The symbol (+) in 
the equation denotes the notion of Boolean addition which represents a logical operator 
OR. A simple equation A + B  = C  can be translated into a s tatement that if either 




Thus, from eq. (4.2), we can write the following: 
~empl-growth*~manuf-growth*fire-growth*~income*housing*~race*education + 
~empl-growth*~manuf-growth*fire-growth*~income*~housing*race*education + empl-
growth*~manuf-growth*fire-growth*~income*housing*race*education → outcome   
(decision to demolish urban freeways)......………………………………………….…(4.3) 
a∙b∙C∙d∙E∙f∙G + a∙b∙C∙d∙e∙F∙G + A∙b∙C∙d∙E∙F∙G  → Y   ................(4.4) 
C·E·G (a + A + b + d + f + F) → Y      ................(4.5) 
C∙E∙G → Y         ................(4.6) 
where Y is the decision to demolish urban freeways.  
 
Thus, the eq. (4.6) can be translated as follows. 
FIRE-growth * housing * education → decision to demolish urban freeways ....(4.7)  
 
In other words, employment growth in FIRE industries (fire-growth), growth in housing 
occupancy rate in the central city (housing) and educational attainment as indicated by 
changes in the number of college graduates (education) altogether affect the decision to 
remove urban freeways. In other words, each of these causal conditions is necessary but 
insufficient to make the city remove its urban freeway. This means that employment 
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growth in FIRE industries independently cannot influence the decision to remove urban 
freeway removal. Nor do the other two conditions.  
 
Equation (4.7) can be explained logically as follow. A high proportion of college 
graduates and holders of advanced degrees stimulates employment growth, especially in 
FIRE industries. They serve as indicators of the city's ability to create jobs with higher 
value added. FIRE industries favor central cities over suburban places due to the principle 
of agglomeration economies, in particular localization economies. Localization 
economies stimulate firms to locate closer to other firms in the same, or related, industry. 
Localization economies encourage a more compact development because of this reason, 
and this helps explain why central city prevails over suburban place.  
 
Agglomeration economies in the central city propel FIRE industries forward. Two factors 
of agglomeration location are worth mentioning: localization economies and urbanization 
economies. Localization economies stimulate firms to locate closer to other firms in the 
same, or related, industry. Labor pooling, such as a high proportion of college graduates 
and holders of advanced degrees, is often cited as one of several sources of localization 
economies. The other source is idea exchanges that facilitate innovation and invention. 
Implicit in this statement is the fact that knowledge and high-skilled workers often value 




Agglomeration economy is responsible in attracting college graduates and holders of 
advanced degrees. These are people with talents and skills, and have the capability to 
become entrepreneurs. Moreover, they also stimulate local consumption in a city. In the 
following section, I try to establish an association between the creative class and the 
ability of a city to remove its urban freeway. The argument is as follows. The creative 
class bolsters the local economy through their consumption of local amenities as part of 
their lifestyles. Because of this, the city is willing to fulfill their need by removing an 
underutilized urban freeway and replaced it with amenities. I direct my attention to the 
empirical data of the 21 cities where five of these successfully removed their urban 
freeways.7 
 
The five cities with successful urban freeway removal had higher median value in seven 
out of ten categories than the other 16 cities. These seven categories are the proportion of 
college graduates and holders of advanced degrees, the concentration of workers in the 
FIRE industries, the 1990 median household income, retail establishment density, retail 
sales and the average sales per establishment, and the number of innovation in 1990.  
 
Post-industrial cities attract certain demographic groups. These groups bring the talent 
and skill necessary to bolster local economies in turbulent times. The higher the 
proportion of this group, the higher the median household income is. The median value 
for the proportion of college graduates and holders of advanced degrees in the five cities 
                                                          
7 The five cities that successfully removed their urban freeways are Portland, New York City, Niagara 
Falls, San Francisco and Milwaukee.  
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with successful urban freeway removal is 27.40%. This figure is 16% higher than the 
median value for the remaining 16 cities in the same category. Moreover, the median 
value of the concentration of workers in the FIRE industries (measured by number of 
workers per square mile) in these five cities is three times higher than those cities with 
unsuccessful urban freeway removal. As expected, the median value for the median 
household income in these five cities is more than ten percent greater than the median 
value for the remaining 16 cities.  
 
We can associate these three factors with local consumption rates. I use the following 
indicators to define local consumption: (1) retail establishment density, (2) retail sales, 
and (3) average sales per establishment. I argue that these three indicators reflect the size 
of local consumption in a city. The median value of local consumption in the five cities 
with successful urban freeway removal is higher than in the other 16 cities.  
 
This finding corroborates Clark's argument about the role of the creative class in 
bolstering the local economy (2000, 1994). The higher the proportion of the creative class 
in a city, the higher the local consumption is. Higher local consumption leads to higher 
rate of innovation. There is a significant variation between post-industrial cities and 
declining, transitional industrial cities. Post-industrial cities have a higher proportion of 
the creative class and average sales per establishment than declining, transitional 
industrial cities. However, I cannot establish the association between the proportion of 
the creative class with the innovation rate in a city. Table 4.6 summarizes this narrative. 
Of all 21 cities that advance urban freeway removal, the five cities that successfully 
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removed their freeways (Milwaukee, New York City, Niagara Falls, Portland and San 
Francisco) had higher values of retail sales, numbers of workers in FIRE industries and 




























































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   







   







   
   
   









   
   






















   
   
   
   















   
   
   









   
   






















   
   
   
   
   






   
   






   
   
   
   








   
   


















   
   
   
   







   







   
   
   









   
   





















   
   
   








   







   
   
   
   








   
   
























   
   
   
   








   







   
   
   









   
   


















   
   
   
   








   







   
   
   
   








   
   






















   
   
   
   








   







   
   









   
   


















   
   
   
   








   







   
   
   









   
   



























   
   
   
   








   







   
   
   









   
   


















   
   
   
   








   







   
   
   
   








   
   


























































































































































































































































































































Glaeser, Kolko & Saiz (2004) provided a convincing argument by presenting empirical 
evidence about urban amenities from U.S., U.K. and French cities. They noted that in 
American cities natural amenities such as temperature and proximity to the coast 
positively affected population growth at county level between 1977 and 1995. In French 
cities, there was a positive correlation between hotel rooms per capita and population 
growth. In their study, hotel rooms were used not as an amenity but as a proxy for tourist 
demand for the city. Further, they also put an emphasis on ur ban density. Higher 
population density facilitates enjoyable social contact, something that low-density 
development cannot provide.  
 
This brings the notion of localization economies and communication economies as 
central tenets to the discussion on how amenities can stimulate economic development. 
Localization economies stimulate firms to locate closer to other firms in the same, or 
related, industry. Communication economies require face-to-face contact, which can 
occur at lower cost in the central city where physical distance between firms is the 
shortest. For years, urban scholars and researchers have recognized face-to-face contact 
as an important force in influencing the location of office employment.8  
 
                                                          
8 Ihlanfeldt reiterates Clapp (1993) argument about the importance of face-to-face contact that differentiates 
offices in central city with those in suburban place. See detail in Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. June, 1995. The 
Importance of the Central City to the Regional and National Economy: A review of the arguments and 
empirical evidence. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 1 (2); Clapp, John M. 1993. 




Thus, we can construct a proposition that high concentration of urban amenities is an 
indicator of a healthy economy. Urban amenities indicates whether cities are attractive or 
not to individuals and households contemplating to move to other locations. The higher 
the concentration of urban amenities in the city, the higher the number of population is. 
In addition, urban amenities very often attract knowledge workers and high-skilled 
labors, an important factor in driving local economy through the FIRE industries. As the 
proportion of knowledge workers and high-skilled labors increases over time, FIRE 
industries will create higher value-added and this will affect median household income. 
The number of college graduates and holders of advanced degrees in a city is used as a 
proxy for knowledge and high-skilled workers. Further, there is no i ncentive for FIRE 
industries to relocate to suburbs due to localization and communication economies. This 
bolstered the demand for housing, which leads the city to find available space for 
development. High proportion of population with college graduate and holders of 
advanced degrees leads to high demand on urban amenities and thus creates additional 
demand for land.  
 
A detailed observation on the five cities that deconstructed the freeways confirms the 
above proposition. All five cities experienced growth in finance, insurance, real estate 
(FIRE) industries, and college graduates and holders of advanced degrees between 1970 
and 2000. These two factors are connected one with another. High-skilled workers satisfy 
labor demand in FIRE industries and at the same time they also stimulate FIRE 
industries' growth through innovation and invention. This in turn fuels the demand for 
housing and other public services. San Francisco and Portland are surrounded by top-tier 
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universities and research centers. The numbers of patents produced between 1990 a nd 
2000 in both cities are the testament to the ability of the region to innovate and capitalize 
on that innovation. Among the five cities with urban freeway removal initiatives, New 
York City lead the group with 295 patents per 100,000 people. Even Milwaukee 
produced more patents (126 patents per 100,000 people) than San Francisco (121 patents 
per 100,000 people) between 1990 and 20009.  
 
This unique combination of factors in turn affected the housing demand and housing 
occupancy rate in each city. Data from the State of the Cities Data System (SOCDS) 
shows that between 1970 and 2000 the housing occupancy rate in central cities increased 
30 percent, whereas in suburban places the rate decreased by more than 30 percent. A 
closer examination reveals that housing occupancy rate in Portland increased by almost 
60 percent, San Francisco by more than 10 percent, and New York by 2.23 percent. Even 
Milwaukee enjoyed growth in terms of housing occupancy rate in the same period. 
However, not all central cities enjoyed this trend. Niagara Falls experienced a drop in 
housing occupancy rate by more than three percent. Four of five cities describes here 
have population of 500,000 people or more (New York, San Francisco, Portland and 
Milwaukee). Only Niagara Falls has population of less than 50,000 people. This does not 
mean that there was a significant population influx from suburbs to central city, which 
                                                          
9 In average between 1990 and 2000, each county in the U.S. produces 192 patents. This roughly translates 
into 267 patents per 100,000 population (according to the report from Office for Patent and Trademark 
Information, April 2000. United States Patent Grants by State, County, and Metropolitan Area (Utility 
Patents 1990 - 1999)) 
113 
 
fueled the housing demand. Rather, low housing occupancy rate in suburbs was triggered 
by the high rate of decentralization in the U.S.10 
  
What separates these five cities with the national trend is the ability of households and 
individuals in buying and renting housing unit in the central city. The average number of 
housing units occupied in central cities increased by almost 30 percent between 1970 and 
2000. Portland has the highest housing demand with more than 50 pe rcent increase in 
terms of the number of housing units occupied. The number of housing units occupied in 
San Francisco increased almost 11 percent, a sign of a healthy economy. Only in New 
York City and Milwaukee did housing occupancy rate increase by fewer than ten percent, 
and Milwaukee only increased by one percent. On the other hand, Niagara Falls 
continues to lose its attractiveness as housing occupancy rate decreased almost four 





                                                          
10 Detailed breakdown of number of central cities and suburbs between 1970 and 2009 is obtained from the 
State of the Cities Data System (SOCDS) under the Housing and Urban Development website 
http://socds.huduser.org/Census/Census_Home.html). In 1970, there were only 4,080 suburban places. In 
1980, the number increased to 9,363. Ten years later, it reached 10,351 and in 2000, the number of 
suburban places in the U.S. reached 11,397. 
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Characteristics of Cities that Influence the Decision to Remove Urban Freeways: A 
conclusion 
 
The findings corroborate the notion that the economy in the post-industrial city grows 
faster than in the declining, transitional industrial city, as exemplified through the 
correlation between the stocks of human capital and economic growth of the city (Florida 
2005; Romer, 1990). As the economy grows, demand for housing increases and it forces 
the city to look for land for development. To compensate for this, municipal government 
looks for assets that can be reused, such as abandoned building and underutilized 
freeways. Underutilized freeways are attractive because they are often located near 
downtown areas, where demand for housing in postindustrial cities is high. Underutilized 
urban freeway removal also underscores that the city embarks on a gentrification process.   
 
Three causal conditions should be present before a city embarks on removing its urban 
freeways. These are job creation in FIRE industries, increasing housing demand, and a 
high proportion of college graduates and individuals with an advanced degree. However, 
these three causal conditions are not sufficient when they independently influence the 
outcome. Only a combination of these three causal conditions will lead to a decision to 




EVALUATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF URBAN FREEWAY REMOVAL 
IN SAN FRANCISCO AND MILWAUKEE 
 
 
This chapter serves as an assessment on the economic impact of urban freeway removal 
on local economies. Previous chapters provide a general framework for understanding 
how and why urban freeway removal worked in some cities and failed in other cities. 
This chapter illuminates in detail about the effect of freeway removal on the local 
economy in San Francisco and Milwaukee. I identified a number of causal conditions 
such as the number of jobs created in FIRE industries, educational attainment, and 
increased housing demand, as factors that affect the decision to remove urban freeways. 
Despite broad support from urban scholars and local elites on ur ban freeway removal 
projects, there is no comprehensive assessment on the effect of urban freeway removal on 
local economies. This chapter contributes to the discussion by analyzing the case of urban 





Urban Freeway Removal in San Francisco and Milwaukee 
 
I now direct my attention to the evaluation of the impact of urban freeway removal only 
in San Francisco and Milwaukee. San Francisco is a p erfect representation of a p ost-
industrial city, while Milwaukee is a symbol of a declining, transitional industrial city. 
Contrasting San Francisco with Milwaukee helps to understand the effect of urban 
freeway removal on local economies, as measured by property value. In doing so, I use 
the hedonic price model to evaluate the housing price relative to its close proximity to the 
former site of urban freeway. I argue that the closer the location of a house to the former 
site of an urban freeway, the higher the price of the house. I also include other attributes 
of a house, such as physical, environmental, and neighborhood characteristics.  
 
To test my hypothesis, I use a mixed approach in evaluating the effect of urban freeway 
removal on residential and commercial property value in San Francisco and Milwaukee. 
Because studies and assessment of the effect of urban freeway removal on property value 
in San Francisco are immense, I use one of those studies as part of my assessment in 
evaluating the effect of urban freeway removal on local economies. I use studies by 
Cervero et al. (2009) because they used the hedonic price model in predicting the effect 





For the case of urban freeway removal in Milwaukee, I collected transaction sales of 
residential and commercial properties from Milwaukee County Assessor's Office. These 
were sales data from 2002 to 2008. I specifically analyze the effect of urban freeway 
removal on these property values in 2002, 2005 and 2008. The first analysis measures the 
direct impact of the urban freeway removal project on pr operty values. The second 
analysis evaluates the medium term impact of the project, assuming that the project had 
created a multiplier effect on the local economy. The last analysis tries to measure 
whether the project can generate sustainable economic effect on the local economy when 
there is an economic crisis. I use the finding from the analysis to test my proposition that 
the effect of urban freeway deconstruction in the post-industrial city is more evident than 
in the declining, transitional industrial city.  
 
 
Economic Impact of Urban Freeway Removal in San Francisco 
 
Urban freeway removal in San Francisco revealed a deep discontent for urban freeway 
among San Franciscans since the 1960s. However, because of the political gridlock since 
the 1980s, the city was not able to arrive at the decision of whether to remove urban 
freeways or not. Political battles that ensued between 1990 a nd 2000 r evealed that the 
discourse on urban freeway removal was not a cl ear-cut issue. Two opposing 




Urban freeway removal in San Francisco is famous as it exemplified the reactions from 
local residents and politicians when their argument was rejected through empirical 
evidence. The 1989 earthquake that tore down portions of urban freeways in this city 
helped to open the eyes of urban freeway removal opponents. Their complaint about 
traffic jam problem had not occurred, even though the portion of freeways was damaged 
and motorists were not able to use them. This fact alone helped to stop the political 
debates of whether the city should rebuild urban freeways after the earthquake or replace 
them with urban amenities.  
 
Cervero et al. evaluated the effect of urban freeway removal (the Embarcadero and 
Central Freeway) on residential property values before and after the project. They use the 
hedonic price model in predicting whether a property with a close proximity to the former 
urban freeway experiences a s ignificant increase in its economic value. Cervero et al. 
(2009) used two different approaches to build the model, as the Embarcadero Freeway 
was located near the downtown area, while the Central Freeway was located near a 
residential neighborhood.   
 
In evaluating the effect of removing Embarcadero Freeway, Cervero et al. (2009) 
developed three different variables: property characteristics, neighborhood characteristics 
and the property's close proximity to road infrastructure. Because the Embarcadero 
Freeway was located near the downtown/financial district, they also measured the 
interaction between variables. For the Central Freeway, they replaced variable that 




Their finding in the case of Embarcadero Freeway revealed that after the removal, a 
property with a close proximity to the boulevard has high property value compared to the 
one far from the boulevard. Cervero et al. utilized the mixed-use entropy index to 
measure the effect of various uses of land around Embarcadero on the property value. 
They acknowledged the fact that the property’s close proximity to the waterfront 
contributed to the higher property value (2009: 42-43).    
 
For the property characteristics, the number of bathrooms in a property significantly 
affects the property value than the age of the house. All variables of neighborhood 
characteristics significantly affect the property value. This confirms my argument that 
regardless of whether the city of San Francisco removed the Embarcadero Freeway or 
not, the property value will continue to increase due to amenities available in the adjacent 
neighborhood. For the roadway infrastructure characteristics, Cervero et al. (2009) use 
two different indicators to evaluate the effect of the Embarcadero Freeway removal. They 
use the distance of a property from the boulevard as the first indicator and the property’s 
close proximity to the boulevard as the second indicator. Combined, the opening of the 
boulevard has a positive impact on the property value, as measured through distance and 
access (close proximity).1  
 
                                                          
1 Although proximity and distance indicate ‘closeness’, they are not similar. Distance indicates nearness 
between two points as a straight line, while proximity not only measures the nearness of two points in 
space, but it also acknowledges the economic and social relationship between the two. We can define 
proximity using the word: access.   
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The interaction between distance and boulevard opening has a regression value of -
213,621.3. On the other hand, the interaction between proximity and boulevard opening 
has a regression value of 283,740.0. T his means that access (indicated by proximity) 
increases the property value by $283,740.0 per one additional mile from the boulevard. 
The further the location of a property from the boulevard the property value decreases by 




































Table 5.1 Hedonic price model for predicting residential property value near 
Embarcadero corridor in San Francisco, 1986-2005 
Variable B Standard Error t p 
Property Characteristics     
Structure size (square feet) 174.8 2.7 65.9 0.000 
Bathrooms (number) 1977.4 719.0 2.8 0.000 
Structure age (years) 1349.7 243.5 5.5 0.000 
Structure material (masonry = 
1; otherwise = 0) 
-108,092.7 33,522.6 -3.2 0.000 
     
Neighborhood characteristics     
Residential density (number of 
households per gross acre) 
2356.9 720.9 3.3 0.000 
Employment density (number 
of employees per gross acre) 
605.3 112.4 5.4 0.000 
Mixed-use entropy index -570,543.4 70,435.7 -8.1 0.000 
     
Roadway infrastructure 
characteristics 
    
Freeway pre-demolition period 
(January 1986-February 1991 = 
1; otherwise 0) 
-118,263.4 26,216.4 -4.5 0.000 
Distance effect: straight-line 
distance (feet) from the 
freeway/boulevard centerline to 
the property 
-64.1 3.8 -16.8 0.000 
Boulevard opening (June 2000-
2005 = 1; otherwise = 0) 
-300,757.1 57,893.3 -5.2 0.000 
Interaction: Distance 
effect*Boulevard opening effect 
34.3 5.5 6.2 0.000 
Proximity effect (property is 
located within 0.75 miles of the 
freeway/boulevard = 1; 
otherwise = 0) 
-213,621.3 42,795.6 -5.0 0.000 
Interaction: Proximity 
effect*Boulevard opening effect 
283,740.0 59,255.2 4.8 0.000 
Constant 1,649,995.3 83,027.8 19.9 0.000 
     
Notes: Dependent variable = price (US$, 2007) per sold residential unit 
Mixed use entropy = { - ∑k[(pi)(lnpi)]}/lnk), where pi is the proportion of total land-use 
activities in category i (where the i categories are households, retail employment, office 
employment, and other employment); and k = 4 (the number of land-use categories) 
N = 7,278 
F-statistics (probability) = 449.221 (0.000) 




The Central Freeway was a different story. This freeway connected the Bayshore 
Freeway with Hayes Valley neighborhood. The 1989 earthquake damaged the northern 
part of the freeway. Two different proposals emerged concerning the fate of the Central 
Freeway after the 1989 earthquake. One was to retrofit the Central Freeway while the 
other was to tear down the freeway and replace it with a boulevard. Similar to the case of 
the Embarcadero Freeway removal, Caltrans developed these two proposals. After three 
consecutive ballots, a compromise was made between these two groups. The municipal 
government tore down a portion of freeway and replaced it with Octavia Boulevard and 
Caltrans retrofitted another portion of the freeway. 
 
Cervero et al. (2009) evaluated the effect of removing the Central Freeway on residential 
property values and found that although a close proximity to the Octavia Boulevard did 
affect property value, the effect of the distance variable was smaller compared to the 
effects of structure and neighborhood characteristics. In explaining the model of the 
Central Freeway corridor, Cervero et al. (2009: 44-45) argued that other factors such as 
nearby neighborhood improvement might be attributed to producing a result where close 
proximity to the boulevard was not as significant as in the case of Embarcadero.   
 
A close examination reveals that the effect of roadway infrastructure is not as high as the 
neighborhood characteristics. Accessibility and distance do not play significant roles in 
influencing the property value. The interaction between distance and boulevard opening 
only shows a small -12.7. This means that there is no significant effect of the property’s 
location from the boulevard. In the case of the Central Freeway, the determinant factors 
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are property characteristics and neighborhood characteristics (including accessibility to 
municipal transit). Table 5.2 provides a glimpse of why close proximity to the boulevard 
does not significantly affect the property value. 
 
Table 5.2 Hedonic price model for predicting residential property value near Central 
Freeway/Octavia Boulevard corridor in San Francisco, 1987-2007 
Variable B Standard Error t p 
Property Characteristics     
Structure size (square feet) 173.2 2.8 61.2 0.000 
Bathrooms (number) 1695.2 692.6 2.4 0.000 
Structure age (years) 1381.2 199.5 6.9 0.000 
     
Neighborhood characteristics     
Transit accessibility: within 
0.25 mile of MUNI railway 
station (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
63,525.0 17,054.4 3.7 0.000 
Interaction: Transit 
accessibility*structure index 
33.1 4.6 7.2 0.000 
Employment density (number 
of employees per gross acre) 
702.0 94.9 7.4 0.000 
Jobs and housing balance index 197,451.7 30,944.8 6.4 0.000 
     
Roadway infrastructure 
characteristics 
    
Distance effect: straight-line 
distance (feet) from the 
freeway/boulevard centerline to 
the property 
44.2 2.7 16.5 0.000 
Boulevard opening (1 = 2005; 0 
= otherwise) 
116,603.1 30,301.9 3.8 0.000 
Distance effect*Boulevard 
opening effect 
-12.7 3.2 -3.9 0.000 
Constant 216,511.2 29.822.5 7.3 0.000 
     
Notes: Dependent variable = price (US$, 2007) per sold residential unit 
Job-housing balance index = (1 - abs [employed residents - total employees/employed 
residents - total/employees]) 
N = 9,772 
F-statistics (probability) = 789.228 (0.000) 




Economic Impact of Urban Freeway Removal in Milwaukee 
 
Urban freeway removal in Milwaukee is unique in a sense that a declining, transitional 
industrial city was able to remove one of its urban freeways amid broad support from its 
urban residents for continuing building urban freeways as exemplified in 1975 ur ban 
referenda. Political debates that ensued after the emergence of civil rights movement in 
the 1960s revealed not only a deep discontent from minority groups towards local 
development policies that aimed at rejuvenating local economies by tearing down 
minority and poor neighborhoods, but also showed a lingering conflict between two 
competing ideologies, those who favor individual liberties vis-à-vis those who prefer 
populist agenda. This culture war not only hampered the economic growth of the city, but 
it contributed to the negative perception on M ilwaukee from outsiders and regional 
business communities.   
 
The ability of mayor Norquist in orchestrated efforts to secure funding from the federal 
government convinced state government and adjoining localities to work together in 
achieving his proposal to remove the Park East Freeway. Although the Park East Freeway 
was not his first choice as the target for removal, he finally made a compromise and let 
Park East Freeway with lower utilization to be removed. The city developed the former 




This narrative serves as a b ackground for me to evaluate the effect of urban freeway 
removal on t he local economy, as measured by commercial and residential property 
values. I posit that the increased value in commercial and residential properties is 
attributed to the healthy economy in a particular city, especially if the city can sustain this 
increase in the property value.  
 
To evaluate the economic impact of urban freeway removal in Milwaukee, I use a similar 
approach that Cervero et al. (2009) used to evaluate the impact of the Embarcadero and 
Central Freeway removal on the local economy. I use property characteristics and 
neighborhood characteristics, including property’s close proximity to the former site of 
Park East Freeway, as the independent variables. I then developed 10 different indicators 
from these two variables. For the dependent variable, I use the property value using three 
different time periods.   
 
I start my analysis by evaluating whether the urban freeway removal is associated with an 
economic impact on the property value. I use the property data from 2001 because it was 
the year the Park East Freeway was demolished. From all variables involved in the 
calculation, the 'district' variable, which measures the proximity of a particular property 
from former site of Park East Freeway, has the highest coefficient compared with other 
variables. Not only does this variable have the highest coefficient among variables 
involved in the calculation, it is  also statistically significant. Structure variables are not 
statistically significant in influencing residential property value. In other words, a close 
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proximity to the former site of Park East Freeway significantly affected residential 
property value near the Park East Freeway. It appears the closer the location is to a 
particular house sold to the site of former urban freeway, the higher the price is. Because 
the calculation uses the 2002 data, which relied on property sales data from 2001 (one 
year after Park East Freeway removal took place), I argue that it was the effect of this 
project that significantly affected the housing price.  
 
Table 5.3 Hedonic price model for predicting residential property value near Park East 
Freeway using 2002 property sales data 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 6923.169 12,866.676  .538 .591 
District/Access 100,298.682 4656.487 .215 21.540 .000 
Stories -5177.440 3164.123 -.019 -1.636 .102 
Structure Age 16.951 6.761 .025 2.507 .012 
No. of rooms -1847.247 978.636 -.019 -1.888 .059 
Structure Size (sq. 
feet) 
27.436 .449 .660 61.050 .000 
Unit -6299.031 1580.716 -.068 -3.985 .000 
No. of bedrooms 1882.641 909.459 .035 2.070 .038 
Finished Bathroom 16,107.210 2196.006 .079 7.335 .000 
H. Bathroom 22,150.412 2489.650 .088 8.897 .000 
Lot size (sq. feet) 1.509 .133 .120 11.384 .000 
      
Notes: 
Dependent variable = housing price (US$, 2002) per sold residential unit  
n = 5,182 
F-statistics (probability) = 638.534 (0.000) 
R2 = 0.553 
 
To identify the immediate effect of urban freeway removal on property sales data, I direct 
my attention on commercial property values near Park East Freeway, again using 2002 
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property sales data. Table 5.4 provides a snapshot on t he hedonic price model for 
predicting commercial property value near Park East Freeway using 2002 property sales 
data. Again, the district variable, which represents the location of a particular commercial 
property relative to Park East Freeway, has the highest coefficient in determining the 
property value after the project was implemented in 2001. H owever, careful attention 
should be given to this variable because a closer examination reveals that its p-value for 
the coefficient of district is greater than 0.05, which means that the coefficient is not 
significantly different with 0. T he only variable that was statistically significant in 
predicting the commercial property value was the total area of the property. 
 
Table 5.4 Hedonic price model for predicting commercial property value near Park East 
Freeway using 2002 property sales data 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 43,608.772 122,390.179  .356 .722 
District/Access 182,195.826 109,533.256 .095 1.663 .098 
Stories 2201.227 47,623.042 .003 .046 .963 
Structure Age 5.764 70.909 .005 .081 .935 
Lot (sq. feet) 1.291 .748 .105 1.726 .086 
Area (sq. feet) 24.106 2.267 .650 10.634 .000 
      
Notes: 
Dependent variable = commercial sales (US$, 2002) per sold commercial unit  
n = 166 
F-statistics (probability) = 33.581 (0.000) 
R2 = 0.512 
 
 
I then proceed to evaluate the medium impact of the project on property values near the 
former site of Park East Freeway. I argue that as the city of Milwaukee has completed the 
project and started to market the area, demand for housing stabilized. As the demand 
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stabilized, property values near the former location of Park East Freeway was relatively 
the same as property values in other locations far from it. Table 5.5 displays my 
calculation using 2005 property sales data. 
 
Table 5.5 Hedonic price model for predicting residential property values near Park East 
Freeway using 2005 property sales data 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient T Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 100,983.089 55,933.398  1.805 .071 
District/Access 16,746.500 24,874.140 .004 .673 .501 
Stories 705,393.520 13,691.055 .397 51.522 .000 
Structure Age -348.295 30.597 -.069 -11.383 .000 
No. of rooms 2684.483 5905.534 .003 .455 .649 
Structure Size (sq. 
feet) 66.788 .919 .559 72.665 .000 
Unit -
107,617.398 8837.294 -.116 
-
12.178 .000 
No. of bedrooms -13,483.347 5125.827 -.026 -2.630 .009 
Finished Bathroom -
122,651.510 11,878.703 -.069 
-
10.325 .000 
H. Bathroom -60,371.975 14,871.382 -.024 -4.060 .000 
Lot size (sq. feet) -.856 .409 -.014 -2.092 .036 
      
Notes: 
Dependent variable = housing price (US$, 2005) per sold residential unit  
n = 10,792 
F-statistics (probability) = 1940.888 (0.000) 
R2 = 0.643 
 
 
As expected, the variable district, which measures location of a particular house from the 
former site of Park East Freeway, is not statistically significant in predicting the property 
value in 2005. In other words, the increased property value in Milwaukee is the result of 
the short-term impact of urban freeway removal project and not because there is a 
129 
 
sustained demand of housing in the city. Only structure variables such as the age of the 
building (year built), square footage of the building and features of the building 
(bedrooms and bathrooms) had a significant impact on the property value. What makes 
the calculation interesting is the fact that even features of the building negatively affected 
the property value. This confirms my prior argument that property values in Milwaukee 
city lost its attractiveness even after the city removed Park East Freeway in 2000-2001. 
Indeed, population data in the central city shows that Milwaukee city continued to lose its 
population between 2000 and 2010.  
  
My assessment for predicting commercial property values near Park East Freeway also 
informed similar result. Property buyer seemed more interested in purchasing commercial 
property far from the former site of Park East Freeway, as can be seen in the coefficient 
for the ‘district’ variable, which measures the distance of a particular establishment from 
the location of Park East Freeway. Even if we compare the district variable with the year 
the property was built, the former which indicates a locational factor is far more reliable 
in predicting the property value. Table 5.6 displays my calculation for predicting the 
commercial property value near the former site of Park East Freeway in Milwaukee in 
2005, four years after the completion of Park East Freeway removal and the creation of 








Table 5.6 Hedonic price model for predicting commercial property values near Park East 
Freeway using 2005 property sales data 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 571,602.631 473,297.356 









6 .402 7.963 .000 
Structure Age -1207.021 264.409 -.114 -4.565 .000 
Lot (sq. feet) 2.199 2.441 .028 .901 .368 
Area (sq. feet) 64.651 6.240 .546 10.361 .000 
      
Notes: 
Dependent variable = commercial sales (US$, 2005) per sold commercial unit  
n = 427 
F-statistics (probability) = 281.731 (0.000) 
R2 = 0.770 
 
I proceed again to test whether after more than five years a significant change might take 
place in Milwaukee, assuming that the city successfully marketed the gentrification 
project and attracted highly educated workers to bolster the local economy. I use similar 
variables in creating a hedonic price model, but this time I employ 2008 property sales 
data to predict residential property value near the former site of Park East Freeway (see 
table 5.7). If my prediction is right, controlling other factors constant, the calculation 
should predict that the closer the location of a particular property to the former site of 
Park East Freeway, the higher the price is. Yet, the calculation shows that the ‘district’ 
variable does not statistically predict the residential property value in 2008, only structure 
variables that significantly affect the residential property value. This shows that the 
gentrification project in the former site of Park East Freeway not only failed to reverse 
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the suburbanization of employment where people chose to purchase houses and work in 
suburbs but it also failed to generate a significant economic impact on the long run.    
 
Table 5.7 Hedonic price model for predicting residential property values near Park East 
Freeway using 2008 property sales data 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 310,601.408 56,549.052  5.493 .000 
District/Access 29,578.064 26,113.833 .011 1.133 .257 
Stories 258,024.577 19,000.198 .168 13.580 .000 
Structure Age -267.248 30.327 -.074 -8.812 .000 
No. of rooms 21,635.317 5997.578 .036 3.607 .000 
Structure Size (sq. 
feet) 92.945 1.538 .852 60.438 .000 
Unit -94,342.063 12,829.666 -.100 -7.353 .000 
No. of bedrooms 10,379.367 6701.112 .022 1.549 .121 
Finished Bathroom -3494.819 15,069.102 -.002 -.232 .817 
H. Bathroom -15,365.919 17,409.015 -.008 -.883 .377 
Lot size (sq. feet) 




      
Notes: 
Dependent variable = housing price (US$, 2008) per sold residential unit  
n = 3,872 
F-statistics (probability) = 1195.552 (0.000) 
R2 = 0.756 
 
Further, the 2007-2008 economic crises also affected commercial property value as seen 
in table 5.8. The variable district is not statistically significant in predicting commercial 
property value. Only structure variables such as the number of stories, year the structure 
built and lot area are statistically significant in predicting property value. My calculation 
revealed the fact that the urban freeway removal failed to gentrify surrounding 
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neighborhoods and the housing crisis further weakened the demand for commercial 
property in the area.  
 
Table 5.8 Hedonic price model for predicting commercial property values near Park East 
Freeway using 2008 property sales data 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -283,380.559 457,977.688  -.619 .537 
District/Access 14,302.239 502,968.867 .001 .028 .977 
Stories 1,777,774.160 147,935.725 .811 12.017 .000 
Structure Age -1222.612 253.733 -.137 -4.819 .000 
Lot (sq. feet) 13.041 2.938 .249 4.438 .000 
Area (sq. feet) 14.080 9.216 .128 1.528 .129 
      
Notes: 
Dependent variable = commercial sales (US$, 2008) per sold commercial unit  
n = 147 
F-statistics (probability) = 251.363 (0.000) 
R2 = 0.899 
 
 
If we look at the house price index at the metropolitan level (Milwaukee-Waukesha-West 
Allis, MSA), the index continued to climb until it reached its apex in 2007 (see figure 
5.1). However, because the index measures changes at metro area level, this did not mean 
that the central city also experienced similar changes. In other words, it was possible that 
the increase in the property value might be attributed to the healthy economy in suburbs 
rather than in the central city.  
 
To analyze the effect of gentrification in Milwaukee, I use the average residential 
property value in 2000 and 2010. If there is an increase in residential property value, it 
may be the result of gentrification in the former site of Park East Freeway, although I 
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cannot rule out other factors. Between 1970 and 2010, median household owner's value 
in Milwaukee remained stagnant around US$100,000. On the other hand, median 
household owner's value in suburbs continues to increase, from US$ US$137,543 (2010 
dollars) in 1970 to US $197,150 (2010 dollars) in 2000. Hence, it is difficult to argue that 
the gentrification has a significant impact on Milwaukee. The Housing Price Index for 
Milwaukee MSA between 1997 and 2008 confirms my argument (Figure 5.1). It shows 




Figure 5.1 House Price Index for Milwaukee MSA 1997-2008 
 








Summary and Discussions 
 
Although urban scholars applauded urban freeway removal as a means to bring back the 
economic vitality to the city, there is no guarantee that every city with successful urban 
freeway removal will have a positive economic impact after the project is implemented. 
In the case of Milwaukee, there is no significant impact to the local economy, measured 
by commercial and residential property values between 2002 and 2008. One possible 
explanation is the fact that gentrification requires a s table economy, indicated by jobs 
available in the city. Indeed, my calculation in chapter IV with cs/QCA reveals that one 
causal condition that influence the decision to remove urban freeway is the availability of 
jobs in the city, in particular jobs in the service sector.  
 
If we observe San Francisco and Milwaukee in a h istorical trajectory, we see a 
contrasting situation between these two cities after 1980 (see table 5.9). While San 
Francisco and Milwaukee experienced population downturn after 1960, San Francisco is 
able to recover after 1980, whereas Milwaukee continues to lose its population. Further, 
between 1970 and 2000, San Francisco was able to reduce the unemployment rate from 
6.2 percent in 1970 t o only 4.6 pe rcent in 2000. This city was also able to create 
significant jobs between 1970 and 2000, as its labor force increased by 27.8 percent. On 
the other hand, the unemployment rate in Milwaukee kept climbing from 4.1 percent in 
1970 to 12.4 percent in 2010. In contrast with San Francisco, Milwaukee was unable to 
create jobs for its population, as the city lost 9.8 percent of its labor force between 1970 
and 2000, due to suburbanization of jobs.    
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Table 5.9 Historical snapshots of San Francisco and Milwaukee 
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 
San Francisco 634,536 775,357 740,316 715,674 678,974 723,959 776,733 805,235 
Milwaukee 587,472 637,392 741,324 717,099 636,212 628,088 596,974 594,833 
Unemployment rate (percent) 
San Francisco    6.2 6.0 6.2 4.6  
Milwaukee    4.1 6.9 8.9 9.4 12.4 
Labor Force Change (percent) 
San Francisco     5.5 12.6 7.6  
Milwaukee     -2.1 -1.7 -6.2 5.4 
Source: U.S. Population Census 1940 - 2010, SOCDS HUD 
 
Although theoretically a close proximity to the former urban freeway has a s ignificant 
effect on commercial and residential property values, my evaluation in the case of San 
Francisco and Milwaukee yields a d ifferent result. In San Francisco, the closer the 
location of a particular property is, the higher the price. However, in Milwaukee, high 
property value was the result of local government project in removing Park East Freeway 
and gentrifying the neighborhoods. The city of Milwaukee created three new 
neighborhoods in the former site of Park East Freeway. Moreover the city also 
implemented tax incremental financing (TIF) in this area to attract investment. Private 
sector came because of the incentive provided by the city. Prospective homebuyers 
bought the properties with the expectation that the area will be filled with businesses. 
Once the project was completed, the property value stabilized again following the 
trajectory of national housing price trend.       
 
This brings us to Florida's argument about the role of the creative class in bolstering the 
local economy (2002, 2005). He posits that in order to thrive, cities should attract creative 
classes. This can be achieved by providing urban amenities and an inviting urban 
environment for these creative classes. However, as I compare the finding of my 
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calculation using the hedonic price model with demographic data of San Francisco and 
Milwaukee, I fail to find whether the provision of urban amenities leads to the migration 
of creative classes to a particular city. San Francisco does experience an influx of creative 
classes, but this is caused by the presence of jobs in FIRE industries. Indeed, between 
1970 and 2000, S an Francisco created more than 6,000 jobs in FIRE industries while 
Milwaukee only created one third of what San Francisco had done. This did not include 
jobs created under professional services where San Francisco created 50,275 new jobs 
between 1970 and 2000.   
 
By attaching urban freeway removal as part of the gentrification process, we can see that 
the increased property value was the result of the existing demand on c ommercial and 
residential property. Urban freeway removal in the case of San Francisco only acted as a 
catalyst in stimulating housing demand. Indeed, the success story of the Embarcadero 
Boulevard was partially attributed to the fact that the former area of Embarcadero 
Freeway was in a close proximity to the waterfront and thus removing the portion of the 
freeway helped increase access to waterfront. In the case of the Central Freeway removal, 
opponents and proponents of urban freeway removal agreed to remove a portion of the 
freeway and replace it with a boulevard, and retrofit another portion of the freeway. This 
was caused by the fact that there were no locational factors that could affect the property 




Therefore, urban freeway removal only helped create an attractive urban environment and 
partially stimulated the property value in a post-industrial city. In a declining, transitional 
industrial city, it ma y work if there is a sustained demand on hous ing and commercial 





FREEWAY DECONSTRUCTION AND LOCAL GROWTH COALITIONS IN 
SAN FRANCISCO AND MILWAUKEE 
 
 
This chapter outlines the processes in which San Francisco and Milwaukee were able to 
remove freeways resulting in a number of political and social consequences. In doing so, 
this section delves deeper into coalition building between actors and institutions. It also 
asks whether such coalitions are able to deliver on promises of rejuvenating central cities.  
 
 
San Francisco and Milwaukee: post/declining industrial cities in motion 
Freeway deconstruction in some aspect contradicts the promises put forward by urban 
renewal proponents. Central cities keep losing population and are struggling to stay 
fiscally sound. Employment centers emerged and created a large number of jobs in the 
‘80s and ‘90s; however, most of these occurred in the suburban areas. Central cities were 




Even though not all central cities experienced this trajectory, data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau revealed that between 1950 and 2010 suburban population increased considerably 
from a mere 35 million to more than 140 million, while at the same time central cities 
failed to double their population size (Beauregard 2012: 5). A closer examination 
between 1990 and 1998 revealed that central city population on average grew only 3.9% 
yet population at metro level grew by 12.5%. Central cities in the Midwest and Northeast 
lost about 2% of their population during this period. However, between 2000 and 2010, 
central cities population increased by 0.3 percent, whereas population growth rate at the 
metropolitan level only grew at 12 percent, down five percent from previous decade. Of 
the many possible explanations, this fact often attributed to technological advancement 
and changes in urban lifestyle, with the emergence of telecommunication infrastructure 
and start-up internet companies in the 1990s as the factor that lures high skilled labors 
and young entrepreneurs to live in the cities.   
 
San Francisco is a perfect example of how a local growth coalition steered this city to be 
a post-industrial city. Gold rush in California from 1848 t o 1855 ha s propelled San 
Francisco to a prominent position. Port of San Francisco, banking industries, railway 
networks and the military presence through Fort Point and a fort in Alcatraz Island are 
the evidence of the impact of the gold rush. What makes San Francisco different from 
other cities during this particular period was the emergence of public-private coalition 
among banking industries, military, local government, and local communities that put this 
city on the map. The role of this coalition was also evident during the period of 
reconstruction after 1906 earthquake and subsequent event such as 1915 Panama-Pacific 
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International Exposition. Even during the Great Depression in 1933-1934, this city was 
able to withstand the economic pressures as its financial center stood still against the 
economic crisis that engulfed the nation.  
 
Milwaukee, on the other hand, is famously known as a manufacturing powerhouse and 
the site of brewing industries. German, Polish and other European immigrants, dominated 
the demographic make-up. Milwaukee was famous for its pragmatic approach in urban 
governance, especially in the first half of the 20th century. Three elected mayors between 
1910 and 1960 ran on the Socialist party ticket. The decline of the manufacturing 
industry in the 1960s onward did not deter the city from creating development strategies. 
However, as local tax base keep declining over the years, Milwaukee increasingly 
focuses on implementing developmental policies to attract investment and businesses to 
the city.   
 
Both San Francisco and Milwaukee enjoyed high rates of industrialization during and 
after World War II, although this boom was experienced only for a short period of time. 
Table 6.1 shows that during and after World War II, population in both cities increased 
rapidly, at least until 1960. However, as the manufacturing sector lost its competitive 
advantage and local governments supported with federal funding started implementing 
urban renewal and freeway constructions, population in both cities declined considerably. 
Between 1960 and 1990, population in both cities declined sharply, although San 





Table 6.1 Population of San Francisco and Milwaukee, 1940 - 2010 
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
San Francisco 634,536 775,357 740,316 715,674 678,974 723,959 776,733 805,235 
Milwaukee 587,472 637,392 741,324 717,099 636,212 628,088 596,974 594,833 
 
Source: US Census Population 
 
Even though both cities also received a l arge influx of African Americans during the 
height of industrialization, there was a distinct pattern that differentiated San Francisco 
and Milwaukee. Whereas Milwaukee relied heavily on the manufacturing industries, San 
Francisco diversified its economic bases, relying not only on the financial services and 
the manufacturing industry but also on research institutions. This combination gave San 
Francisco an edge during the period when the labor-intensive manufacturing industry 
declined.  
 
Other factors such as the relocation of the manufacturing industry to suburbs followed by 
a large migration of middle-class white families from racially mixed urban regions to 
racially homogenous suburbs contributed to the distinct racial composition in Milwaukee 
with blacks and other minority groups dominating the urban landscapes. The percentage 
of the black population in Milwaukee kept increasing, from only 3.4% in 1950 to become 
more than 40% in 2010. Table 6.2 reveals racial composition in Milwaukee and San 
Francisco between 1980 and 2000. African-American becomes predominant in 
Milwaukee. On the other hand, the proportion of African-American population in San 
Francisco continues to diminish (SOCDS HUD).  
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One possible explanation about this trend comes from the fact that the central business 
district of San Francisco is dominated by global financial centers and research institutions 
affiliated with well-known universities. These economic barriers also explain why the 
proportion of the black population in San Francisco is higher in the suburbs than in the 
central city, whereas in Milwaukee, it is the other way around.  
 
Table 6.2 Percentage of the black population in central city and metro level  
 San Francisco  Milwaukee 
central city Metro (MSA)  central city Metro (MSA) 
1980 12.5 11.8  22.9 10.7 
1990 10.6 11.2  30.2 13.6 
2000 8.2 10.2  38.0 16.0 
2010 6.7 9.1  40.9 17.4 
Source: US Census Bureau & US2010: Discover America in a new century 
(http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/segregation2010/Default.aspx?msa=41620) 
 
Economically speaking, a combination of large financial services and a large number of 
research institutions propelled San Francisco ahead, especially in the global economy. 
The central city contributed more than fifty percent of gross metropolitan products in 
2008. The labor force is concentrated in the central city rather than in surrounding 
regions. The share of employed people from total population in San Francisco rose 
sharply from 51.3 percent in 1980 to 55.10 percent in 2000 compared with a steady figure 
at the metropolitan region which hovered around 49 percent between 1980 and 2000.  In 
the case of Milwaukee, the employed share of the total suburban population is greater 
than the employed share from total central city's population. In other word, Milwaukee 
represents a common phenomenon of U.S. cities, where the central city lost not only its 




Between 1970 and 2010, as the manufacturing industry lost its competitive advantages 
and globalization swept the globe, various development strategies were introduced in 
many cities in the U.S. to foster local and regional economy and to prepare the city for 
intense competition in the global economy. The results differ significantly in the case of 
San Francisco and Milwaukee. Using median household income as a proxy to measure 
whether successful economic development took place in a city, we can argue that the city 
of Milwaukee was eclipsed by its suburbs, whereas in San Francisco, it was the opposite. 
In Milwaukee median household income declined from $47,572 i n 1970 to $35,921 in 
2010, yet in suburbs the same figure increased from $66,308 in 1970 to $73,292 in 2000 
(SOCDS HUD, 2010). Median household income in San Francisco increased almost 180 
percent between 1970 and 2000; however in the suburbs the median household income 
only increased 140 pe rcent. Further, the percentage of top 20 p ercent earner (high-
income) in San Francisco kept increasing (from 18.4 percent in 1970 t o more than 34 
percent in 2000), while in Milwaukee the proportion of top 20 p ercent earner (high-
income) steadily decreased (from 18.3 percent in 1970 to a mere 9.9 percent in 2000).   
 
Milwaukee is an example of a declining industrial city that tried to change its fate. The 
city lost its population and its competitive advantage. Between 1970 and 1990, the city 
lost more than 30,000 manufacturing jobs. Although Milwaukee also added new jobs 
from service-related industries, this considerable loss affected the whole economy and 
resulted in a net loss of more than 5,000 jobs. In a comparative perspective, between 
1970 and 1990 the suburbs of Milwaukee MSA created more than 140,000 jobs, of which 
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more than 14,000 j obs were manufacturing jobs. This shows that the manufacturing 
industry has moved either to surrounding suburbs or to different locations outside 
Milwaukee MSA. Further observation also unraveled the fact that between 1970 and 
1990 suburbs in the Milwaukee MSA impressively outperformed Milwaukee city in 
terms of jobs creation in almost every sector. 
 
 
Assessing Freeway Deconstruction in San Francisco and Milwaukee: Similar 
policies with different rationales 
 
San Francisco and Milwaukee are two cities with completely different characteristics. 
One is endowed with financial institutions, surrounded with a large number of research 
institutions and agglomeration of human capital, making it capable of bargaining and 
competing in the global economy. The other is a p erfect example of an industrial city 
which lost its competitive advantage after globalization swept the region in the 70s and 
early 80s, and still struggles to define its future through various development strategies. 
Both cities have introduced progressive movements in the decision-making process, 







Freeway Revolts and Urban Freeway Removal in San Francisco 
San Francisco has a long history with urban freeway development. A civil rights 
movement emerged in the mid 50s that lasted until the 1960s to oppose freeway 
development since people saw urban freeway as an integral part of urban renewal 
policies. The freeway revolt began as a movement in 1955 where the public opposed the 
construction of the Embarcadero Freeway. The revolt was triggered by Allan Temko of 
the San Francisco Chronicle's publication of proposed routes of new freeways. Temko 
was a passionate defender of the city’s existing social fabrics and often criticized the 
city's development plan in which freeways would crisscross the city. His writing helped 
shape public opinion on f reeway construction that would split apart San Francisco’s 
physical and social fabrics.  
 
In 1955, The U.S. Department of Transportation published TrafficWays Plan. A local 
coalition emerged to oppose this plan. As a result, San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
voted down seven of ten previously planned freeways in 1959. To avoid additional 
opposition, the plan was revised in 1960 and a number of freeways were not built or 
completed. However, this did not persuade the public to back down from opposing any 
plan to construct new freeways. The public persistently opposed building any new 
freeways, even after the plan was revised in 1960. As a result, the Board of Supervisors 




The Embarcadero Freeway was part of the freeway revolt story in San Francisco. Built in 
1953, it was designed to connect the Bay Bridge to Oakland with the Golden Gate Bridge 
to Marin County. Unfortunately planners and transportation engineers at that time often 
ignored local inputs when designing the road networks. Local neighborhoods’ inputs, 
especially those affected by the freeway, were not incorporated in the planning and 
design of the Embarcadero Freeway. Numerous objections and opposition from various 
groups, including a petition signed by 30,000 people (approximately five percent of the 
total population at that time), persuaded the Board of Supervisors to vote against the plan 
to build urban freeways in the city, including Embarcadero Freeway and Central 
Freeway. At this point, the Embarcadero Freeway had already been built 1.2 miles in all, 
while one mile of the Central Freeway was already built1. As a result portions of 
freeways were left hanging beyond the off-ramps.  
 
This result emboldened freeway opponents to coalesce to further their agenda to remove 
the unfinished freeways. In order to achieve this, they argued that freeways had created 
social blight, as it not only split apart existing neighborhoods but it also encouraged 
objectionable businesses to thrive. For example, since the Board of Supervisors cancelled 
any plan to build freeways in the city, the Embarcadero Freeway stopped at the 
Broadway off-ramp and traffic was funneled through North Beach and Chinatown. As a 
result, in the 1960s, this created unintended uses such as adult entertainment in the 
                                                          
1 See http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Timeline-A-look-back-at-Octavia-St-and-the-2680322.php 
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Broadway at North Beach2. Residents in the effected neighborhoods detested it, and this 
dissatisfaction turned into a broader movement at city level.  
 
Between 1960 and early 1990, San Francisco municipal government and social activists 
tried to dismantle the idea that building freeways will create value added for the city. In 
particular, social activists pointed to the fact that local residents affected by construction 
bitterly opposed the initiative because they were not involved in the decision-making 
process. Freeway opponents mounted a movement at the neighborhood level aimed at 
rejecting any plan to build freeway and further advancing the initiative for freeway 
removal. However, there was a proposal to continue freeway construction in the city. In 
1962, a plan was developed to revive a previous plan by building freeway through 
Golden Gate Park and the narrow park to the east side called Panhandle. However, the 
plan was cancelled by the Board of Supervisors in a narrow vote in 1966.   
 
The 1989 Pieta Loma Earthquake gave impetus to the city to reconsider the benefits and 
disadvantages of freeways. As the earthquake severely damaged portions of the freeways, 
traffic was mildly disrupted, although drivers quickly adjusted to the situation by using 
alternate routes and different modes of transportation. As freeway proponents realized 
gridlock was no longer a problem and thus their main argument for rejecting the idea of 
removing freeways was invalidated, a movement was mounted to remove what was 
remaining of the freeway rather than to repair it. Two different situations emerged from 
this. In the case of Embarcadero Freeway, although there were objections from local 
                                                          
2 See http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysEmbarcadero.html 
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businesses (mainly those in Chinatown), the Board of Supervisors narrowly passed a 
recommendation for a study of a surface boulevard and underground freeway along the 
Embarcadero. This was proposed by Mayor Art Agnos. A different story took place in the 
case of Central Freeway. Although the earthquake severely damaged the freeway, there 
was a portion that Caltrans considered reparable. Despite vast differences between the 
two cases, in the end the city of San Francisco decided to demolish Embarcadero and 
Central freeways. Regardless of similar outcomes, there were variations in how each 
project was approached.  
 
The Embarcadero Freeway gained its notoriety as it was part of the first freeways built in 
San Francisco and it had been accused of creating urban blight and bisecting existing 
neighborhoods. The number of residents that rejected the continuation of Embarcadero 
Freeway was higher than those that rejected Central Freeway with 30,000 signatures 
petitioning the city to stop the freeway construction. While Proposition I and J in June 
1986 failed to garner enough votes for the city to remove the Embarcadero Freeway, this 
did not persuade freeway opponents to back down from their goal3. Pieta Loma 
earthquake helped those opposed to the freeways to advance their goal by demonstrating 
that without freeways, traffic automatically adjusted and there was no reason to believe 
that gridlock would occur. Caltrans developed two proposals in 1990 as a response to the 
                                                          
3 Proposition I asked whether the city should tear down the Embarcadero Freeway, while Proposition J 
asked whether the city of San Francisco should replace part of the Embarcadero Freeway, if it would 
increase public access to the waterfront and improve traffic. Voter turnout was low, and both propositions 
were narrowly rejected by voters (in Proposition I it was 2 to 1 while in Proposition J it was 3 to 2). For 
detail see http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/June3_1986short.pdf 
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Pieta Loma earthquake that damaged the Embarcadero freeway. One was to rebuild the 
freeway, while the other was to replace it with a surface boulevard. 
 
In 1990, the Board of Supervisors passed a resolution for a study of a surface boulevard 
and an underground freeway along the Embarcadero as a replacement for the elevated 
freeway. However, since an underground freeway was considered expensive, the city 
decided to forgo this and instead opted for a surface boulevard. During the decision-
making process, Chinatown merchants objected to the idea of freeway removal. They 
argued that removing the freeway would affect their businesses, as their businesses 
declined fifteen to forty percent after the earthquake4.  
 
The Central Freeway also became the target of criticism of residents’ dissatisfaction as 
the design split apart existing neighborhoods and greatly affected housing prices. Figure 
6.1 shows how Central Freeway split apart neighborhood in the west and east of Market 
Street in San Francisco. In 1959, similar to what happened to the Embarcadero Freeway; 
freeway opponents mounted a campaign to halt construction and were able to garner 
significant support. Approximately 20,000 l etters and 15,000 s ignatures were collected 
which mostly voiced concerns about the effect of freeway construction on the local 
economy. A follow-up plan was developed to resurrect this freeway in 1962, but it was 
narrowly defeated in a Board of Supervisors meeting. Because of the 1989 earthquake 
that severely damaged the Central Freeway in 1995, the city of San Francisco developed 
                                                          
4 See http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysEmbarcadero.html 
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a proposal to remove and replace it with a surface boulevard, something similar to 

















Figure 6.1 Part of the Proposition H that was put in the November 1997's ballot 




In responding to this situation, Caltrans decided to keep the portion of Central Freeway 
that was still intact by reopening the existing freeway to traffic. In addition to that, it also 
developed a plan to demolish its upper deck and expand the lower deck in order to be 
able to carry traffic in both directions. During the planning stage, a number of groups 
started voicing their objections to the Caltrans' plan to rebuild the Central Freeway. At 
the same time, residents of western neighborhoods marched in favor of Caltrans plan to 
rebuild the freeway. Heated debates ensued between those in favor of rebuilding the 
freeway and those proposing removing it. Those in favor of rebuilding the freeway 
circulated a petition to place an initiative on the 1997 ballot with the argument that 
97,000 cars that used the freeway each day would back up and block Market Street if the 
freeway were closed.5  
 
This led to Proposition H in 1997 sponsored by the Coalition to Save the Central 
Freeway6 where voters approved the initiative to rebuild the Central Freeway by a narrow 
margin. However, this result was challenged by freeway opponents and in 1998, 
Proposition E was put on the ballot. This time, voters approved the removal of the 
Central Freeway by a narrow margin7. The result of Proposition E was challenged again 
in 1999 through Proposition I and J. Combined, both propositions paved the way for the 
city to remove the Central Freeway and replace it with a surface boulevard.  
                                                          
5 See http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November4_1997short.pdf for details 
6 San Francisco Chronicle. 2004. A Look Back at Octavia St. and Central Freeway. Wednesday, October 
20.  
7 See http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November3_1998short.pdf for details 
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Although initially there was a proposition to challenge the result of the 1999 initiative, 
freeway proponents decided not to pursue it and instead focusing on a chieving 
compromise with freeway opponents. In the final compromise, it was decided that 
Caltrans would remove the overpass over Market Street and would rebuild the part that 
crossed the marginal light-industrial district south of Market Street. Table 6.3 provides a 
glimpse of voters' preferences in removing urban freeways between 1986 and 1999. It 
appears that the majority of voters opted to keep urban freeways intact rather than 
demolish them, although they approved the initiative to create boulevard as part of 
beautification program.  






Source: Department of Elections, City & County of San Francisco  
 
In order to remove the Embarcadero Freeway, more than fifty million dollars were spent. 
Of this, ten million dollars came from San Francisco, while the rest came from federal 
and state funding earmarked for infrastructure improvement. For area redevelopment, 
another seventeen million dollars were spent to match federally funded transit 
improvement projects, for a total of fifty million dollars. In the case of the Central 
Freeway, another fifty million dollars was spent but unlike Embarcadero Freeway, the 




Urban Freeway Removal in Milwaukee: Race and economic decline 
Milwaukee did not experience a situation similar to what San Francisco had. Voters 
initially approved a master plan to create a n etwork of freeways in the city. However, 
during implementation, city officials and transportation engineers often deliberately did 
not convey detailed information about the engineering design to local residents until 
public hearing was held. By then it w as too late for local residents to submit any 
objection to city officials and transportation planners for design adjustment. This 
gradually created resentment among local residents as their voices were not heard during 
the decision-making process. For those affected, they felt that the government was 
arbitrary, inhumane and needed restraint. Further, since the proposed freeway 
construction had decreased housing prices, the evicted home owners were often given 
less than their homes would had been worth without the plan (Cutler, 2001). 
 
Opposition to halt the construction of freeways in Milwaukee did not occur until at least 
the mid 1965s. Spurred by various freeway revolts across the country, a coalition began 
to emerge in 1965 to oppose the construction of the Lake Freeway as part of the ring road 
surrounding downtown Milwaukee, famously called as the ‘downtown loop closure’ 
freeways. The ‘downtown loop closure’ consisted of North-South Freeway in the west, 
East-West in the south, Park Freeway in the north and Lake Freeway in the east. Because 
of the budget constraint, the city of Milwaukee decided to build the Lake Freeway first. 
The freeway opponents were able to mobilize a referendum in April 1967, w here 
Milwaukee voters were asked whether the downtown loop closure, particularly the Lake 
Freeway, should be completed (figure 6.2). Even though the opponents were persistent in 
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pushing the idea of halting the freeway construction, the referendum passed with a near 
2-1 margin. This was the third time voters supported construction of a freeway system in 
Milwaukee through a referendum.8  



































Source: Cutler, 2001  
                                                          
8 The first referendum in the city of Milwaukee where freeway development was put in the ballot was in 
1948. This referendum asked voters to approve a $5 million bond program for expressway-type 
improvement. The second referendum was held in 1953. This time, voters was asked for an additional $3 





Given that there was broad public support for freeway construction in Milwaukee, one 
factor stood in the way that prevented the city for building freeways. Lack of advance 
public notice was identified as main culprit for the emergence of opposing freeway 
construction. Cutler (2001) points to the fact that policy makers often favored freeway 
construction over the interests of homeowners in several respects. Details about the 
proposed freeway were not disclosed until a public hearing was held. However, this 
situation was not unique, since not only Milwaukee but other cities also experienced 
similar situations (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). The intensity of freeway opposition 
increased by the end of 1969 as Federal government began to require through National 
Environmental Protection Act that all federally-funded projects should have 
environmental impact statements prepared and attached to the plan. Because previous 
opposition movements to stop freeway construction were futile, freeway opponents 
seized this opportunity by turning this NEPA law into a political weapon (Altshuler & 
Luberoff, 2003: 86).  
 
In 1970, t he Citizen Regional Environmental Coalition was formed in Milwaukee to 
oppose any plan to build freeways in a more united manner. The coalition rallied under 
the belief the freeways would split neighborhoods, were intended for suburbanites to 
reach their jobs in the downtown faster, and to facilitate suburbanization of employment 
centers (mainly manufacturing) to the suburbs. To achieve their objectives, the coalition 
supported local politicians with similar ideologies or political views who ran for various 
public offices. This changed the government’s perspective on the freeway construction as 
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those politicians in favor of freeway removal were elected (Cutler, 2001). Hence, as the 
coalitions were able to elect their candidates to public office, their voices and views 
drowned out public enthusiasm for freeway construction in the City of Milwaukee and 
surrounding region. 
 
The battles that ensued in the 1980s until late 1990s were the product of contentious 
politics on freeway construction during the urban renewal period. In the 1970s, 
Milwaukee saw the emergence of public officials who opposed the construction of new 
freeways, largely because of close association with local coalitions such as the Citizen 
Regional Environmental Coalition who opposed freeways. One of the prominent actors 
who challenged the proposal to build freeways in Milwaukee was John O. Norquist. He 
was elected to the Wisconsin State Assembly in 1975 based largely on an anti-freeway 
campaign before becoming a member of state senate in 1983. During his tenure as a state 
senator, Norquist helped limit and block new proposals for freeway construction in 
Milwaukee. After he became mayor, he directed his attention and his efforts toward 
specific freeways and projects.  
 
Norquist previously aimed at removing the East-West Freeway and replacing it with a 
landscaped, surface boulevard with traffic lights and direct access to businesses. 
However, he faced opposition and one technical problem stood in his way. 
Approximately 89,000 vehicles used East-West Freeway per day, and this amount of 
traffic cannot be handled by a surface boulevard. In addition, Lake Parkway as part of I-
794/East-West Freeway was nearing completion, and this added the volume of traffic 
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using I-794. Because of this situation, he turned his attention to Park Freeway which was 
never completed due to opposition in the late 1960s. His argument was that by tearing 
down this underutilized freeway, the city can free up many acres of land for development. 
Norquist then persuaded Governor Tommy Thompson and Milwaukee County Executive 
Thomas Ament to apply for federal funding and split the fund among three major 
projects, with the freeway deconstruction being one of these (Cutler, 2001).  
 
Urban Freeway Removal in San Francisco and Milwaukee: A historical comparative 
assessment 
We can identify a number of similarities and differences in the case of urban freeway 
removal in San Francisco and Milwaukee. Both cities experience contentious and heated 
debates between factions that opposed and those that supported freeway construction. 
While both cities were able to remove their freeways, these were freeways with low 
utilization and at some point had been partially torn down by natural forces. Both cities 
replaced freeways with similar design: a landscaped, surface boulevard in order to 
rejuvenate the area.  
 
While at the surface, San Francisco and Milwaukee succeeded in their battle against 
freeway construction, one stark difference stood between these cities. Opposition and 
support for freeway construction came primarily from neighborhood associations in San 
Francisco, while in Milwaukee it a ppeared that elites mobilized the debates. The 
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Power in the City: Conflict and coalitions in the decision-making process 
 
This section focuses on what makes San Francisco and Milwaukee differ in the case of 
freeway removal. Both cities achieve the same outcome despite having different socio-
economic characteristics. One possible explanation is the effect of power structure in the 
city on the decision. There were a number of actors who carried out important roles in 
shaping the agenda and directing the political debates surrounding freeway 
deconstruction.  
 
Supporters of Urban Freeway Removal 
Generally speaking, the initiatives to tear down freeways came not from social activists 
and local communities but from city officials. In San Francisco, it was John Molinari 
from San Francisco's Board of Supervisors supported by Mayor Dianne Feinstein and 
planning director Dean Macris; in Milwaukee, it w as Mayor John O. Norquist and 
planning director Peter Park who took the initiative. Norquist was known for his active 
role in opposing freeway construction since the early 1970s as an activist and as state 
senator before he successfully ran as mayor in 1988. Professional association and groups 
such as the American Institute of Architects, San Francisco Chapter, Sierra Club, 
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California Transit League and San Francisco League of Environmental Voters rallied 
behind the decision to tear down freeways. In the case of Central Freeway, Bay Area 
Rapid Transit (BART) opposed the idea of removing the freeway, citing that San 
Francisco cannot be part of a regional economy if its freeways only skirt the edge of the 
city.  
 
Local neighborhoods and social activists were also actively involved in the freeway 
deconstruction in both cities, albeit for different reasons. Residents of poor 
neighborhoods felt that they were treated as an object in the decision-making process to 
build freeways in the central city. In San Francisco, after the San Francisco Chronicle 
published TrafficWays Plan in 1956, those in Sunset, Telegraph and Russian Hills, 
Potrero, Polk Gulch, Haight-Ashbury that were in the path of freeway construction set off 
neighborhood movements to oppose the plan. However, residents in the western part of 
the city opposed the idea of removing Central Freeway completely, citing that it would 
affect access to their areas. Several ballot initiatives were launched in order to garner 
support for both the removal initiative and the rebuilding proposal before a compromise 
decision was reached in 1999. In Milwaukee, there was no broad opposition on freeway 
construction. Local residents as a m atter of fact were in favor in continuing freeway 






Opponents of Urban Freeway Removal: Political figures and businesses association 
In Milwaukee, in general downtown businesses were in favor of removing Park East 
Freeway, although there was an objection from a homeowner group led by George 
Watts9. This challenge was part of his campaign to run against Norquist for Milwaukee 
mayor. He argued that removing the freeway would eliminate a vital route for customers 
and workers. On June 30, 1999, The Common Council’s Public Improvement Committee 
approved 5-0 a measure that allowed city officials to negotiate with Milwaukee County 
and the state of Wisconsin about budget and related tasks to remove the freeway spur10. 
In California, despite support from the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, a heated 
debate took place concerning whether the city should tear down the Embarcadero 
Freeway or rebuild it. A number of merchant associations from Chinatown, Polk District 
and Outer Sunset merchants objected to the decision to remove the freeways, arguing that 
after the earthquake, businesses was down significantly, and therefore it was a poor 
decision to completely remove the freeways.   
 
Opposition to the freeway removal initiative came not only from local businesses but also 
from local progressive politicians. In San Francisco, Richard Hongisto, also a member of 
the Board of Supervisors, objected to the idea and vowed to bring the issue to the voters. 
                                                          
9 George Watts pressed a lawsuit in order to stop the removal process (see: See Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, 1999. Panel Paves Way for End to Park East Freeway. Thursday, July 1; Milwaukee, Wisconsin: 
Park East Freeway (http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysParkEast.html). In order to support his 
claim, he listed sixteen businesses and institutions that would be affected had Park East Freeway been 
removed. However, during the hearing, developer Gary Gruneau pointed out that he had talked with all but 
two on the list, and ten supported the decision, while the remaining four described that the decision would 
not have significant impact on them.  





Hongisto was known for his effort to place Proposition M, a measure which would limit 
construction of high rise commercial buildings which later had a dramatic impact on the 
San Francisco's skyline. Hongisto put the debate into voters' hands by asking whether 
they support removing freeways or rebuilding the freeway instead. Hongisto 
recommended a no vote on the June 1986 ballot and voters supported his effort by a two 
to one margin. Mayor Feinstein in commenting on the result argued that the ballot 
effectively ended two decades effort to remove freeways from the city.  
 
In Milwaukee, after being elected as mayor in 1988, Norquist tried to persuade the public 
about the impracticality of building more traffic lanes in Milwaukee. He pointed to other 
cities’ success in utilizing light rail rather than freeways in solving increasing traffic 
congestion. Milwaukee County Executive F. Thomas Ament supported Norquist’s idea to 
build light rail, pointing out that it was impractical to build more traffic lanes and also 
light rail had proven to be successful in other cities. However, there was opposition to 
this proposal. Waukesha County Executive Daniel M. Finley and Wisconsin Governor 
Thompson objected to the idea of building light rail based on two factors. One was high 
cost in building light rail, and the other was the fact that there were a l arge number of 
workers living in Waukesha County who commute to the city of Milwaukee.  
 
Milwaukee is unique in a sense that each group reached a compromise because of the 
deadline in using transportation funding. In 1991 Congress suspended an accumulated 
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transportation fund totaling 289 m illion dollars11 and required that the State of 
Wisconsin, Milwaukee County and City of Milwaukee agree on what kind of projects 
should be financed using this fund. If by the deadline there was no consensus between 
state and local government, the funding would be forfeited. Although Norquist previously 
suggested that I-794 (East-West Freeway) should be torn down, he opted to tear down 
Park East Freeway because the freeway had lower utilization. Because of this, the State 
of Wisconsin, Milwaukee County and the City of Milwaukee finally reached a w ritten 
agreement on how to use the ISTEA fund before the deadline for the ISTEA fund was set 
to expire. 241 million dollars were secured of which 25 m illion dollars were used for 
Park East Freeway demolition, 91 million dollars were designated to study the merit of 
mass transit system, 51 million dollars were spent to on reconstructing 6th Street viaduct 
and building two ramps to make Menomonee Valley industrial area more accessible for 
development, and the rest was spent to Marquette Interchange reconstruction (Cutler 
2001: 107-8). 
 
Contentious Politics in Urban Freeway Removal: Ballots and Compromise 
 To achieve their goal, both proponents and opponents of freeways had created strategic 
coalitions and had utilized various strategies and approaches. In San Francisco, local 
government officials courted chambers of commerce and professional associations in 
order to make freeway removal possible. A similar situation also emerged in Milwaukee, 
                                                          
11 This funding is part of the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) that provides 
an overall intermodal approach to highway and transit with collaborative planning requirement. This law 
gave greater endorsement to metropolitan planning organization.  There are 80 high priority corridors 
identified as part of the national highway system under ISTEA included Corridor 57 (US Route 41 
Corridor) which was designated to serve the corridor between Milwaukee and Green Bay.  
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where Norquist as mayor of Milwaukee with the support from Milwaukee County 
Executive promoted the idea of freeway removal as an economic development policy, a 
powerful issue that later garnered support from chamber of commerce and a majority of 
downtown merchants. A coalition to oppose freeway removal among local 
neighborhoods, merchants, local politicians and partisan-groups had also emerged. 
Chinatown merchants, groups of motorist and a number of Republican politicians also 
opposed the idea of removing Embarcadero Freeway. In the case of Central Freeway, it 
was the neighborhood association in western San Francisco along with Chinatown and 
Outer Sunset merchants and labor unions who formed a coalition to oppose the removal 
of Central Freeway and instead urging the city with Caltrans to rebuild it.  
 
In 1970 the African American population in Milwaukee accounted for almost 23 percent 
of the total population, and this number almost doubled in 2010. At the same time, the 
central city lost more than 20,000 between 1970 and 2000, while surrounding suburbs 
gained almost 200,000 ne w jobs. Manufacturing was hit hardest as Milwaukee lost 
almost 50,000 jobs, yet its suburbs were able to create more than 11,000 ne w 
manufacturing jobs. Further, between 1986 until 1997, the Department of Transportation 
spent more than $400 million (in 1996 dollars) for adding new capacity to the highway 
system in counties that encircled Milwaukee.12 These facts alone might explain why there 
was resistance with regard to the idea of freeway removal.  
                                                          
12 Orfield, Myron. 1998. Milwaukee Metropolitics: A regional agenda for community and stability. First 
preliminary report submitted to the Center on Wisconsin Strategy, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 






Race and Ethnicity as the Determinant Factor  
Ethnic groups also played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of urban freeway 
removal in San Francisco, although this was not the case in Milwaukee. DeLeon (1992) 
argued that in San Francisco, the progressive movement can be classified into three 
distinct categories: liberalism, environmentalism and populism.13 He evaluated whether 
there were correlations between voter characteristics and their policy preferences by 
looking at thirty four ballot propositions between 1979 and 1990 in San Francisco. His 
study revealed that there are strong associations between race/ethnicity and type of 
progressivism in San Francisco. Blacks and Hispanics are more aligned with 
progressivism while Asian inclined toward conservatism, although they supported liberal 
ballot proposition such as affordable housing, public school spending, rent-control, and 
municipalization of public utilities (DeLeon 1992: 183). On the other hand, home 
ownership also affected how individual perceived local issues. Homeowners are more 
attracted to populism rather than liberalism. The higher an individual’s socio-economic 
status, the more attracted they are to environmental issues rather than populist aspects of 
progressivism.   
 
                                                          
13 Deleon defines progressivism as a movement which “attacks all structures of social domination, imposes 
conditions on business elites for access to the city’s space, gives priority to community-use values over 
market-exchange values in land-use and development planning, and seeks to empower neighborhoods and 
groups historically excluded from public leadership roles (1992, p.34).” He then developed three distinct 
but somewhat interrelated categories of progressivism: liberalism, environmentalism and populism. 
Liberalism focuses more on the autonomy of the individual and favoring civil and political liberties and 
protection from arbitrary authority, environmentalism places its emphasis on preserving green spaces, or 
the air quality rather than heredity as the important factor in the development, and populism views that the 
rights and power of the people in their struggle against the privileged elite should be acknowledged and 
accommodated in the development.  
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Demographic structure helps us understand how race and ethnicity influence urban 
politics in San Francisco. Whereas the white population continues to decline (from 53.10 
percent in 1980 to 41.90 percent in 2010), Asian and Hispanic population continues to 
grow. Combined, these two races accounted for more than 48 percent in 2010, a  sharp 
increase from 1980, where they accounted for less than 35 percent. Homeownership in 
San Francisco is predominantly Asian and their number has been increasing significantly 
over the last ten years14, and this might explain their objections to freeway removal.15    
   
DeLeon in his study (1992) measured the perception of each race relative to the level of 
progressivism and whether they are more oriented toward specific type of progressivism 
(liberalism, environmentalism and populism). He broke down San Francisco’s population 
into three different ethnic groups: Black, Hispanic and Asian. Further, he also evaluated 
whether the level of progressivism was influenced by the rate of homeownership in the 
city. He contended that Black and Hispanic are more progressive than Asian. Moreover, 
the Black population is more inclined toward liberalism. Hispanics, on the other hand, are 
more progressive than Blacks and Asians. Asians are the most conservative among the 
three groups observed. Table 6.4 provides a snapshot of the association between race and 
the level of progressivism in San Francisco.  
                                                          
14 Western metros experienced strong growth of the Asian share of owners. Five of the six metros posting 
the strongest growth are located in California, including San Francisco, where 22% of homeowners were 
Asian. See McArdle, N. et al. 2012. The Changing Face of Homeowners in Large Metro Areas. 
diversitydata.org Issue Brief. Available online at 
http://diversitydata.sph.harvard.edu/Publications/Homeownership_brief_final.pdf  
15 During contentious debate in deciding whether the city should remove or retrofit the Embarcadero and 
Central Freeways, two factions emerged. One who opposed the idea of removing the freeways and those 
that supported the removal. One of the groups who opposed the idea of removing the freeways was the 
Chinese merchants. What makes them unique in this case is that they often utilize their houses as stores, a 
fact commonly found among Asian communities. Thus, it was not surprising that they opposed the idea of 
removing the freeways as they feared their businesses might decline.  
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Table 6.4 Liberalism, Environmentalism, Populism and Overall Progressivism in San 
Francisco Precinct as a function of Race/Ethnicity, Sexual Orientation, Home Ownership, 







Percent Black .614 ** -.302 ** -.252 ** .020  
Percent Hispanic .749 ** .335 ** .114  .399 ** 
Percent Asian .47  -.105 * -.446 ** -.168 ** 
Gay (Dummy) 14.914 ** 8.150 ** 9.802 ** 10.956 ** 
Percent Home Owners -.461 ** -.360 ** .172 ** -.216 ** 
SES 1.129 ** 1.470 ** .510 ** 1.036 ** 
SES2 -.011 ** -.011 ** -.011 ** -.011 ** 
Constant 31.427 ** 32.473 ** 58.909 ** 40.936 ** 
Standard Error of Estimate 12.031  10.952  12.548  8.788  
Adjusted R2 .71  .64  .49  .58  
(Adjusted R2 without SES2) (.65)  (.55)  (.41)  (.44)  
Number of Precincts 710  710  710  710  
 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
Source: DeLeon 1992: 185 
 
DeLeon's table (table 5.5) enables us to understand the political dynamics around freeway 
removal in San Francisco. Asians rallied to oppose freeway removal by arguing that such 
decision would negatively affect their businesses, while whites and blacks supported the 
idea of tearing down freeways for different reasons, such as concern with the decline of 
urban environmental quality. This helps us understanding why plans for freeway 
construction were finally voted down through ballot initiative. Racial composition in San 
Francisco influenced the outcome of the vote. Whites and blacks combined accounted for 
more than fifty percent of the total population, while Asians only accounted for thirty 




In Milwaukee, a different story emerged. The racial composition in Milwaukee reveals 
similarity with other cities in Midwest, but the dissimilarity index16 is hovering around 
70. At the metropolitan level, the index stood around 80 since 1990, the highest among 
U.S. metro areas. The proportion of the black population increased more than tenfold in 
less than a half century in the city of Milwaukee, while at metro level it only increased 
twofold in the same period. Combined with the fact that the poverty rate in the central 
city is significantly higher than in the suburbs (it was twenty two percent in Milwaukee 
city compared with approximately four percent in the suburbs in 2003), job creations and 
economic growth became a pertinent issues rather than the idea of creating an inviting 
and attractive physical environment. Results from the 1975 referenda reinforced the 
previous two referenda, where the majority of Milwaukeeans opted for freeway 
construction. Thus, freeway revolts in Milwaukee were caused by the following factors: 
(1) the local government’s decision to build urban freeways that split apart poor 
neighborhood, and (2) the local government’s decision to not inform the local community 
about the detailed urban freeway designs to those who would be affected by the project 
until last few minutes of public hearing.     
 
Actors and Their Role in the Decision-making Process 
While both cities revealed political dynamics before and during the decision-making 
process, including negotiations and compromise, there are similarities and differences 
that can be summarized in table 6.5. It maps actors' involvement and their roles in 
                                                          
16 The Dissimilarity index measures the relative separation or integration of groups across all 




shaping the decision-making processes. By comparing San Francisco and Milwaukee, 
similarities and differences between two cities are revealed.  
 
Table 6.5 Actors and their roles that shape the decision making process 
 San Francisco (Embarcadero 
Freeway & Central Freeway) 




EPA through NEPA Act in 
1970 indirectly influenced the 
way activists and freeway 
opponents set the agenda for 
debate.  
 
EPA through NEPA Act in 
1970 indirectly influenced the 
way activists and freeway 
opponents set the agenda for 
debate.  
 
 The Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA)  
provided necessary funding for 
removing both freeways and 
subsequent costs associated 
with redevelopment the areas 
The Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA)  
provided necessary funding for 
removing both freeways and 
subsequent costs associated 
with redevelopment the areas 
State Government The State of California 
Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans) was assigned either 
to rebuild or to remove 
freeways affected by the 1989 
earthquake. It also administered 
state and federal resources 
allocated for freeway projects; 
however, disbursement for any 
project was pending city 
approval.  
In the case of the Embarcadero 
Freeway, Caltrans provided 
support for both plans (option 
1. to rebuild freeway and option 
2. to remove freeway). 
Governor Thompson originally 
vetoed the plan to remove 
freeway. His objection was not 
against urban freeway removal, 
but on replacing the freeway 
with light rail. He pointed out 
that light rail cost more than 





 San Francisco (Embarcadero 
Freeway & Central Freeway) 
Milwaukee (Park East 
Freeway) 
However, in the case of the 
Central Freeway, Caltrans 
initially supported keeping the 
portion of the freeway. 
However, they changed the 
plan after there were petitioned 
by the local community 
opposing the plan  
Municipal (local) 
government 
San Francisco City: Initiated 
plan for removing freeways  
Milwaukee City: Initiated plan 
for removing freeways through 
mayor John O. Norquist 
supported by head of planning 
director Peter Park 
  Milwaukee County: opposed 
the idea of removing the 
freeway citing that commuters’ 
mobility would be disrupted 
  Waukesha County: objected to 
the plan citing that it was costly 
to build mass rapid transit as 
compared with upgrading the 
bus services already in place 
Local community There were no unified voices 
with regard to freeway 
removal. In the case of 
Embarcadero Freeway, there 
were two groups, one who 
opposed and the other who 
supported  
Local communities supported 
freeway construction. In 1975 
referenda asking about the fate 
of five different segments of 
freeway, more than fifty 
percent supported the effort to 
continue building freeways. 
Private Sectors Chamber of Commerce: There 
is no opposition from the 
chamber of commerce for 
removing both freeways. They 
argue (in line with argument 
Chamber of Commerce: There 
is no opposition from the 
chamber of commerce for Park 
East Freeway removal. Similar 
to what happened in San 
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 San Francisco (Embarcadero 
Freeway & Central Freeway) 
Milwaukee (Park East 
Freeway) 
from municipal government) 
that freeway removal and 
redevelopment will bring 
federal and state dollars and 
create jobs   
Francisco, the idea that 
removing the freeway will 
bring federal and state dollars 
and additional jobs to the city 
enticed them to voice their 
support for the city’s decision. 
 Local businesses, especially 
Chinatown merchants opposed 
the idea of removing freeways, 
while other local businesses 
were receptive to the idea  
Local businesses: a number of 
downtown merchants opposed 
the plan by arguing that it 




American Institute of 
Architects (AIA) and American 
Planning Association (APA) 
San Francisco chapter endorsed 
the removal of Embarcadero 
and Central Freeways. Both 
associations have voiced their 
support for freeway removal on 
ballot.  
Congress of new Urbanism 
voiced their support for the idea 
of freeway removal. American 
Institute of Architects (AIA) 
and American Planning 
Association local chapter also 
endorsed the plan for similar 
reasons.   
 
Source: author analysis 
 
 
Economic Restructuring as the Driver for Change 
 
After World War II, population in both San Francisco and Milwaukee increased. 
However, ten years later urban population in both cities declined, due to the 
implementation of urban renewal programs. After 1980, S an Francisco was able to 
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reverse this course. However, unlike San Francisco, Milwaukee kept losing its population 
even after 1980. One possible explanation was that freeway construction spurred rapid 
development in the surrounding suburbs. Ease of movement has granted people freedom 
to choose where to live and to work. Further, businesses realized in the 1950s that the 
single story layout was much more cost effective than the traditional, older, multi-story 
factory design commonly found in central city. As this required more spaces than central 
city can accommodate, businesses started to relocate their plants to spacious industrial 
parks even before freeways were built (Cutler 2001: 112).  
 
Changes in transportation modes also affected population trends in both cities, albeit 
indirectly. Started in late the 1950s, trucks gradually replaced rail in terms of cargo 
delivery to and from factories and eventually trucks carried for 81% of the value of all the 
nation's freight, and 60% of the tonnage (Kilborn, 1999). As industries became more 
reliant on trucks than rails, businesses started to develop industrial parks in the suburbs 
adjacent to freeways and thus reinforced dramatic transformation between central city 
and suburbs, as can be seen in table 6.6. In 1970, almost 50% of total metropolitan area 
population lived in central cities. However, more than three decades later, this proportion 
changed. More than half metro population now lives in suburbs.  
Table 6.6 Population breakdown between central city and suburbs in Milwaukee and San 
Francisco MSA 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 
Milwaukee City 51.09 45.54 43.86 39.78 38.82 
Milwaukee suburbs 46.04 50.86 52.17 55.90 56.75 
San Francisco City 48.42 45.60 45.14 44.87 44.30 
San Francisco suburbs 51.58 54.40 54.86 55.13 55.70 




Economic restructuring provides several possible explanations as to why these 
phenomena occurred. After the 1960s many manufacturing industries were relocated 
outside U.S. territory. The industries argued that rising cost of labors made the 
commodities less competitive compared with similar commodities from other countries. 
While arguably the decision to move the factory from central city to suburbs might had 
reduced the pressure due to rising production costs, U.S. commodities still could not 
compete in a global market due to high prices. The solution was relocating the factory not 
only from central city to suburbs or from the Rustbelt to the Sunbelt in the south, but also 
by moving of from U.S. territory to other territory where the cost of labor was considered 
cheap and there was no stringent environmental regulation.17  
 
At that time, manufacturing industries still produced low technology as compared with 
research and development (R&D) which produced high-technology, high added-value 
products. Looking at the U.S. trade balance in high-technology and low-technology 
products between 1960 and 1979, there was a sharp difference between these two18. The 
U.S. gained significant surpluses in terms of high technology products being exported 
(from $5 bi llion in 1960 to almost $40 bi llion in 1979, while low-technology products 
showed a dramatic decline from less than $500 million in 1960 into more than $35 billion 
in 1979). Even though the net effect from low-technology product and high technology 
                                                          
17  http://prospect.org/article/plight-american-manufacturing, last accessed on November 1, 2011 
18  High-technology industries are defined as those having high R&D expenditures relative to total sales 
and a high proportion of skilled labor in their work force, while low-technology industries are defined 
as those having low R&D expenditures and a low proportion of skilled workers. See detailed 
explanation in Branson, W.H. 1983. The Myth of De-industrialization. Regulation: AEI Journal on 
Government and Society 7 (5): 24-54. 
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products exports combined was only a surplus of $2 bi llion in 197919, it brought a 
dramatic impact to U.S. cities in the national economic constellation as well as in the 
global economy in subsequent decades. A detailed observation shows developing 
countries consumed more of U.S. high-technology products especially in 1970s (from 
around $6 billion in 1970 to a staggering $23 billion in 1979). Also, the U.S. had trade 
surpluses with other developed countries with the exception of Japan and Germany (West 
Germany at that time).  
 
These factors combined had a chilling effect on central cities. Milwaukee, one of the 
bastions of manufacturing industries in the Midwest was severely affected because of this 
global trend. Table 6.7 portrays this effect on both cities albeit with a different effect. In 
the 1970s, almost half of labor force in Milwaukee worked in the manufacturing sector. 
However, four decades later, this number plummeted to less than one fifth of its labor 
force. San Francisco fared slightly better, since manufacturing employment never 
accounted for more than one fifth of total employment. This did not mean that suburbs in 
Milwaukee had higher advantages than central city. During the same periods, the share of 
employment in the manufacturing industry in Milwaukee suburbs within Milwaukee 
MSA also declined sharply from 52.2 pe rcent in 1970 t o 33.6 percent in 2000. S an 
Francisco suburbs were on a similar trajectory; however, because the region did not rely 
on manufacturing as its economic base, the region lost less than 10 percent of its 
manufacturing employment between 1970 and 2000.    
                                                          
19  Ibid. 
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Table 6.7 Share of manufacturing employment in San Francisco and Milwaukee city, 
1970-2010 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
San Francisco 21.8 16.8 15.3 11.7 5.9 
Milwaukee 44.7 41.1 32.7 29.3 15.4 
 
Source: American Community Survey (ACS) 
 
During a contentious debate after the November 5, 1974 referenda in Milwaukee, 
Congressman Henry A. Reuss pointed out that the rising gasoline price due to Arab oil 
embargo might have a crippling effect on consumers. At a time when gas prices had 
doubled from 30 cents per gallon to almost 60 c ents per gallon, Reuss proposed that 
instead of focusing on freeway development, Milwaukee should focus on bui lding 
housing, light industry, public transit and outdoor recreation (Cutler 2001: 88). Despite 
the fact that more than half of the voters supported completing seventeen miles freeways 
comprised of five different segment of freeways, the freeway opponents fared better in 
shaping public opinion by using global concern (at that time was the rising oil prices) to 
delay the construction processes.  
 
Regardless of the outcome, economic restructuring, where the manufacturing industry is 
slowly replaced by service-related industries, shapes the way actors frame their 
arguments for or against specific policies. Coupled with local pressures from residents for 
job creation and economic growth, economic restructuring also creates challenges for 
local governments in crafting development strategies that can satisfy everyone. As cities 
no longer compete one with another in the same region but also with cities from different 
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countries, visual and economic attractiveness became main goals for winning local and 
foreign investment. Although San Francisco outperformed Milwaukee in attracting 
companies (there were eight top Fortune 500 companies in San Francisco compared with 
only five companies in Milwaukee), both cities are outperformed by their peer cities in 
different categories. After New York, San Francisco is ranked second to the U.S. under 
the diversified financial activities and a flagship for headquarters in the IT sector, while 
Milwaukee is ranked second after New York in the U.S. as a destination for world’s 
largest service providers, in particular capital goods (Ernst & Young & CSA, 2008). All 
of these combined became the driving force for actors and institutions to use global 
concerns as a means to persuade the public and other politicians about the direction of 
local development in the city should take. 
 
 
Inter-governmental Relation as a determinant factor 
 
Local politics is shaped and built around socio-economic status of the city residents. 
However, while any decision is decided by local actors, inter-governmental relations also 
contribute to the process. In San Francisco and Milwaukee, states and the federal 
government directly or indirectly influenced the local political dynamics leading to 





The Federal Highway Act of 1962 gave impetus for a collaborative decision-making 
process between states and local governments through its 3C (collaborative, 
comprehensive, continuing) principles. Further, this act also required all actors involved 
to consider local land development patterns and other transportation modes when 
designing long-range freeway plans and programs. Since the federal government had 
promised to provide 90 percent of the total cost for freeway development if state and 
local government fulfilled the 3C principles, cities such as San Francisco and Milwaukee 
were able to exercise local political power determining whether they would accept a 
freeway or not.20 Seven years later, another act indirectly influenced the trajectory of 
urban freeway development in the U.S. cities. The Federal government through the 
National Environmental Protection Act had created a new mandate and regulations 
demanding that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) should be taken before any 
federal funds could be disbursed for any development project.  
 
Combined, the Federal Highway Act of 1962, Federal Highway Act of 1968, and NEPA 
of 1969 had created an avenue for local movements in Milwaukee and San Francisco to 
revolt against freeway construction. Freeway opponents seized this opportunity to delay 
the decision-making process (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; Cutler, 2001). In Milwaukee, 
freeway opponents brought suit against the federal government arguing that an EIA had 
to be made before any decision was taken with regard to freeway construction. This cost 
                                                          
20 Although there were second provision from Federal Highway Act of 1962 required state highway 
department to provide relocation assistance to displaced families and businesses, this did not take effect 
until July 1, 1965. Thus, this hindered any effort to protect urban communities from any arbitrary 
transportation decision (Mohl 2004: 680). To respond to mounting  criticism, a set of amendment were 
incorporated in the Federal Highway Act of 1968 required that states should provide decent, safe, and 
sanitary relocation housing prior to property acquisition for interstate routes.  
177 
 
the city more than twenty two million dollars for the cost of land acquisition (99 percent 
has been acquired) and clearance of more than 1,500 houses (Cutler 2001: 83-84). After 
heated debates in a public hearing in 1974 and general referenda in 1975, the city and 
state agreed to discontinue building freeways in Milwaukee. In San Francisco, although a 
federal mandate and regulations were powerful tools in slowing down the construction 
process, it was a combination of changes in the state legislature and the wealthy and 
affluent residents’ resistance that reinforced the opposition to freeway construction. 
Before the enactment of the Federal Highway Act of 1962 with its 3C principles, the state 
of California had revised the California Streets and Highway Code to require the Division 
of Highways to solicit public responses to new freeway plan. At the same time, the 
proposed freeway plan affected wealthy and affluent parts of the city. Altogether, these 
two factors had created avenues for a powerful opposition to resist new freeway plans. 
That being said, all of these had paved the way for a new interaction between states and 
local governments and between central cities and their surrounding suburbs in the future 
debate about freeway (de)construction. 
 
To remove Park East Freeway, Milwaukee tried to tap federal funding available through 
ISTEA fund to achieve the goal. Because of the failure to compromise in utilizing the 
funding, Congress suspended 289 m illion dollars in 1991 and asked that the State of 
Wisconsin, Milwaukee County and Milwaukee City agreed on which projects should be 
financed with this fund. Before the deadline, the State of Wisconsin, Milwaukee County, 
and Milwaukee City were able to secure a d eal, and were able to utilize 241 million 




Local governments treated the proposals similar to mega-projects and relied on federal 
and state funds to finance the project. San Francisco put the proposition on the ballot that 
if voters supported the idea the city would get federal and state funds to finance the 
project. In other words, securing federal and state fund in freeway deconstruction was 
essential for local economic development and city beautification. In 1992, the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors voted against building any new above-ground ramps to 
the Central Freeway north of Fell Street. In 1997, Proposition H was put on ballot asking 
voters whether they supported the Board of Supervisors plan to authorize Caltrans to 
rebuild certain portions of Central Freeway and to end the ban on construction of new 
aboveground freeway ramps north of Fell Street. Aside from the technical and social 
impacts, the City Controller has estimated that if the voters supported the plan, the project 
was estimated to cost 52 million dollars. This would typically come to the State 
Department of Transportation from state and federal sources since local government did 
not usually fund freeway projects from local revenues.  
 
San Francisco and Milwaukee also revealed the dynamic relationship between state and 
local government. While the city of Milwaukee actively pursued light rail as part of its 
integrated development policy, the State of Wisconsin and surrounding counties (in 
particular Waukesha County) were not excited about such an initiative. They agreed that 
light rail would not be able to solve the transportation problem; however, the reasons 
behind their positions were completely different from one with another. Governor 
Thompson objected to the idea because of the high cost involved, while Waukesha 
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County Executive Daniel M. Finley argued that alongside the high cost associated with 
light rail, the demographic structure of Milwaukee suburbs should also be taken into 
account. Waukesha County was an industrial region and most of its residents worked in 
the manufacturing industry. Building fixed light rail track connecting central city and 
suburbs lacked flexibility to move workers to various locations in metro areas21. The 
State of Wisconsin, Milwaukee County and Milwaukee City were finally able to reach an 
agreement. However, this agreement was the result of pressure from Congress and federal 
government intervention.  
 
In San Francisco the situation was a little bit different. Before the 1989 earthquake, city 
officials had urged local community to support their proposal to redevelop the 
Embarcadero area by tearing down the freeway. Yet, many distrusted such a bold plan 
and argued that changes might make things worse. Local residents were equally divided, 
half were in favor of freeway removal, the other half insisted that freeway should be kept 
for economic reasons. The proposal to remove Central Freeway also faced similar 
situation. Faced with these difficulties, Caltrans agreed to provide two different 
alternatives in the case of Central Freeway to be put in the ballot, while in the case of 
Embarcadero Freeway, Caltrans provided an alternative between retrofitting the freeway 
and removing it and replaced it with boulevard and other amenities.   
 
                                                          
21 From 1970 to early 2000, construction and manufacturing workers accounted for 30% of total employed 
residents in Waukesha County, while city of Milwaukee hovered around 20 to 25 percent (State of the 
Cities Data Systems, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development). However, median household 
income in Waukesha County far exceeded median household income in the city of Milwaukee ($64,482 in 
Waukesha County compared with $41,486 in the city of Milwaukee).   
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Freeway deconstruction validated a pattern in mega projects (Altshuler & Luberoff, 
2003) where local government invested a large amount of financial resources into a 
project that they believed would change the course of progress amid political 
controversies and opposition. The projects relied on federal and state government 
funding. Prior to implementation, local governments often touted the merit of these 
projects in creating employment and spurring the local economy. In each case, excluding 
funding from federal and state government, local government spent between three to five 
million dollars to remove freeways and another twenty to fifty million dollars to 
redevelop the area and its surrounding neighborhoods.  
 
 
Freeway Deconstruction in Retrospect 
 
Dramatic changes during the 1990s and early 2000s have brought a different attitude and 
perspective in looking at the relationship between freeways and the local economy. The 
common conception that freeways are important in shaping local competitive advantage 
is challenged both at the city level, and at the neighborhood level. Freeway 
deconstruction has provided a new avenue to test and to challenge this assumption.  
 
Freeway deconstruction has been applauded as an appropriate solution to rejuvenate 
central cities. Criticism is directed toward freeway construction claiming it caused central 
cities to lose eight percent of its population between 1950 and 1990 (Baum-Snow, 2007). 
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Therefore, it is assumed that tearing down a freeway can bring back central city 
population. San Francisco demolished its freeways in the late 1990s; however, its 
population had been increasing even before 1980 based on U.S. Population Census data 
(it grew by 3.7 pe rcent between 2000 and 2010). On the other hand, Milwaukee tore 
down Park East Freeway in 2002 and based on 2010 U.S. Population Census data there is 
no sign that its population will increase. In fact, between 2000 and 2010, Milwaukee's 
population decreased by 0.4 percent.  
 
It is pertinent to evaluate the effects of freeway deconstruction on local politics and 
economy. I direct my attention to actors and institutions involved in the decision-making 
processes. Supporters of the freeway construction often cited the effects of the freeway 
on the local economy, and the fear of gridlock that motorists had to endure had the 
freeway not been built. Supporters of freeway removal argued that a different 
arrangement would ease the traffic and at the same time stimulate local economy. 
Empirical evidence from a number of cities shows that it is hard to point out a concrete 
conclusion on whose claim is true. Of the twenty one cities engaged in the heated debates 
on whether a particular freeway in the city should be removed or not, only five cities 
were finally able to remove freeways albeit for various reasons. Despite claims of success 
from each side, there was no common consensus on how  to measure the impact of 
freeway construction on the local economy and the city.    
 
San Francisco and Milwaukee were able to secure federal funding to remove a portion of 
their freeways. Approximately eighty percent of the total cost of freeway removal came 
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from federal funding, while the remaining came from local funds. At the same time, both 
cities spent a considerable amount of money to redevelop the areas after the demolition. 
Milwaukee spent 25 m illion dollars to recreate three neighborhoods after it tore down 
Park East Freeway. San Francisco spent 50 million dollars to create a six-lane boulevard 
in the former site of Embarcadero Freeway and 62 million dollars to create a similar 
approach in the former area of Central Freeway and to rejuvenate Hayes Valley 
neighborhood.  
 
Despite competing claims from both sides concerning the cost and benefit to the city of 
the freeway removal, San Francisco Municipal Agency did a post-project evaluation and 
found that there were backlogs on several streets and delayed arrival time for transit 
services. Further, there were discrepancies from the initial design and the implementation 
such as the width of the lane for traffic calming (from 16.5 feet in the initial design to 18 
feet). On the other hand, the redesign of Octavia Boulevard did reduce the amount of 
traffic (from an average of 3,223 daily vehicles with 85th percentile speed of 27 mph in 
2006 to 1,721 da ily vehicles in 2010 w ith 85th percentile speed of 22 mph)22. Hayes 
Valley neighborhood experienced an increase in its property value after Central Freeway 
had been removed. As for the case of Embarcadero Freeway, it was difficult to isolate the 
                                                          
22 The 85th percentile speed is a major parameter used by traffic engineers and transport planners. It is 
defined as “the speed at or below which 85% of all vehicles are observed to travel under free flowing 
conditions past a nominated point.” (http://metrocount.com/downloads/flyers/Speed_analysis_1.pdf, 
retrieved January 09, 2014). The use of the 85th percentile speed concept is based on the theory that: (1) the 
large majority of drivers: (a) are reasonable and prudent, (b) do not want to have a crash, and (c) desire to 
reach their destination in the shortest possible time, and (2) a speed at or below which 85% of people drive 
at any given location under good weather and visibility conditions may be considered as the maximum safe 
speed for that location. 
(http://onlinemanuals.txdot.gov/txdotmanuals/szn/determining_the_85th_percentile_speed.htm, retrieved 
January 09, 2014)  
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impact of freeway removal on the neighborhood since the area was part of Fisherman’s 
Wharf and a tourist destination. A number of studies confirmed that house prices did 
increase after the removal (Cervero et al., 2007). However, these studies did not take into 
account the fact that the study areas are tourist destinations.   
      
The demolition of Park East Freeway arguably is based on a political compromise rather 
than technical assessment. Norquist originally proposed tearing down I-794 (East-West 
Freeway). However, his proposal was criticized due to the fact that this freeway carries 
more than 89,000 vehicles per day (Cutler 2001: 107). Park East Freeway, suffered from 
the contentious battle of freeway construction in the 1970s carries only 35,000 vehicles 
per day. Tearing down Park East Freeway would help him accomplish his idea of pushing 
light rail forward as a means to tackle transportation problems in the city of Milwaukee. 
The removal was followed by the creation of three new neighborhoods in the area in 
order to attract new investment to the area. Yet, after almost a decade, the city still 
struggled to attract new investment, and some investors asked whether the city could 
provide financial assistance to spur the development.    
 
While many applauded the initiative to tear down the freeway in both cities, a number of 
criticisms have emerged with regard to the decision. Norquist made a remark that the city 
of Milwaukee did not need new freeways because of the decreased utilization of existing 
freeways and therefore the removal of Park East Freeway was justifiable. Norquist’s 
claim was criticized by Cutler (2001). He pointed that the decreased utilization of 
freeways was caused by adding more freeways onto road networks that enable drivers to 
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travel different routes if they encountered gridlock. The removal of the Embarcadero and 
Central Freeway also creates backlog and delay by more than two minutes for transit 
services.  
 
The other criticism was targeted at the fiscal issue of the redevelopment project after 
freeway demolition. People inquired whether the redevelopment project is financially 
sustainable that it does not need financial support from taxpayers' money. Along with 
this, there was doubt whether such a project can create significant economic impact to the 
city. Although the area, formerly site of Park East Freeway, was ready in 2004, the 
redevelopment was considered slow. This perhaps was due to the unexpected financial 
crisis in 2007. Coupled with the fact that the lot size in the area was relatively large made 
it difficult for the city to sell it. On the other hand, San Francisco was able to rejuvenate 
the former area of Embarcadero Freeway since it was and still is a tourist destination. The 
area surrounding Octavia Boulevard and Hayes Valley neighborhood also experienced 
significant improvement after the removal of Central Freeway.   
 
Property value assessment around Park East Freeway site obtained from Milwaukee 
County Assessor revealed that after the demolition property value around the site 
experienced positive valuation until 2008 when gradually total property value assessment 
for overall areas around the site declined until 2011. Figure 6.4 summarizes property 
value assessment around former site of Park East Freeway between 2004 and 2011. The 
increased value perhaps was caused by the start of the revitalization processes initiated by 
the economic development office. Although economic crisis in 2007 is often pointed out 
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as a primary culprit in the declining property value, there might be other explanations 
such as low interests from captive markets to relocate to Milwaukee or there are no 
interesting employment opportunities available in the city.  
 
Figure 6.3 Property value assessments around former site of Park East Freeway (based 






























Source: Milwaukee County Assessor, author analysis 
 
A careful observation of percent changes in the property value between 2004 until 2011 
revealed that the initiatives to rejuvenate the former site of Park East Freeway did not 
bring the intended impact. The areas only experienced a brief increase between 2005 and 
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2006, and after 2006, t he property value decreased similar to other parts of the city. 
Between 2009 a nd 2011, the property values in the area even decreased sharply as 
compared with city of Milwaukee.  
 
 
Summary and Discussions 
 
Although San Francisco and Milwaukee succeeded in removing freeways, it was the role 
of growth coalitions manifested in political pressure via ballot and budget compromise 
that enabled such changes to happen. In each city, it was a diverse coalition comprised of 
various actors with different socio-economic background. In San Francisco wealthy 
neighborhoods’ dissent later turned into neighborhood movements that motivated the 
movement toward oppose freeway construction. It was a different problem in Milwaukee. 
Local economic decline in the early 1960s and urban renewal project targeting poor 
neighborhoods spurred the movements to oppose freeway construction or expansion. We 
can conclude that urban freeway removal in San Francisco was motivated by 
neighborhoods’ movement while in Milwaukee it was the local elites who bolstered the 
initiative.  
 
However, there is a clear separation with regard to political ideology in both cities. Those 
aligned with the Republican/Conservative party were rejecting the idea of removing 
freeways while those identifying as Democrat/Liberals were pushing the freeway 
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deconstruction initiative. State officials argued that removing freeways and replacing 
them with mass rapid transit would interrupt existing regional flows of goods and 
services. Local officials, supported by members of local chambers of commerce, 
neighborhood associations, local business association and professional association, 
pushed for freeway removal since freeway did not bring the intended economic effect to 
the central city and neighborhood. Federal government appeared to stay neutral, as 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) not only provided funding to build freeways 
but also agreed to fund costs associated with freeway removal.   
 
In both cities, the following criteria were drivers for the coalition formation to pursue 
freeway removal: 
1. There is a n eed to cater to a n ew market (either to create jobs or to provide 
amenities), and since land available for development is limited, public attention is 
directed toward removing freeways;  
2. There is a continuing support for freeway removal from local communities, 
especially those affected with freeway construction during the urban renewal 
periods and those who feared that their land value will decrease as an effect of an 
expanding freeway construction; 
3. Both cities have undergone economic transformation with advanced-service 
sectors dominated local economy; 
4. There are under-utilized freeways ready for removal;  
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5. A dominant central city with advanced service sectors as an economic base sought 
to strengthen the attractiveness of its local economy with strong ties to state 
officials and lawmakers, and   
6. Indirect federal support in the form of financial assistance to cover major portion 
of the project if it is approved. 
 
This historical narrative serves as the last foundation in understanding the way local 
coalitions in two cities with different characteristics were able to influence the cities' 
decision to remove their urban freeways. Although we can say that the driving forces 
behind the decision to remove urban freeways in San Francisco and Milwaukee came 
from endogenous factors, there is significant difference between the two cities. In San 
Francisco grass roots and neighborhood associations influenced the public perception on 
urban freeways, whereas in Milwaukee it was the activists and elites that mobilized the 
coalition.  
 
Despite the fact that pro-growth coalitions dominated the local political landscape in the 
pre-1985 era (Hu, 2012), it was during Mayor Art Agnos' and Frank Jordan's tenure that 
the slow-growth movement gained its support from the government and their stance was 
accepted by the local business community. The slow-growth movement places the 
emphasis in preserving San Francisco's traditional characters and integrating the 
inclusionary program as part of the city's development strategies. As homeowners and 
neighborhood associations morphed into a community-based organization with a strong 
political power, they gradually influenced the City Hall officials' view on urban freeways. 
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Even though the City Hall embraced the idea of removing urban freeways after the 1989 
Pieta Loma earthquake hit the city, this coalition of homeowners and neighborhood 
associations managed to convey their view of urban freeways and the development 
trajectory of the city. The removal of the Embarcadero Freeway in 1991 and the Central 
Freeway six years later substantiated this claim.  
 
On the other hand, despite strong efforts from activists and African-Americans in 
Milwaukee in challenging the pro-growth stance of the city, the majority of 
Milwaukeeans continued to support the pro-growth strategy. The 1975 referendum 
exemplified this view as more than 50% of voters approved the plan to build a network of 
urban freeways. The removal of Park East Freeway was the result of Norquist's view of 
whether a city should rely more on urban freeways or on light rail. At the same time, it 
also reflected opposing view between the City Hall and the majority of the city's 
population, and between the city and the State and adjacent counties. 
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The scholarship on t he role of power and planning in influencing infrastructure 
development is immense. However, many of them present little if any evidence to 
address the association between the city’s characteristics and urban infrastructure 
development. The immediate goal of this dissertation was to explore whether the 
characteristics of the city play a pivotal role in shaping the decision to remove urban 
freeways within the American context. My long range ambition was to produce a 
dissertation that adds to both the theoretical and practical knowledge of how power 
affects planning and infrastructure development.  
 
Current public policy options designed to bolster the growth of urban areas are usually 
directed toward building more urban freeways. The economic growth of urban areas is 
believed to be positively associated with urban freeways. However, the study finds that 
this is not always the case. Five out of twenty-one cities investigated have demolished 
some portions of their urban freeways; yet, their economies continue to grow despite 
claims that demolishing urban freeways impede the economic growth of urban areas. If 
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cities no longer need urban freeways, can we refute the claim that urban freeways 
positively contribute to the local economic growth and it is a folly for a city to remove its 
urban freeways? Using twenty-three urban freeway removal proposals in twenty-one 
American cities, the study finds mixed results. A number of cities successfully removed 
urban freeways and enjoy continuous economic growth. Other cities only experience 
modest if not insignificant economic impact to their economies. Some of the remaining 
cities which did not succeed in deconstructing their freeways continue to grow; other 
unsuccessful cities continue to decline and lose population. However, this result is not 
without value. I argue that this finding adds to the evidence questioning the underlying 
assumptions of the effect of urban freeways on the local economy. I have situated these 
questions in a larger effort to understand the impact of urban freeway development. 
Having done this, I should emphasize that my findings are based on 23 cases and I make 
no claims as to their generalizability. Nevertheless, we can learn a great deal from these 
cases, and I state my findings in the sections below.  
 
 
The Characteristics of the City and Urban Freeway Removal 
    
This research finds that characteristics of the city have significant influence on 
infrastructure development. A prosperous post-industrial city will opt to remove urban 
freeway and use the land previously used for freeways to build urban amenities. A 
declining, transitional industrial city, on the other hand, may have a hard time selling the 
idea of urban freeway deconstruction, as the local economy still relies on freeways to 
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transport goods and commodities to other regions. A breakdown of the characteristics of 
the city into seven conditions revealed that three of these conditions are strongly 
associated with the decision to remove urban freeways. Employment growth in the 
finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industries, a high proportion of college 
graduates, and increasing housing demand are positively associated with the city's ability 
to remove urban freeways. In a broad stroke, these three conditions reflect the 
characteristics of a prosperous post-industrial city and confirm that the post-industrial 
city is capable to implement progressive urban development.  
 
Further, my findings reveal the differences between a post-industrial city and a declining, 
transitional industrial city when both cities successfully removed urban freeways from 
their road networks. First, the economic impact of urban freeway deconstruction in the 
declining, transitional industrial city is not high as compared to the impact in the 
prosperous, post-industrial city. The declining industrial city may be able to garner 
necessary political and economic support to remove its urban freeways, yet the result is 
pale in comparison with the economic outcome of the same project in the post-industrial 
city. Second, a prosperous post-industrial city has broad support in deciding whether the 
city will remove the urban freeway; something that a declining, transitional industrial city 
does not have.  
 
The study finds that the effect of urban freeway deconstruction on the local economy is 
mixed. Housing price, as an indicator of an economic growth, continues to increase in a 
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prosperous post-industrial city, but this is not the case in a declining, transitional 
industrial city – even though both cities successfully remove their urban freeways.  
 
 
Power and Planning in the Deconstruction of Urban Freeway 
 
The study reveals that local growth coalitions are positively associated with the 
characteristics of the city. White-collar workers and professional associations drive the 
growth coalition in a prosperous post-industrial city. On the other hand, local political 
elites become the main driver of the local growth coalition in a declining, transitional 
industrial city. College graduates and holders of advanced degrees positively affect the 
decision to remove urban freeways; whereas employment growth in the manufacturing 
industry negatively influences the decision. In analyzing twenty-one cities with urban 
freeway removal proposal, the study finds that the median number of FIRE workers in 
the city that successfully removed urban freeways is five times greater than in the 
unsuccessful city. Further, the proportion of college graduates in the cities with 
successful urban freeway removal projects is 1.25 greater than cities that did not succeed 
in removing urban freeways.    
 
One possible explanation lies in the fact that white-collar workers are driven by social, 
environmental, and aesthetic considerations. They prefer to work in a work environment 
that provides ample open space and mobility alternatives to the automobile. They favor a 
local government that respects the fragility of the ecosystem by reducing the reliance on 
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automobiles. Further, they also approve of socially sensitive governance that imposes 
financial obligations on private investment to fund essential social needs such as 
affordable housing, mass transit, and parks (Rosdil 2011, 3468). These facts also confirm 
the argument that education, family structure, and other lifestyle choices replace 
traditional markers of group identity such as ethnicity, religion and occupation (Giddens, 
1990).         
 
Elazar's conceptualization of subcultures in the United States (1984) may explain why 
progressive development policy in the post-industrial city receive broad support, yet in 
the declining, transitional industrial city it only receives little attention and support. He 
defines political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in 
which each political system is imbedded (Elazar 1984, 109)." He posits that each political 
subculture views the role of government differently, partially driven by perception of 
government as service and partially by the influence of religion on morals and public 
standards. Elazarian typology differentiates American subculture into three distinct 
categories: an individualistic subculture, a moralistic subculture and traditionalistic 
subculture. Individualistic subculture treats the democratic order as a m arketplace in 
which individuals bargain and exchange to achieve private goals and politics functions 
with the values of business. Moralistic subculture views government as an arena for the 
pursuit of a communal public good and in which participation is a matter of citizenship 
duty rather than businesslike pursuit of private gain. Traditionalistic subculture is marked 
by paternalistic and elitist views of who should participate and an emphasis on t he 
preservation of the existing order. Elazarian typology helped me understand the 
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differences between a p ost-industrial city and a declining, transitional industrial city in 
terms of political culture.  
 
Drawing from this classification, the study infers that the political culture in the post-
industrial city resembles the moralistic subculture. On the other hand, the political culture 
in the declining, transitional industrial city is a mixture of paternalistic and traditionalistic 
subcultures. This may explain the broad supports for a progressive development policy in 
a post-industrial city such as San Francisco, and only a handful of support, and mostly 




A Cautionary Note: Learning from case studies  
 
This dissertation argues that characteristics of the city play a pivotal role in shaping the 
decision to remove urban freeways. A qualitative comparative analysis of twenty-one 
cities supports this thesis. Using case studies of urban freeway deconstruction in San 
Francisco and Milwaukee, this study finds that the city's political subculture affects the 
decision to remove urban freeways. However, the finding does not fully explain variance 
among similar cities. A number of post-industrial cities initiated urban freeway 
deconstruction; yet not all of them were successful in achieving that goal. While an 
examination reveals that post-industrial cities are more successful in implementing 
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freeway deconstruction, I should also point out that it is not a coincidence that these cities 
have strategic market advantages in the global economy. 
 
Because of their strategic advantages in the global economy, these cities use their 
desirability to bargain with businesses and investors (Rosdil, 2011). Prospective 
businesses and investors internalize demands from the local community as business 
requirements that should be met. This may explain why a progressive development policy 
is more successful in a post-industrial city. Once a city has made a full transition from a 
goods-producing economy to a knowledge-intensive economy, it gives political leverage 
to local elites to challenge long standing beliefs. 
 
Therefore, in a context of progressive development policy, a political subculture and an 
established position in the global economy are important as additional conditions for the 
emergence of progressive governance. Without these conditions, it is difficult for a 
progressive development policy to achieve its intended goals. 
 
 
Implications for Academic Research 
 
This research has several implications for the social scientific study of development 
policy. I will first discuss the importance of connecting urban politics, especially the 
influence of local growth coalition on urban infrastructure development, with economic 
development policies and place making strategies. Secondly, I will review the policy 
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implications for place-making strategies and economic development policies at the 
central city and neighborhood level. 
 
I began this dissertation by investigating the assumption that freeways are important to 
the local economy and asked whether there is an association between the role of urban 
freeways and place-making strategies. It is commonly assumed that urban freeways 
stimulate economic growth, yet at the same time, empirical evidence points to the 
negative effects of freeways on central cities. I directed my attention to the following 
argument: If freeways do not contribute to the local economy, then there is no need for 
cities to build more freeways. Yet, the experience points to the contrary of my argument. 
Cities keep building urban freeways for the very same reason they did a half century ago: 
to ease traffic movement and to bolster the local economy.   
 
Economists have long argued that building urban freeways stimulates the economy. They 
theorize that urban freeways have a direct positive effect on the national and local 
economy. However, a new generation of economists and urban planning scholars 
disagree with this proposition. Their studies point to evidence that central cities' 
population declines because of urban freeway development (Baum-Snow, 2007). Further, 
at the local level, urban freeway development induces employment centers to move from 
one area to another (Boarnet, 1998).  
 
Therefore, it is inaccurate to portray urban freeways in all cases as the driver of economic 
development, especially in under conditions of global economic competition. Empirical 
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evidence shows that removing urban freeways from urban road networks does not 
weaken the local economy. Indeed, a number of cities with urban freeway removal 
proposals have experienced economic growth. However, there is a cav eat to this 
proposition. It is misleading to assume that any city can remove an urban freeway and 
replace it with amenities to encourage development. Certain type of city still needs urban 
freeways because their economic bases rely on urban freeways to transport manufactured 
goods and some services. Thus far what has been absent from the scholarly discussion is 
the link between characteristics of the city, especially its demographic makeup and its 
ability to deconstruct freeways.         
 
My dissertation extends the argument that certain characteristics of the city substantively 
influence the decision to alter their physical landscape by removing freeways. What 
Florida calls “creative classes, as indicated by the number of college graduates, holders of 
advanced degrees, and advanced service industries are the main driver for influencing the 
decision to remove urban freeways. Further, these characteristics also affect the outcome 
of this decision indirectly as measured by changes in housing price. Florida (2005, 2002) 
repeatedly points to the role of creative classes in stimulating local economy. This study, 
while confirming his proposition, calls for further exploration of the links between other 
characteristics of the city, such as religion, grass-root movements, political ideology, and 






Implications for Place-Making Strategies 
 
One of the key arguments for urban freeway deconstruction is that the project will create 
an inviting environment in the city. Scholars point to the cases of Portland and San 
Francisco to emphasize the benefits of removing urban freeways and replacing them with 
urban amenities. After freeways are removed and the area is redeveloped, we see a 
remarkable change as indicated by the increasing property value and the population 
increases. While urban scholars lauded this gentrification process as a sign of a healthy 
economy, this research argues that policy-makers should approach this strategy carefully. 
Not all cities are attractive enough for creative classes and therefore cities should 
consider developing their own approach to stimulating their economies rather than 
duplicate other cities' strategies.     
 
Further, place-making strategies are indirectly influenced by the culture war in the U.S. 
The debate between those who opposed and supported urban freeway removal reflects the 
division between progressive-populist and traditionalist-individualistic cultures. Indeed, 
those who opposed urban freeway removal claim that the proposal impedes individual 
liberty and mobility, a trait that is often associated with traditionalist-individualistic 
cultures. On the other hand, the progressive-populist movements argue that removing 
urban freeways protects the urban environment and urban neighborhoods. However, both 
parties agree that the health of local economies should be the main concern in deciding 
whether to remove or retain urban freeways. This confirms Peterson's claim that urban 
politics is "above all the politics of land use (Peterson 1981, 25)." Because a city has little 
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direct control over its labor supply, a city's control of land becomes its principal vehicle 
for attracting industry.  
 
Comparing San Francisco with Milwaukee also reveals a link between local growth 
coalitions and political ideology. In both cities, local growth coalitions associated their 
policy choice with a populist approach. As they garnered enough political and economic 
supports, they were able to wield their power in resisting interventions from state 
governments. As expected, Republicans rallied behind the efforts to retain urban 
freeways while Democrats gave their supports to urban freeway removal.  
 
 
Recommendation: A framework for reinvigorating cities 
 
My findings corroborate theories of urban scholars who point out that not all cities are 
equal in terms of economic size and political influence. Therefore, any successful 
economic development policy in one city could not be directly implemented in another 
city. My study indicates that a s uccessful economic development policy in any city is 
associated with the growing role of creative classes and FIRE industries as the 
predominant sector. This implies that creative classes are the key drivers in bolstering a 
local economy and therefore it is logical that cities compete against one another to attract 
these creative classes. However, creative classes are only attracted to move to a particular 
city if there are interesting jobs available. As long as job demand is not present it is  
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difficult for any city to attract creative classes and have these groups as the economic 
driver of the local economy.  
 
I hope scholars find this dissertation useful for future research in planning, politics and 
place making strategies – not only in the U.S. but in other parts of the world.  However, 
we should approach this approach cautiously and with an eye toward recognizing urban 
differences as Allen et al. aptly put their argument (1999):  
 
Clearly cities cannot be understood as territories in any sense of being 
firmly bounded, easily demarcated or contained. But that the complexity 
of city social and political life, the diversity of economic activities and 
spaces and the multiplicity of flows and networks which operate in and 
through cities might constitute a distinctive place, a site for social, 
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Table A.1.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 659,167 305,088 343,886 46.3 52.2 
1980 806,041 302,459 490,236 37.5 60.8 
1990 934,427 303,466 615,984 32.5 65.9 
2000 1,042,030 299,024 727,041 28.7 69.8 
 
Table A.1.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 72.30 43.40 89.00 
non hispanic 1990 71.10 38.70 86.00 
    2000 66.30 31.00 78.80 
black,   1980 25.30 54.40 8.50 
non hispanic 1990 25.70 59.00 10.40 
    2000 27.20 64.00 14.30 
other races, 1980 1.40 1.20 1.50 
non hispanic 1990 2.00 1.40 2.30 
    2000 4.40 3.30 4.90 
total hispanic 1980 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(all races)   1990 1.20 1.00 1.30 
    2000 2.00 1.70 2.00 
 
Table A.1.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $50,594  $39,727  $60,164  
1979 $55,307  $37,857  $65,186  
1989 $63,237  $41,601  $73,327  










Table A.1.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not   1970 55.5 65.7 47.7 
Graduate   1980 38 51.6 30.5 
High School  1990 25.3 39.3 19.2 
    2000 18.1 31.6 13.6 
High School 1970 26.2 21 30.2 
Graduate    1980 31.8 26.7 34.8 
    1990 28.5 27.5 29 
    2000 27.1 28.2 26.9 
Some College 1970 8 6 9.6 
or Associate 1980 13.3 10.4 14.9 
Degree    1990 23.1 17.7 25.5 
    2000 25.6 21.1 27.1 
    1970 10.3 7.2 12.5 
College   1980 16.9 11.3 19.8 
Graduate or 1990 23.1 15.5 26.3 




























Table A.2.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 433,392 166,101 238,399 38.3 55.0 
1980 471,805 156,393 285,918 33.1 60.6 
1990 490,179 151,887 309,743 31.0 63.2 
2000 508,779 145,320 335,672 28.6 66.0 
 
Table A.2.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 88.30 69.60 96.90 
non hispanic 1990 86.30 63.20 96.20 
    2000 82.50 51.80 93.90 
black,   1980 9.10 26.30 1.20 
non hispanic 1990 10.10 30.40 1.40 
    2000 11.50 36.60 2.10 
other races, 1980 1.30 1.40 1.20 
non hispanic 1990 1.60 1.70 1.50 
    2000 3.10 4.10 2.70 
total hispanic 1980 1.30 2.70 0.70 
(all races)   1990 2.00 4.70 0.90 
    2000 2.90 7.50 1.30 
 
Table A.2.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $51,495  $38,395  $60,152  
1979 $51,617  $34,258  $59,533  
1989 $48,589  $31,976  $57,511  










Table A.2.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not   1970 49.6 60.9 42.1 
Graduate   1980 34.6 46.2 29 
High School  1990 23.7 32.7 19.5 
    2000 17 25.4 13.9 
High School 1970 31.2 25.1 34.8 
Graduate    1980 36.3 30.4 38.7 
    1990 32.7 29.2 33.7 
    2000 31.2 29.1 31.4 
Some College 1970 9.6 7.3 11.3 
or Associate 1980 14.6 12.3 15.9 
Degree    1990 24.8 22.1 26.1 
    2000 28.6 27.2 29.1 
College   1970 9.6 6.7 11.8 
Graduate or 1980 14.5 11.1 16.4 
Advanced Degree  1990 18.8 16 20.6 




























Table A.3.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 2,325,292 1,206,909 1,007,534 51.9 43.3 
1980 2,684,812 1,173,758 1,380,321 43.7 51.4 
1990 2,844,080 1,130,888 1,572,738 39.8 55.3 
2000 3,120,046 1,148,253 1,799,757 36.8 57.7 
 
Table A.3.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 69.80 43.20 90.00 
non hispanic 1990 66.30 38.20 84.70 
    2000 58.00 31.30 73.90 
black,   1980 19.60 39.50 4.50 
non hispanic 1990 19.00 38.70 6.40 
    2000 18.60 36.40 8.50 
other races, 1980 2.60 3.20 2.10 
non hispanic 1990 3.60 3.90 3.40 
    2000 6.20 6.30 6.30 
total hispanic 1980 8.10 14.00 3.30 
(all races)   1990 11.10 19.20 5.50 
    2000 17.10 26.00 11.30 
 
Table A.3.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $57,522  $46,666  $71,452  
1979 $60,245  $45,215  $72,851  
1989 $62,807  $45,504  $75,064  










Table A.3.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 46 56.1 35.8 
Graduate 
 
1980 32.4 43.8 23.9 
High School  1990 23.3 34 16.5 
  
 
2000 19 28.2 13.6 
High School 1970 30.8 26.5 35.4 
Graduate  
 
1980 32.7 28.4 36 
  
 
1990 26.6 24.6 28 
  
 
2000 24.2 23 24.9 
Some College 1970 11.5 9.3 13.8 
or Associate 1980 16.5 14 18.4 
Degree  
 
1990 25.6 21.9 28 
  
 
2000 26.7 23.3 28.7 
College 
 
1970 11.7 8.1 15 
Graduate or 1980 18.5 13.8 21.7 
Advanced Degree  1990 24.5 19.5 27.4 




























Table A.4.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 784,002 264,149 479,057 33.7 61.1 
1980 867,133 239,416 578,138 27.6 66.7 
1990 895,914 224,117 621,878 25.0 69.4 
2000 949,454 215,089 682,405 22.7 71.9 
 
Table A.4.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 81.20 52.30 92.00 
non hispanic 1990 79.40 48.00 89.80 
    2000 75.40 38.80 86.50 
black,   1980 16.10 43.50 6.40 
non hispanic 1990 17.10 46.30 8.00 
    2000 18.30 50.50 9.30 
other races, 1980 1.00 1.10 0.90 
non hispanic 1990 1.20 1.30 1.30 
    2000 2.90 3.50 2.70 
total hispanic 1980 1.80 3.10 0.70 
(all races)   1990 2.30 4.40 0.90 
    2000 3.30 7.30 1.50 
 
Table A.4.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $56,458  $41,674  $64,086  
1979 $55,921  $36,279  $63,389  
1989 $52,511  $30,835  $60,697  










Table A.4.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not   1970 45.7 62.6 37 
Graduate   1980 31.9 49.1 25.4 
High School  1990 24.5 41.2 19.1 
    2000 17.1 31 13.1 
High School 1970 34.8 27.5 38.3 
Graduate    1980 39.2 34.1 40.8 
    1990 33.3 31.4 33.6 
    2000 32.4 33.2 31.8 
Some College 1970 9.2 5.6 11.1 
or Associate 1980 14.1 10.5 15.5 
Degree    1990 23.6 19.3 24.9 
    2000 27.2 24.4 27.8 
College   1970 10.3 4.4 13.5 
Graduate or 1980 14.8 6.4 18.2 
Advanced Degree  1990 18.5 8.1 22.4 




























Table A.5.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 336,366 58,246 266,805 17.3 79.3 
1980 395,733 55,233 325,730 14.0 82.3 
1990 456,911 56,065 382,836 12.3 83.8 
2000 478,174 50,488 408,106 10.6 85.3 
 
Table A.5.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 88.10 44.60 94.70 
non hispanic 1990 83.80 30.70 91.30 
    2000 77.40 17.80 84.50 
black,   1980 6.70 33.30 2.50 
non hispanic 1990 7.90 36.30 3.60 
    2000 9.00 36.00 5.60 
other races, 1980 1.10 1.70 1.00 
non hispanic 1990 1.70 2.00 1.70 
    2000 4.10 5.60 3.80 
total hispanic 1980 4.20 20.50 1.90 
(all races)   1990 6.70 31.00 3.30 
    2000 9.60 40.50 6.10 
 
Table A.5.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $58,854  $37,851  $63,169  
1979 $58,917  $34,022  $62,807  
1989 $71,271  $38,305  $76,354  










Table A.5.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not   1970 44.2 60.2 41.1 
Graduate 
 
1980 29.8 49.2 26.9 
High School  1990 21.3 40.6 18.9 
    2000 16.4 39.2 14.1 
High School 1970 32.3 25.5 33.6 
Graduate  
 
1980 35 28.9 35.9 
  
 
1990 29.8 28.3 30 
    2000 29 30.4 28.8 
Some College 1970 10.6 7.1 11.3 
or Associate 1980 15.3 10 16 
Degree  
 
1990 23 16.7 23.8 
    2000 24.8 18 25.5 
College 
 
1970 12.9 7.2 14.1 
Graduate or 1980 19.9 11.9 21.1 
Advanced Degree  1990 26 14.4 27.4 




























Table A.6.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 292,833 129,626 149,822 44.3 51.2 
1980 360,732 126,081 219,825 35.0 60.9 
1990 389,235 123,786 249,888 31.8 64.2 
2000 436,127 120,856 298,230 27.7 68.4 
 
Table A.6.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 86.50 70.70 93.70 
non hispanic 1990 85.80 68.80 92.50 
    2000 82.00 61.90 88.60 
black,   1980 12.30 28.00 5.10 
non hispanic 1990 12.80 29.60 6.20 
    2000 13.80 32.80 7.50 
other races, 1980 0.60 0.60 0.60 
non hispanic 1990 0.90 1.00 0.80 
    2000 2.60 3.40 2.30 
total hispanic 1980 0.60 0.70 0.60 
(all races)   1990 0.50 0.60 0.50 
    2000 1.60 1.90 1.50 
 
Table A.6.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $48,426  $38,663  $56,113  
1979 $49,258  $36,270  $56,604  
1989 $47,468  $34,847  $54,499  










Table A.6.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not   1970 53.7 59.1 49.1 
Graduate   1980 37 44.5 32.8 
High School  1990 26.7 32.8 23.7 
    2000 18.7 23.9 16.6 
High School 1970 29.3 25.2 32.5 
Graduate    1980 35.9 29.9 38.9 
    1990 32.3 28 34 
    2000 31.3 28.9 32.1 
Some College 1970 8.4 7.4 9.3 
or Associate 1980 13.4 12.3 14.2 
Degree    1990 23.8 21.9 24.8 
    2000 27.8 25.9 28.5 
College   1970 8.7 8.3 9.2 
Graduate or 1980 13.7 13.3 14.1 
Advanced Degree  1990 17.2 17.2 17.5 




























Table A.7.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 446,432 245,954 188,420 55.1 42.2 
1980 519,377 253,446 247,598 48.8 47.7 
1990 559,301 253,883 283,380 45.4 50.7 
2000 615,092 248,733 339,557 40.4 55.2 
 
Table A.7.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 85.60 71.30 97.90 
non hispanic 1990 81.10 60.90 97.30 
    2000 74.40 45.40 94.00 
black,   1980 10.70 22.90 0.50 
non hispanic 1990 13.70 30.30 0.70 
    2000 15.50 36.90 1.30 
other races, 1980 1.20 1.70 0.80 
non hispanic 1990 1.90 2.90 1.00 
    2000 3.90 5.70 2.60 
total hispanic 1980 2.50 4.10 0.80 
(all races)   1990 3.40 6.00 1.00 
    2000 6.30 12.00 2.10 
 
Table A.7.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $55,920  $47,572  $66,308  
1979 $58,684  $47,364  $69,674  
1989 $55,911  $40,878  $70,219  










Table A.7.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 43.2 50.8 34.8 
Graduate 
 
1980 28.3 36.4 21.7 
High School  1990 20.3 28.5 14.5 
  
 
2000 15.5 25.2 9.9 
High School 1970 34.8 32.8 36.9 
Graduate  
 
1980 38.5 36.9 39.9 
  
 
1990 32.1 31.9 32.3 
    2000 29.1 30.2 28.4 
Some College 1970 10.9 9 13 
or Associate 1980 16.1 14.4 17.4 
Degree  
 
1990 26.3 24.8 27.3 
  
 
2000 28.4 26.3 29.7 
College   1970 11.2 7.4 15.3 
Graduate or 1980 17.1 12.3 21 
Advanced Degree  1990 21.3 14.8 25.9 




























Table A.8.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 230,083 147,212 74,271 64.0 32.3 
1980 319,475 179,041 128,001 56.0 40.1 
1990 409,497 218,898 171,912 53.5 42.0 
2000 507,024 241,392 236,937 47.6 46.7 
 
Table A.8.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 82.60 75.20 91.80 
non hispanic 1990 82.60 73.30 92.80 
    2000 78.00 64.00 90.30 
black,   1980 16.00 23.10 7.30 
non hispanic 1990 15.40 24.20 6.00 
    2000 15.50 26.70 5.80 
other races, 1980 0.70 0.90 0.30 
non hispanic 1990 1.20 1.60 0.60 
    2000 3.30 4.60 2.00 
total hispanic 1980 0.70 0.80 0.60 
(all races)   1990 0.70 0.80 0.60 
    2000 3.30 4.70 1.90 
 
Table A.8.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $41,598  $43,843  $39,353  
1979 $48,885  $47,603  $52,136  
1989 $52,290  $48,134  $57,475  










Table A.8.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 52.7 49.2 60.5 
Graduate 
 
1980 36.5 34.6 39.4 
High School  1990 26 24.6 27.7 
  
 
2000 18.6 18.9 18.6 
High School 1970 28 28.8 26.5 
Graduate  
 
1980 33 31.9 34.6 
  
 
1990 29 27.1 31.6 
    2000 28.1 24.9 31.4 
Some College 1970 9.1 9.9 7.1 
or Associate 1980 13.7 14.9 12 
Degree  
 
1990 23.6 24.7 22.3 
  
 
2000 26.4 26.5 26.2 
College   1970 10.2 12.1 6 
Graduate or 1980 16.8 18.6 14 
Advanced Degree  1990 21.4 23.6 18.4 


























New Haven, CT 
 
Table A.9.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 158,610 48,886 91,375 30.8 57.6 
1980 187,381 50,612 114,581 27.0 61.1 
1990 212,144 53,842 133,499 25.4 62.9 
2000 220,597 52,758 143,264 23.9 64.9 
 
Table A.9.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 84.90 58.80 94.80 
non hispanic 1990 80.60 49.00 92.40 
    2000 73.00 35.60 86.30 
black,   1980 10.30 31.40 3.20 
non hispanic 1990 11.80 35.50 4.20 
    2000 12.70 36.10 5.70 
other races, 1980 1.10 1.90 0.90 
non hispanic 1990 1.80 3.00 1.50 
    2000 4.50 7.00 3.90 
total hispanic 1980 3.70 8.00 1.20 
(all races)   1990 5.80 12.50 1.90 
    2000 9.80 21.40 4.10 
 
Table A.9.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $54,686  $34,741  $63,882  
1979 $53,894  $34,524  $62,709  
1989 $67,671  $44,657  $77,797  










Table A.9.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 43.2 51.8 37.2 
Graduate 
 
1980 30 39.1 25.2 
High School  1990 20.7 29 16.8 
  
 
2000 15.7 26.4 11.6 
High School 1970 32 27.6 34.2 
Graduate  
 
1980 34.6 29.7 36 
  
 
1990 30.2 27.1 30.6 
    2000 29.3 28.2 28.7 
Some College 1970 10.8 8.1 12.6 
or Associate 1980 14.9 11.5 16.4 
Degree  
 
1990 21.7 17.3 23 
  
 
2000 23.6 18.3 24.7 
College   1970 13.9 12.6 15.9 
Graduate or 1980 20.6 19.8 22.4 
Advanced Degree  1990 27.4 26.7 29.6 


























Niagara Falls, NY 
 
Table A.10.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 433,392 28,892 238,399 6.7 55.0 
1980 471,805 29,494 285,918 6.3 60.6 
1990 490,179 28,549 309,743 5.8 63.2 
2000 508,779 27,787 335,672 5.5 66.0 
 
Table A.10.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 88.30 84.80 96.90 
non hispanic 1990 86.30 81.00 96.20 
    2000 82.50 75.30 93.90 
black,   1980 9.10 12.60 1.20 
non hispanic 1990 10.10 15.30 1.40 
    2000 11.50 18.50 2.10 
other races, 1980 1.30 1.60 1.20 
non hispanic 1990 1.60 2.20 1.50 
    2000 3.10 4.20 2.70 
total hispanic 1980 1.30 1.00 0.70 
(all races)   1990 2.00 1.50 0.90 
    2000 2.90 2.00 1.30 
 
Table A.10.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $51,495  $47,584  $60,152  
1979 $51,617  $43,750  $59,533  
1989 $48,589  $35,712  $57,511  










Table A.10.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 49.6 54.3 42.1 
Graduate 
 
1980 34.6 40.2 29 
High School  1990 23.7 32.3 19.5 
  
 
2000 17 23.4 13.9 
High School 1970 31.2 32.7 34.8 
Graduate  
 
1980 36.3 38.5 38.7 
  
 
1990 32.7 36.8 33.7 
    2000 31.2 37.9 31.4 
Some College 1970 9.6 7.2 11.3 
or Associate 1980 14.6 12.1 15.9 
Degree  
 
1990 24.8 21.1 26.1 
  
 
2000 28.6 26.2 29.1 
College   1970 9.6 5.8 11.8 
Graduate or 1980 14.5 9.1 16.4 
Advanced Degree  1990 18.8 9.7 20.6 


























New Orleans, LA 
 
Table A.11.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 371,016 208,017 158,158 56.1 42.6 
1980 492,121 226,055 257,270 45.9 52.3 
1990 535,188 224,107 302,020 41.9 56.4 
2000 549,420 212,660 326,672 38.7 59.5 
 
Table A.11.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 62.40 40.30 78.60 
non hispanic 1990 59.30 33.10 75.60 
    2000 54.70 26.60 70.30 
black,   1980 32.20 54.60 15.70 
non hispanic 1990 34.50 61.60 17.70 
    2000 37.30 66.70 20.80 
other races, 1980 1.50 1.60 1.40 
non hispanic 1990 2.00 2.10 2.00 
    2000 3.70 3.60 3.70 
total hispanic 1980 3.90 3.40 4.30 
(all races)   1990 4.10 3.20 4.70 
    2000 4.40 3.10 5.20 
 
Table A.11.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $41,469  $32,572  $51,822  
1979 $46,941  $34,911  $56,956  
1989 $42,243  $31,968  $48,316  










Table A.11.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 54.7 57.7 51.6 
Graduate 
 
1980 37.3 40.8 35 
High School  1990 28.1 31.9 26 
  
 
2000 22.3 25.3 20.8 
High School 1970 26.1 22.8 29.8 
Graduate  
 
1980 32.1 27.2 35.9 
  
 
1990 29.1 23.6 32.7 
    2000 28.4 23.4 31.1 
Some College 1970 9.1 8.6 9.4 
or Associate 1980 14.6 14.2 14.7 
Degree  
 
1990 23.4 22.1 24.1 
  
 
2000 26.7 25.5 27.3 
College   1970 10.2 10.8 9.2 
Graduate or 1980 16.1 17.7 14.5 
Advanced Degree  1990 19.3 22.4 17.2 


























New York City, NY 
 
Table A.12.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 3,288,965 2,917,499 353,122 88.7 10.7 
1980 3,362,223 2,940,837 402,218 87.5 12.0 
1990 3,431,261 2,978,686 431,936 86.8 12.6 
2000 3,647,474 3,172,559 453,511 87.0 12.4 
 
Table A.12.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 56.40 51.90 83.40 
non hispanic 1990 48.10 43.40 76.70 
    2000 39.60 35.00 68.20 
black,   1980 21.90 24.00 9.60 
non hispanic 1990 23.60 25.60 11.10 
    2000 22.70 24.50 11.90 
other races, 1980 4.00 4.30 2.20 
non hispanic 1990 6.80 7.30 3.80 
    2000 12.60 13.50 6.60 
total hispanic 1980 17.70 19.90 4.80 
(all races)   1990 21.60 23.70 8.30 
    2000 25.10 27.00 13.30 
 
Table A.12.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $46,871  $44,889  $67,079  
1979 $43,182  $40,939  $66,891  
1989 $54,774  $51,598  $86,901  










Table A.12.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 50.9 53.1 35.5 
Graduate 
 
1980 37.6 39.8 24.4 
High School  1990 29.7 31.7 18.1 
  
 
2000 26 27.7 15.5 
High School 1970 28.8 28.3 32.8 
Graduate  
 
1980 30.7 30.3 33.1 
  
 
1990 26.2 26.3 25.8 
    2000 24.2 24.4 22.7 
Some College 1970 8.5 8 11.7 
or Associate 1980 13 12.6 15.6 
Degree  
 
1990 19.4 19 21.9 
  
 
2000 20.7 20.4 22.2 
College   1970 11.8 10.6 20 
Graduate or 1980 18.7 17.3 26.9 
Advanced Degree  1990 24.6 23 34.2 




























Table A.13.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 380,021 151,838 212,111 40.0 55.8 
1980 537,890 167,830 350,180 31.2 65.1 
1990 617,174 197,948 398,241 32.1 64.5 
2000 781,506 236,296 485,416 30.2 62.1 
 
Table A.13.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 92.30 85.30 95.00 
non hispanic 1990 89.80 83.10 92.60 
    2000 81.60 75.50 84.10 
black,   1980 2.50 7.50 0.60 
non hispanic 1990 2.70 7.50 0.60 
    2000 2.60 6.50 1.00 
other races, 1980 3.20 5.10 2.50 
non hispanic 1990 4.30 6.40 3.30 
    2000 8.40 11.20 7.10 
total hispanic 1980 2.00 2.10 2.00 
(all races)   1990 3.30 3.00 3.40 
    2000 7.40 6.80 7.80 
 
Table A.13.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $48,607  $39,195  $54,868  
1979 $53,563  $43,682  $59,586  
1989 $53,700  $44,278  $59,110  










Table A.13.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 37.6 39.6 36.3 
Graduate 
 
1980 22 24.2 20.6 
High School  1990 15.7 17.1 14.8 
  
 
2000 12.8 14.3 11.9 
High School 1970 35.4 33.4 36.7 
Graduate  
 
1980 36.4 32.2 38.3 
  
 
1990 26.9 24.9 27.6 
    2000 23.8 22.2 24.3 
Some College 1970 14.5 14.6 14.3 
or Associate 1980 22.1 21.5 22.4 
Degree  
 
1990 34.2 32 35.1 
  
 
2000 34.5 30.8 35.9 
College   1970 12.5 12.4 12.7 
Graduate or 1980 19.6 22.1 18.7 
Advanced Degree  1990 23.3 25.9 22.5 




























Table A.14.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 323,743 105,501 218,242 32.6 67.4 
1980 380,332 102,603 277,729 27.0 73.0 
1990 414,605 101,066 313,539 24.4 75.6 
2000 444,391 99,571 344,820 22.4 77.6 
 
Table A.14.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 89.40 67.70 96.10 
non hispanic 1990 86.90 58.60 94.70 
    2000 82.20 44.30 91.70 
black,   1980 7.50 25.40 2.10 
non hispanic 1990 8.70 31.00 2.50 
    2000 9.90 37.40 3.10 
other races, 1980 1.10 1.50 1.00 
non hispanic 1990 1.60 2.20 1.50 
    2000 3.50 5.50 3.00 
total hispanic 1980 1.90 5.40 0.80 
(all races)   1990 2.80 8.20 1.30 
    2000 4.30 12.80 2.20 
 
Table A.14.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $56,224  $42,966  $62,391  
1979 $56,580  $40,310  $62,464  
1989 $58,828  $39,421  $64,735  










Table A.14.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 43.7 56.8 38.2 
Graduate 
 
1980 29.7 42 26 
High School  1990 21 31.2 18.3 
  
 
2000 15.6 27 13.1 
High School 1970 32 27.1 34.1 
Graduate  
 
1980 35.4 30.9 36.8 
  
 
1990 30.5 27.7 31.2 
    2000 29.2 28.6 29.3 
Some College 1970 11.5 8.3 12.9 
or Associate 1980 16.2 13.2 17.1 
Degree  
 
1990 25.6 22.1 26.6 
  
 
2000 28.1 24.2 29 
College   1970 12.8 7.8 14.9 
Graduate or 1980 18.7 13.9 20.2 
Advanced Degree  1990 22.9 19 23.9 


























San Francisco, CA 
 
Table A.15.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 571,065 310,378 260,687 54.4 45.6 
1980 641,625 316,351 325,274 49.3 50.7 
1990 676,348 326,966 349,382 48.3 51.7 
2000 704,700 342,686 362,014 48.6 51.4 
 
Table A.15.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 65.20 52.30 76.00 
non hispanic 1990 57.90 46.80 67.00 
    2000 51.20 43.60 57.30 
black,   1980 8.40 12.50 5.00 
non hispanic 1990 7.40 10.60 4.70 
    2000 5.20 7.60 3.20 
other races, 1980 15.30 22.90 8.80 
non hispanic 1990 20.60 29.20 13.60 
    2000 26.80 34.70 20.40 
total hispanic 1980 11.10 12.30 10.20 
(all races)   1990 14.10 13.30 14.80 
    2000 16.80 14.10 19.10 
 
Table A.15.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $49,723  $39,546  $64,665  
1979 $56,663  $46,885  $67,275  
1989 $70,060  $57,811  $81,135  










Table A.15.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 32.5 38.2 26.4 
Graduate 
 
1980 20.8 26 16.1 
High School  1990 17.6 22 13.7 
  
 
2000 15.8 18.8 13.1 
High School 1970 31.7 29.4 34.2 
Graduate  
 
1980 27.4 25.1 29.5 
  
 
1990 19.2 18.2 20 
    2000 15 13.9 16.1 
Some College 1970 17.6 15.7 19.7 
or Associate 1980 23.1 20.6 25.3 
Degree  
 
1990 28.4 24.8 31.5 
  
 
2000 25.6 22.3 28.5 
College   1970 18.2 16.7 19.7 
Graduate or 1980 28.7 28.2 29.1 
Advanced Degree  1990 34.9 35 34.8 




























Table A.16.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 523,293 221,904 261,959 42.4 50.1 
1980 671,088 229,927 387,956 34.3 57.8 
1990 846,738 248,279 530,430 29.3 62.6 
2000 999,910 268,697 645,030 26.9 64.5 
 
Table A.16.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 88.90 78.40 93.50 
non hispanic 1990 85.60 73.80 89.90 
    2000 76.30 67.90 79.30 
black,   1980 3.50 9.30 1.00 
non hispanic 1990 3.90 9.80 1.90 
    2000 4.30 8.30 3.10 
other races, 1980 5.60 9.70 3.80 
non hispanic 1990 7.90 13.10 5.80 
    2000 14.20 18.60 12.40 
total hispanic 1980 2.00 2.60 1.80 
(all races)   1990 2.60 3.30 2.40 
    2000 5.20 5.30 5.10 
 
Table A.16.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $54,838  $43,451  $61,929  
1979 $60,061  $48,031  $66,199  
1989 $62,505  $50,785  $67,635  










Table A.16.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 32.2 34.9 30.7 
Graduate 
 
1980 18.3 20.3 17.4 
High School  1990 12.3 13.6 11.9 
  
 
2000 9.9 10.5 9.7 
High School 1970 36.2 33.2 39.1 
Graduate  
 
1980 35.1 29.9 38.4 
  
 
1990 24.6 19.6 26.9 
    2000 20.9 15.3 23.3 
Some College 1970 15.8 15.5 15.6 
or Associate 1980 22.8 21.6 23.2 
Degree  
 
1990 33.6 28.9 35.6 
  
 
2000 33.3 27 35.8 
College   1970 15.9 16.3 14.6 
Graduate or 1980 23.8 28.1 20.9 
Advanced Degree  1990 29.5 37.9 25.7 




























Table A.17.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 226,350 71,746 143,339 31.7 63.3 
1980 266,334 73,148 180,910 27.5 67.9 
1990 289,678 71,392 205,650 24.6 71.0 
2000 303,677 68,011 223,050 22.4 73.4 
 
Table A.17.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 93.40 80.50 97.60 
non hispanic 1990 91.50 73.80 96.90 
    2000 88.00 62.40 94.80 
black,   1980 4.50 15.50 0.80 
non hispanic 1990 5.50 19.90 1.10 
    2000 6.30 24.60 1.50 
other races, 1980 1.30 2.40 1.00 
non hispanic 1990 1.70 3.70 1.20 
    2000 3.60 7.70 2.60 
total hispanic 1980 0.90 1.70 0.60 
(all races)   1990 1.20 2.50 0.80 
    2000 2.10 5.30 1.20 
 
Table A.17.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $47,198  $35,209  $53,593  
1979 $49,914  $36,409  $55,771  
1989 $53,126  $36,752  $59,191  










Table A.17.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 42.9 47.6 40.1 
Graduate 
 
1980 30.3 36.4 27.4 
High School  1990 21.2 28.8 18.4 
  
 
2000 16.2 23.8 13.9 
High School 1970 34.1 30.2 36 
Graduate  
 
1980 37.4 31.7 39.5 
  
 
1990 33.1 27.4 34.9 
    2000 32.2 29 32.9 
Some College 1970 10.5 9.1 11.2 
or Associate 1980 15.5 14 16 
Degree  
 
1990 24.9 21.8 25.7 
  
 
2000 27.5 23.9 28.4 
College   1970 12.6 13.1 12.7 
Graduate or 1980 16.9 17.9 17 
Advanced Degree  1990 20.8 22 21 




























Table A.18.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 96,400 35,199 61,201 36.5 63.5 
1980 111,530 35,789 75,741 32.1 67.9 
1990 123,494 33,551 89,943 27.2 72.8 
2000 132,897 33,801 99,096 25.4 74.6 
 
Table A.18.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 77.10 46.20 90.30 
non hispanic 1990 72.70 37.80 85.70 
    2000 64.20 24.60 77.00 
black,   1980 17.80 44.90 6.20 
non hispanic 1990 18.30 48.10 7.20 
    2000 19.40 50.90 9.20 
other races, 1980 1.60 0.90 2.00 
non hispanic 1990 3.20 0.80 4.10 
    2000 6.70 2.90 8.00 
total hispanic 1980 3.40 8.00 1.50 
(all races)   1990 5.70 13.20 3.00 
    2000 9.70 21.50 5.80 
 
Table A.18.3 median household income  
  MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969 $50,980  $38,091  $58,697  
1979 $57,118  $35,998  $67,162  
1989 $71,328  $44,497  $81,912  










Table A.18.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 47.2 63.8 38.2 
Graduate 
 
1980 32.2 50.4 24.9 
High School  1990 22.9 41.8 16.3 
  
 
2000 18.2 37.6 12.4 
High School 1970 29.6 25.2 32 
Graduate  
 
1980 32.9 31.9 33.3 
  
 
1990 27.3 30.1 26.3 
    2000 25.6 32 23.7 
Some College 1970 9.1 6 10.8 
or Associate 1980 13.1 10 14.3 
Degree  
 
1990 20.3 17.6 21.3 
  
 
2000 22.3 21.2 22.6 
College   1970 14.1 5.1 19 
Graduate or 1980 21.8 7.7 27.4 
Advanced Degree  1990 29.5 10.5 36.1 




























Table A.19.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 1,046,201 278,393 683,787 26.6 65.4 
1980 1,329,203 276,792 959,609 20.8 72.2 
1990 1,663,493 276,610 1,278,136 16.6 76.8 
2000 1,927,527 272,591 1,535,157 14.1 79.6 
 
Table A.19.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 68.40 25.70 77.90 
non hispanic 1990 64.50 27.40 70.60 
    2000 56.10 27.80 59.50 
black,   1980 25.60 69.70 16.10 
non hispanic 1990 25.10 65.30 18.80 
    2000 25.70 59.40 22.00 
other races, 1980 3.20 1.80 3.40 
non hispanic 1990 5.10 2.10 5.60 
    2000 9.40 4.90 10.00 
total hispanic 1980 2.80 2.80 2.60 
(all races)   1990 5.20 5.20 4.90 
    2000 8.80 7.90 8.50 
 
Table A.19.3 median household income  
    MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969   $55,809  $39,663  $64,314  
1979   $65,821  $47,904  $72,239  
1989   $79,415  $53,162  $84,998  










Table A.19.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 34.2 44.8 31 
Graduate 
 
1980 22.3 32.9 19.8 
High School  1990 15.7 26.9 13.7 
  
 
2000 13.3 22.2 12 
High School 1970 30.5 26.2 32.1 
Graduate  
 
1980 29.6 25.5 31 
  
 
1990 22.8 21.2 23.4 
    2000 20.7 20.6 21.1 
Some College 1970 13.6 11.2 14.2 
or Associate 1980 17.4 14.1 18.2 
Degree  
 
1990 24.5 18.6 25.9 
  
 
2000 24.2 18.2 25.4 
College   1970 21.8 17.8 22.7 
Graduate or 1980 30.7 27.5 30.9 
Advanced Degree  1990 37 33.3 37 


























Oklahoma City, OK 
 
Table A.20.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 255,084 138,479 90,348 54.3 35.4 
1980 351,964 177,030 136,708 50.3 38.8 
1990 423,256 211,804 164,126 50.0 38.8 
2000 463,483 227,018 182,571 49.0 39.4 
 
Table A.20.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 84.50 78.70 89.80 
non hispanic 1990 79.80 73.10 85.60 
    2000 72.90 64.70 80.40 
black,   1980 9.10 14.50 4.80 
non hispanic 1990 10.40 15.80 6.30 
    2000 10.40 15.20 6.80 
other races, 1980 4.20 4.00 3.80 
non hispanic 1990 6.40 6.40 5.80 
    2000 9.90 10.00 9.00 
total hispanic 1980 2.20 2.80 1.60 
(all races)   1990 3.40 4.80 2.30 
    2000 6.70 10.10 3.80 
 
Table A.20.3 median household income  
    MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969   $41,972  $42,311  $46,503  
1979   $48,572  $47,006  $53,028  
1989   $46,511  $44,535  $50,465  










Table A.20.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 40.8 41.6 40.3 
Graduate 
 
1980 27 27.6 27 
High School  1990 20.8 21.8 20.4 
  
 
2000 16.4 18.7 14.7 
High School 1970 32.2 31.5 35.1 
Graduate  
 
1980 35 34.2 38.1 
  
 
1990 27.5 26.5 30 
    2000 27.8 26.2 30.7 
Some College 1970 14.1 14.3 13.6 
or Associate 1980 19.2 19.3 18.8 
Degree  
 
1990 30.1 30.2 30.4 
  
 
2000 31.4 31.2 32.1 
College   1970 12.9 12.6 11 
Graduate or 1980 18.8 18.9 16.1 
Advanced Degree  1990 21.6 21.6 19.2 




























Table A.21.1 housing units by occupancy status 
  housing units percentage 
  MSA central city suburbs 
central 
city suburbs 
1970 281,507 68,136 143,173 24.2 50.9 
1980 331,307 67,495 183,646 20.4 55.4 
1990 367,203 66,662 215,440 18.2 58.7 
2000 389,825 67,567 235,193 17.3 60.3 
 
Table A.21.2 race/ethnicity groups as percent of total population 
      race & ethnicity 
      MSA central city suburbs 
white,    1980 93.40 78.60 97.00 
non hispanic 1990 89.20 64.90 95.20 
    2000 81.20 45.80 91.30 
black,   1980 2.70 11.50 0.70 
non hispanic 1990 3.40 12.60 1.10 
    2000 4.00 12.70 1.60 
other races, 1980 1.70 4.20 1.10 
non hispanic 1990 2.80 7.70 1.50 
    2000 5.60 11.50 3.60 
total hispanic 1980 2.10 5.80 1.20 
(all races)   1990 4.60 14.80 2.10 
    2000 9.20 30.00 3.50 
 
Table A.21.3 median household income  
    MSA 
central 
city suburbs 
1969   $46,327  $32,525  $51,360  
1979   $46,663  $33,797  $52,949  
1989   $55,032  $38,317  $62,804  










Table A.21.4 Percent of Persons Aged 25 or more by Highest 
Educational Attainment  
      MSA central city suburbs 
Did Not 
 
1970 56.2 59.4 51.5 
Graduate 
 
1980 41.6 46.6 36.4 
High School  1990 30.4 37.2 25.3 
  
 
2000 24 34.2 19.1 
High School 1970 27.6 24.3 30.3 
Graduate  
 
1980 32 27.3 33.9 
  
 
1990 29.2 25 30 
    2000 28.1 23.1 28.3 
Some College 1970 7.8 6.6 8.7 
or Associate 1980 12.4 10.4 13.8 
Degree  
 
1990 20.8 16.1 22.7 
  
 
2000 24.3 18.3 25.8 
College   1970 8.4 9.7 9.5 
Graduate or 1980 14 15.7 15.9 
Advanced Degree  1990 19.7 21.6 22 
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